isiana to France, she bound herself to give back what France had given her in 1762, and not what England had given her in 1783. It was, in the language of the treaty, to be the "Province of Louisiana with the same extent it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States." To the minds of Jefferson and Madison the meaning of these words was that the United States had purchased West Florida. Their reasoning was, this: Spain in 1800 owned West Florida. West Florida was once a part of Louisiana. Spain in 1800 receded Louisiana to France. She therefore receded West Florida. Had such reasoning been applied to a real estate transaction in private life the folly would have been at once apparent. The treaty of 1800 was a treaty of recession. Spain then gave back to France what France had given to her in 1762, and nothing more nor less. In 1762 Spain did not own West Florida. She could not, therefore, in 1800, have receded it to France. But neither Jefferson nor Madison would stop with the treaty of 1762. Frenchmen had built Biloxi and Mobile. The authority of Frenchmen had once been obeyed on the banks of the Perdido, and that much of West Florida at least they were determined to have. To get it, Spain must be pacified, and, as a first step toward pacification, the convention of 1802 was ratified. After the close of the first Napoleonic war a demand had been made on Spain for indemnity. French privateers had been fitted out in Spanish ports to prey upon the shipping of the United States. Scores of American vessels had been condemned by French consuls resident on Spanish soil. Spanish subjects, under the pretended blockade of Gibraltar, had seized every American vessel that came there for convoy through the Mediterranean sea. For the depredations of the Spaniards Spain was ready to make redress; but for the actions of the Frenchmen she would not pay one single piaster. Finding her determined, the American Minister gave way and a convention was drawn up in August, 1802. This provided indemnity for the spoliation of Americans by subjects of Spain, but left the damage done by Frenchmen to be settled in the 1803. SPANISH SPOLIATION CLAIMS. 35 future. Angry at the failure to provide for both sets of claims, the Senate refused to act; the convention went over to the following session, and the American Minister at the Court of Madrid was instructed to again try to have provision for French spoliations inserted.* This he did, and was assured that the demand could not be listened to; that it was wholly incompatible with the law of nations, and had been pronounced so by the most esteemed lawyers in the United States, some of whom then held office under the Government. Not long after the convention of 1802 reached the United States, Yrujo, well knowing that the omission of the French claims would lead to trouble, submitted the question of their justness to five lawyers of high standing. Two of them were Jared Ingersoll and William Rawle, leaders of the Philadelphia bar. A third was Joseph B. McKean, son of the Governor of Pennsylvania and brother-in-law of Yrujo. The fourth was Peter Stephen Du Ponceau; the fifth was Edward Livingston. Concealing the names of the powers, Yrujo stated the case in these words: "The Power A (Spain) lives in perfect harmony and friendship with Power B (the United States). The Power C (France), either with reason or without reason, commits hostilities against the subjects of the Power B, takes some of their vessels, carries them into the ports of A, friend to both, where they are condemned and sold by the official agents of Power C without Power A being able to prevent it. At last a treaty is entered into by which the Powers B and C adjust their differences, and in this treaty the Power B renounces and abandons to Power C the right to any claim for the injuries and losses occasioned to its subjects by the hostilities from Power C." Having thus stated the case, Yrujo asked: "IIas the Power B any right to call upon the Power A for indemnities for the losses occasioned in its ports and coasts to its subjects by those of the Power C after the Power B has abandoned or relinquished by its treaty with C its right for the damages which could be claimed for the injuries sustained from the hostile conduct of the Power C?" Each of the five said "No." * Madison to Charles Pinckney, March 8, 1803. Don Pedro Cevallos to Charles Pinckney, August 23, 1803. When this bit of information and the letters which accompanied it were laid before the Senate in December, 1803, that body was less disposed than ever to approve the convention But the purchase of Louisiana had brought up the question of the ownership of West Florida. New negotiations with Spain must be opened, and to remove every cause of irritation from the negotiation the convention of 1802 was taken up, and, with many marks of disgust and discontent, approved.* A month later the document, duly signed, was sent off to Spain, where the United States was then represented by Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs was Don Pedro Cevallos. To him Pinckney at once carried the ratified convention, feeling sure that it would receive the prompt approval of Spain. Cevallos, however, hesitated, delayed, and demurred, and, while he delayed, a copy of the Mobile Act, sent over by Yrujo, came to hand. Delighted to find a new cause for delay, Cevallos at once took up the act, declared it a violation of the sovereignty of Spain, demanded an explanation + from Pinckney, and wasted a whole month in bickering. Then he consented to state precisely the conditions on which Spain would ratify the convention, and declared they were three in number. Time must be given for the subjects of Spain having claims against the United States to make ready and present their papers; the sixth article, which related to damages done by French cruisers to American ships, must be suppressed; the act setting up a custom district in West Florida must be repealed.