CONSIDERATION. FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. Continued.

the said agreement and promises by means of fraud, covin and
misrepresentations of the plaintiffs, and others in collusion with
them, in this: that, on, etc., plaintiff's sold defendant their warehouse,
situate, etc., for $1500, including one corn-sheller, etc.; that he was
induced to enter into said contract by the representations of plain-
tiffs that they could and would procure for him an assignment of the
lease from the railroad company for the ground upon which the
warehouse and appurtenances were situated, which representations
the plaintiffs knew to be false at the time; that defendant, relying on
said representations, entered into said contract, and in payment
thereof, executed his notes as follows: for the sum of $500 each,
payable in four, eight and twelve months, respectively, the last one
of which is the one declared on, the others having been paid; that
plaintiff's did not and could not procure an assignment of the grounds
on which the warehouse and appurtenances were situated, but that
the railroad company, after such sale, before they would assign said
lease of the plaintiff's to defendant, took possession of a portion of
the grounds and compelled the defendant to remove a portion of said
warehouse, and deprived him of the use of a portion of said grounds,
to his great damage, to-wit: the sum of $500, of all which the plain-
tiff's had notice, etc.: Held, that the plea was substantially good as
a plea of partial failure of consideration. Mann v. Smyser et al. 365.
ACCOMMODATION BILL.

2. Where a bill is drawn payable to a bank, for the accommoda-
tion of a third person, who discounts the same to the bank, in the
usual course of trade, the drawer can not defend on the ground that
he received no consideration for the same, when sued by the bank.
Best v. The Nokomis National Bank, 608.

WHEN CONSIDERATION MUST BE STATED.

3. In declaration. See PLEADING, 2.

MUST BE PROVEN AS LAID.

4. And herein, of sufficiency of proof of consideration. See PLEAD-
ING AND EVIDENCE, 2, 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

1. General rule. In the construction of constitutional provisions
and statutes, the question is not what was the intention of the framers,
but what is the meaning of the words they have used. A constitution
does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but
from the people who ratified it, and the intent to be arrived at is that
of the people, and this is found only in the words of the text. City
of Beardstown et al. v. City of Virginia et al. 34.

RELEASING A DEBT DUE TO THE STATE.

2. Section 23, article 4, of the present constitution, which provides
that the General Assembly shall have no power to release or extin-
guish, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation
of any corporation or individual to the State, was not intended to
embrace a release of claims doubtful or hazardous which the State
may hold against a municipal or other corporation. Burr et al. v.
City of Carbondale, 455.

TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS.

3. Of the mode thereof, under the constitution, and herein, as to the
constitutionality of the act of 1872, giving certain powers to the State
Board of Equalization. See TAXATION.

OF THE RULE OF UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION..

4. Instances of its application. See TAXATION, 13, 23, 24.
WHETHER TAXATION IS FOR CORPORATE PURPOSE.

5. To locate State institution. Same title, 21.

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION.

6. Power of the legislature to create. Same title, 25.
LENDING CREDIT OF THE STATE.

7. Application of the prohibition to act of 1869, "to fund and pro-
vide for paying the debts of counties, townships, cities and towns." See
MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS IN AID OF RAILROADS, 1.

COMPENSATION OF COUNTY OFFICERS.

8. To what officers it applies. See FEES AND SALARIES, 4.

9. "County board"—what constitutes for the purpose of fixing com
pensation of county officers. Same title, 5.

JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS.

10. Under constitution of 1870. See JURISDICTION, 2.

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

11. Whether issued for a corporate purpose. See MUNICIPAL
BONDS, 2.

RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE-ALIEN MINORS.

12. Alien minors, residents of the State April 1, 1848, whether made
voters by constitution of 1870. See ELECTIONS, 1.

CONSTRUCTION.

GENERAL RULE.

1. Words taken in their ordinary meaning. It is not allowable to
interpret what has no need of interpretation, and where the words
have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of con-
jecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes and con-
tracts should be read and understood according to the natural and
most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and

forced construction, for the purpose of either limiting or extending
their operation. City of Beardstown et al. v. City of Virginia et al. 34.
OF AN ORDER OF A COUNTY COURT.

