of the first to all entries which had been previously made. Between the two acts, no rational doubt can exist that all claims are included, whether John Armstrong's, military, or county. The words are general, and why should we seek to restrict their meaning? We shall be able to show there is no reason for such restrictive interpretation.

With the counsel for the plaintiff, we admit the legislature designed to set aside a particular tract of country for the [148] satisfaction of the military claims and pre-emption settlers, etc., therein; this is described in the seventh section of the Act of 1783, c. 3, and that agreeably to this and the eighth section, those claims and no others were to be appropriated within those limits; agreeably to the case Goodloe's Lessee v. Wilson, if laid without those limits, under the laws of North Carolina, such grants would be void. We also admit that the country south of French Broad River and Holston was set aside as Indian hunting ground, and appropriations of any kind forbidden therein. (April, 1778, c. 3, § 5; 1783, c. 2, § 5.) But we say that the balance of the State of North Carolina (including now this State), agreeably to these two Acts of April, 1784, c. 14, § 7, and October, 1784, c. 19, § 6, was equally open to appropriation, without regard to county or John Armstrong's bounds. It is asked, why should the military tract and Indian hunting ground be excluded from general appropriation? It is replied, because the acts respecting these portions of country negatived the idea of any others entering or appropriating lands therein; these provisions have no connection with the general law, or that respecting the county and John Armstrong's office. (1783, c. 3, §§ 2, 3.)

The acts respecting the military and Indian lands had only passed about a year before the first of the two respecting removals; compensation to the officers and soldiers of the Revolution, and the rights of the Indians, were important objects to the State. Very few of the officers and soldiers had located their lands in April or October, 1784; and it was of the last consequence to the public that the Indians should be protected in their hunting grounds. If there were no negative words in the acts respecting the military and Indian lands, it is clear the legislature did not intend by its Acts of April, 1784, c. 14, § 7,

and October, 1784, c. 19, § 6, to authorize individuals to appropriate lands within those tracts or portions of country by removal.

Is there any reason that can be advanced why any other parts of the country should be excluded from appropriation by removal or the operation of these two sections? The first expressly says, that in case of loss by better claims, the enterers may remove to any other vacant land within the State. Our opponents say the State received a higher price for John Armstrong's lands than those entered in the counties. This is a point on which much stress has been laid; we will therefore proceed to examine it. It is clear the legislature, by the Act of 1783, c. 2, designed to include in [149] the provisions of that act county claims, as well as those in John Armstrong's office or her western lands. When the legislature designed by that act to confine a regulation to John Armstrong's office, it was so expressed, otherwise the enactments are general, of which denomination is the price of land. (§ 10.) To show this, we will examine every section of the act. Without exhausting the patience of the court, we have only to observe that the caption is general, the preamble is equally so; the second section revives the county offices which had been shut; the language of the third section is, "that the western boundary be enlarged," etc., describing this extension. The fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth sections respect Indian lands; the ninth section is confined to John Armstrong's office. The tenth section respects the price of lands. Is it confined to John Armstrong's lands? Its words are, "every person, before he shall be entitled to enter a claim for any of the said lands"; what lands, is the question. We say any lands in the State entered in any office. (See Caption, §§ 1, 2, and first part of § 3.)

Thus it already appears that the price of lands in North Carolina, not only in the county but John Armstrong's office, was ten pounds per hundred; the price of lands before that time was fifty shillings. This every man knows who entered lands in those days. Ask all our old settlers, and they will tell you this. Gentlemen on the other side tell us ours are county warrants; if so, we would ask them to tell us whether they were at fifty shillings or ten pounds; the first was the price of county lands till

June, 1781, when those offices were shut, and raised to ten pounds by the Act of 1783, when the second section of the act opened them again. We have another remark to make on this part of the case, that fifty shillings in 1777 and 1778 was of more intrinsic value than ten pounds in certificates, etc., in 1783. Certificates might then be purchased for an eighth and a tenth; it was their common price. So that the State received a better price for the lands sold previous to 1781 than after it opened its offices in 1784. Money had vastly depreciated in the course of the Revolution, and certificates so plenty as to be worth almost nothing. The idea of difference of price, so much insisted on, therefore vanishes. We find that the State, until the offices were shut in 1781, made no difference in the price of its lands; nor did it on opening the offices in 1783; the price was all the same in the counties as well as John Armstrong's office; it was raised, to be sure, from fifty shillings to ten pounds. In the session of April and May, 1784, when it authorized removals, there [150] was no entry office for western lands; all the entries that ever were made for lands in this country were then in existence, and no more were permitted. In this state of things was there any possible reason why removals should be confined to counties, or John Armstrong's bounds kept free, or excluded from the general words of the Acts of April, 1784, c. 14, § 7; October, 1784, c. 19, § 6?