‡ As Pinckney read these demands he seems to have gone mad with rage. All diplomacy, all policy, all good sense was laid aside, and, in a threatening letter to Cevallos, he pressed for an answer to "just one question." Was he to understand that if the sixth article was not suppressed, the convention would not be ratified by Spain? The answer he hoped would come quickly, as he intended in a few days to send couriers to all the American consuls in Spain, and to the commander of * January 9, 1804. Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, vol. i, pp. 461, 462. + Cevallos to Pinckney, May 31, 1804. Cevallos to Pinckney, July 2, 1804. 1804. MONROE SENT TO SPAIN. 37 the American squadron in the Mediterranean. He intended to inform them of the critical situation of affairs, of the probability of war between the United States and Spain, and to bid them warn all merchant ships and be ready to leave Spain at a moment's notice.* Cevallos was greatly alarmed; but he put on a bold front, declared he did not believe the American Minister had instructions to go to such an extreme, and transferred the negotiation to Washington.† Pinckney, however, was not to be overawed; sent off his couriers, and gave out that the moment his affairs were in order he should ask for passports and quit Madrid. ‡ Late in October the news of the quarrel reached the United States, and was soon followed by a request for Pinckney's recall. The request was granted, and Monroe bidden to go with all the speed he could to Madrid.# But, while the letter was being written, he was on his way to Spain. On the seventeenth of February, 1803, he had, when about to set out for Paris to negotiate for the purchase of the island of Orleans and the Floridas, been joined with Charles Pinckney in a commission to treat with his Catholic Majesty Don Carlos IV, of Spain. The two were to treat for the settlement of the claims not included in the convention of August, 1802, and, if the island of Orleans and the two Floridas were not obtained, to secure an enlargement of the right of deposit at New Orleans, the establishment of suitable places of deposit at the mouths of the rivers flowing through the Floridas, and the free navigation of these rivers by citizens of the United States. As soon, therefore, as the treaty for the purchase of Louisiana had been concluded at Paris, Monroe made ready to join Pinckney at Madrid. But the rage with which Spain heard of the sale of Louisiana led the three French consuls to urge him not to go. He took their advice, and while he lin * Pinckney to Cevallos, July 5, 1804. + Cevallos to Pinckney, July 8, 1804. # Madison to Monroe, October 26, 1804. | Madison to Pinckney and Monroe, February 17, 1803. State Papers, vol. ii, pp. 532, 533. ▲ Monroe to Madison, July 20, 1803. Manuscripts State Department. Monroe to Talleyrand, November 8, 1804. Foreign Relations, vol. ii, p. 634. gered at Paris was commissioned Minister Plenipotentiary to England* in place of Rufus King, who had resigned and gone home. In July he reached London, was presented to the King a month later, and was hard at work on the matter of impressment when he received instructions to proceed to Madrid. † There, in connection with Pinckney, he was to attempt four things-persuade Spain to acknowledge the Perdido as the eastern boundary of Louisiana; buy for two millions of dollars the rest of her possessions east of the Perdido; secure payment for the damages suffered by the condemnation of American shipping by French consuls on Spanish soil; insist on the right of the United States to Texas. On this point Spain might be stubborn. In that event he might waive the whole question of a western boundary and consent to separate the dominions of Spain from the dominions of the United States by a broad belt of neutral country, into which the people of neither power should be suffered to go. The eastern limit of this belt was to be defined as the Sabine, from its mouth to its source; a right line to the junction of the Osage with the Missouri; and a line parallel to the Mississippi to the north boundary. On the west the limit was to be the Rio Colorado to its source; a line to the most southwesterly branch of the Red river; the highlands parting the feeders of the Missouri and the Mississippi from the feeders of the Rio Bravo, as far as the source of the Rio Bravo, and a meridian to the north boundary. On no account was our claim to the Rio Bravo to be given up. On no account was the neutral belt to exist for more than twenty years. If possible, the term was to be less and the belt narrower. Indeed, so strongly did Jefferson feel on this point that, three months later, the instructions were greatly modified. The Commissioners were then instructed to secure the Rio Bravo as the limit of Spanish settlement, and the Rio Colorado as the limit of American settlement; but not to give up the territory between these rivers forever. * Appointed during the recess of the Senate. Confirmed November 15, 1803. Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate. Madison to Monroe, April 15, 1804. Foreign Relations, vol. ii, pp. 627-630. |