We feel and know, that many ideas have their origin in the mind, from their connection with outward objects; such as existence, non-existence, possibility or impossibility, contradiction, probability or doubt: but we also feel and know, that there is a cause within us capable of reasoning on these ideas; which, by bringing them in opposition to each other, judges of the different relations which they possess, the one to the other, and the conformity or opposition there is between them.

This intellectual power within us, which calculates, which compares ideas, the one with the other; which is capable of comprehending in that one word, God! the Creator of the universe; the Maker of heaven and earth, and all which they contain; which beholds in one glance, void and space, mass and matter; which, with perfect ease, glides into the future; or which, with equal celerity, brings the past into the same view with the present. This intellectual power, this eternal existence within us, for we feel it to be so, must be of a nature distinguished essentially from all bodily substance; inasmuch as it has a power and actions so different from, and superior to matter, of whatsoever kind its component parts may be. The soul within the human body, with regard to its ideas, may be, not inaptly, compared to a painter in his chamber, examining and arranging his pictures.

In those constituted signs in use among mankind to make themselves intelligible to each other; such as speech, writing, or any other given sign; we clearly see the superiority of the soul over the body, and the difference which exists, between that which is essential to matter, and that which is immaterial in all cases we find these to be as disproportioned to each other, as the word of God is to what the soul comprehends in that single term. For instance; a fire lighted on the top of a hill, or the height of a tower, may convey to the mind of the leader of an army, that the place is besieged and in imminent danger of being compelled to surrender. Let us search as far as we please into the nature of any appointed sign, whether by word or figure, and we shall discover as much difference between the being which reasons within the human body, and the actions of that body itself, as between the fire on the hill or tower, and the idea, which it gives birth to in the mind of the General, that the place is ready to surrender.

With regard to the will of man, we shall from that source, in as few words as we can, draw a further proof in favour of our argument. I move my finger; I do it, not from any natural impulse, but because it is my will to do so. This action is entirely voluntary on my part in it, then, we have not only a convincing proof of the na

ture of the soul, but of the existence of God; for I feel, and am thoroughly persuaded, that my finger moves or remains still, according to my pleasure, and that my will is the origin of the movement. I am convinced, by my own feelings, that this indifferent action is determined by my will alone; and that it has power to change its determination in an instant. Then, as by this it is proved, that there are in nature beings actuated by will in various matters, it is not difficult to believe, that the one self-existent, intelligent Being, from whom all other beings derive their existence, from whom man obtains his intellect, is capable of doing every thing by will, or, to use a more proper expression, is omnipotent. But to reason a little further on the subject of will, we admit, that to act by the will is to act by the knowledge of the power which one has so to act; and this knowledge the body cannot be possessed of, for we have before proved, that knowledge is not a component part of matter. To act by will also consists in a perfect freedom of action, without being determined on or acted upon by any other cause; but it is clear, that the motion of every species of matter is produced, by its following the impression which it has received, without having in itself the least capa

bility of altering its course.

As soon as any given

body receives an impulse capable of carrying it

through any given space, the impression necessarily produces the effect. Should we not consider it as a miracle, if a ball, which had been driven by a blow towards the East, should retrace its track towards the West, without having received any different impulse. It is surely, then, against reason to believe, that all the variations, which I make at discretion, in the movements of my hands, or of any of my fingers, are made only by the motion of these members themselves, which motion is necessarily impressed on them without any assistance of my will. But it is entirely in conformity with the experience, the feeling, and the knowledge which we have of ourselves, to admit a direction in all these actions guided only by will. It is readily allowed, that the human body is a machine composed of many thousand springs, which are susceptible of numberless impressions from outward causes, which consequently produce many different movements: but, in the example proposed as above, the arbitrary movement of a finger, it cannot be denied, and our own feelings convince us, that the will is the first principle of the action; wherefore it amounts to a demonstration, that there are in the universe beings, who act solely and entirely by will, and are consequently not material. I only desire then to be answered with candour: Is it not more reasonable to consider the body, in many of its ac

tions, as making known some of the thousand, thousand ideas, thoughts and reflections, which are generated in the soul of man, rather than to believe it only impressed with blind motion. I will not here argue whether my will is the true cause, or only the occasional cause, of the motion of my finger; of what consequence is it, whether this motion is the proper effect, or the simple result of my will? But we must necessarily agree either, that the will acts effectually on the body, or that there must be in the universe a Cause superior to the will, which fulfils all its desires the instant that they are formed. Thus, which ever way we turn, in pursuing the subject, we arrive at the same conclusion: we fully admit the existence of a Being who acts solely by will. Shall any one pretend to assert, that the body has been regulated, from the commencement of its existence, necessarily to produce, by virtue of its springs, all those, the least of those motions, which the will directs; and that the soul has been united to the body, to have also, at the same instant, a perception and a will in perfect agreement with every motion, with which the body has been from its first formation so impressed!

If the infidel agrees to such a system as this, I would only ask him further to inform me, who is the author of this beautiful, harmonious, and perfect union? For, indisputably we behold in it a