Claimants in Armstrong's office were on an equal footing with those in the country; when their money was paid they made entries, and thus had an opportunity of making at once a choice. If lost by better claims, they should be on the same footing as to removals; that is, anywhere in the State where they could find vacant land, except within the military and Indian lands.

In dismissing this inquiry into the meaning of the Act of 1783, c. 2, we have only to observe that the court will perceive that the ninth, fourteenth, and twenty-fourth sections of the act are confined to J. Armstrong's claims; the balance of the act is general. (See § 22.) Why should boundary make any difference? No reason can be seen why John Armstrong's bounds should be exempted from removals; the price, we have seen, was the same in all parts of the State. If any doubt could

remain on this point the Act of North Carolina, 1790, c. 14, Caption, and § 2, places it out of dispute. This act expressly refers to and repeals part of the Act of 1783, c. 2, reducing the price of lands from ten pounds to thirty shillings. At this time North Carolina had not a foot of land in the limits which were assigned to John Armstrong's office.

That part of the plaintiff's argument respecting removals which confines them to the limits of the county in which the entries were made is refuted by the opinion of the legislature of North Carolina, as expressed in its Act of 1794, c. 17, § 3. This section enacts that in future warrants shall not be removed out of the county. The act had no obligatory force here, having been made since the cession; but it is a legislative construction of the Acts of April, 1784, c. 14, § 6; October, 1784, c. 19, § 7, the force and obligation of which are common to both States.

In this construction of the acts respecting removals, we are futher opposed by the plaintiff's counsel calling to their aid the doctrine of refunding purchase-money in case of loss by better claims. The Acts of November, 1777, c. 1, § 6; [151] April, 1778, c. 3, §§ 2, 5, are referred to. The principle of these acts is contained in the second section of the Act of 1778; it provides that if on survey it shall appear that part of the entry be lost by an older or better claim, the entry taker shall refund in proportion to the part lost.

We are told that this is the only provision for county claims, and that removals were intended solely for John Armstrong's claims. We have already at length examined this point; some other and further views will be taken of it. The Acts of April, 1784, c. 14, § 7; October, 1784, c. 19, § 6, in this respect are cumulative. (Camp. 214; 2 Hayw. 227, 228; 2 Cranch, 389.)

This idea is confirmed by the legislative opinion of North Carolina, 1794, c. 17, § 3. The proviso to the fifth section of the Act of North Carolina, 1791, c. 21, is in further confirmation of this idea. That act provides a method by which entry takers should proceed in refunding money where part of tracts has been lost, agreeably to the principle laid down in the Act of April, 1778, c. 3, § 2. The proviso excludes the ceded territory (this country) from the operation of the act. Not only

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from the fact of North Carolina having parted with all interest in the lands of this country (1789, c. 3), but from this proviso we must be convinced that the State would never agree to refund money for lands lost by better claims here. Nor has it ever been contended that entries from that State could be removed to this since the cession; and vice versa.

Should any doubt remain that the power of removal given by the Act of 1784 is merely cumulative, the opinion of the legislature of North Carolina thereon, as expressed in the Act of 1793, c. 23, § 5, is decisive. These are the express words: "That it shall not be lawful for any person making an entry of land to withdraw the same, but all entrance moneys shall be paid by the respective entry takers into the public treasury; and in case of deficiencies when the land entered shall be surveyed, the persons entering may avail themselves of the mode of relief already pointed out by law"; that is, by removal.

The Cession Act of North Carolina 1789, c. 3, § 1, second edition, has been relied upon. It is asserted that admitting the Acts of April and October, 1784, authorize removals, the Cession Act repeals them. We admit that so far as any of the [152] provisions of the Cession Act are contrary to those of prior date, those acts are repealed; but we insist there is nothing in the Cession Act that countenances the idea contended for on the other side. This act, after providing for the removal of military and John Armstrong's claims, particularly has this clause:

"And where entries have been made agreeably to law, and titles under them not perfected by grant or otherwise, then and in that case the governor for the time being shall, and he is hereby required to, perfect from time to time such titles in such manner as if this act had never been passed; and that all entries made by, or grants made to, all and every person and persons whatsoever, agreeably to law, and within the limits hereby intended to be ceded to the United States, shall have the same force and effect as if such cession had not been made."

The eighth condition of the same act provides that the laws of North Carolina shall continue in force.

Before the cession the titles might be perfected by removal; so it remained afterwards; no alteration was made by the Cession Act in this respect.