For the delivery of municipal bonds-whether the delivery to be condi
tional. See MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTION, 7.

CONVEYANCES-RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. See CONVEYANCES, 4.
DEEDS CONSTRUED. See CONVEYANCES, 2.

CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS, GENERALLY.

See CONTRACTS, 2 to 5.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. See STATUTES, 1 to 12.

CONTINUANCE.

WITHDRAWING DECLARATION FROM FILES.

1. A paper in a cause, when filed with the clerk, is a file of the
court, and should not be withdrawn without leave of the court. But
where a declaration, after being filed, was withdrawn from the files
by the plaintiff's counsel, but restored to the file before the time for
the defendant to plead had expired, and it not appearing that the
defendant had any defense of any kind to the note sued on, or had
sustained any injury: Held, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would not be reversed for the refusal of the court to continue the
cause for this irregularity. Deatherage et al. v. Roach, 321.
AMENDMENT OF DECLARATION.

2. As a ground for continuance. It does not necessarily follow that
a cause must be continued because an amendment is allowed to a
declaration, and the defendant makes an affidavit that, in consequence
thereof, he is unprepared to proceed to or with the trial at the term,
especially when no reason is given to show why he is not prepared.
Crist et al. v. May, 204.

3. Where, after the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the court
allowed the declaration, which was in trespass for taking and carry
ing away a piano and an organ, to be amended, by striking out all
claim for the piano, it was held, that the effect of the amendment was
to render the defendant better instead of less prepared for trial, and
that in such a case it was no error to overrule his motion for a con-
tinuance, though supported by affidavit that he was unprepared to
proceed with the trial. Ibid. 204.

4. Of the affidavit. An affidavit for a continuance by a defendant
on the ground of an amendment of the declaration, should show that
the party has a meritorious defense to the action, and that he was taken
by surprise, and should also state facts from which the court can see
that by reason of the amendment the defendant is unprepared for
trial, and that at another term a good defense can be interposed.
Mills et al. v. Bland's Executors, 381.

CONTINUANCE. Continued.

ABSENCE OF WITNESSES.

5. Where a cause had been once continued on account of the
absence of the same witnesses, who were defendant's partners, and had
absconded, taking with them the partnership books, and the affidavit
for the second continuance for the same cause presented such a state
of circumstances as to reasonably shut out all hope of procuring the
testimony of the witnesses: Held, no error in refusing the second
application. Slade v. McClure et al. 319.

CONTRACTS.

MUST BE BETWEEN TWO OR MORE PARTIES.

1. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover the price of hogs sold,
where the defendant refused to accept and pay for the same, the writ
ten contract showed that the plaintiff bought the hogs of himself, and
that the defendant sold the same number of hogs to himself; in other
words. it appeared that each party signed the writing the other should
have executed: Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, and that
the contract was properly excluded by the court. Canterberry v. Mil-
ler, 355.

CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.

2. Where two instruments in writing are made at the same time,
relating to the same subject matter, they may be regarded as a single
instrument and construed together. Ibid. 355.

3. Where the language of a written contract is unequivocal,
although the parties may have failed to express their real intentions,
there is no room for construction, and the instrument will be enforced
according to its legal effect. Ibid. 355.

CONTRACTS CONSTRUED.

4. Of a contract to make a hedge. Where a person taking a lease
of a quarter section of land for the term of five years, covenanted to
plant and grow a good and substantial hedge fence by the close of
the term, it was held, that the true meaning of the contract was, that
a hedge as good as could reasonably be made before the expiration of
the lease, should be made. It did not impose the duty of making a
hedge that would turn stock, but only that the lessee should plant and
faithfully cultivate it during the term. Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 281.

5. Whether liquidated damages are provided for, or merely a penalty.
See LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, 1 to 5.

CHANGE IN TERMS.

6. If not complied with, whether it will release. Where A and B
agreed to sell and deliver to another 20,000 bushels of corn, to be de-
livered at Mason City by a day named, and A and the vendee subse-
quently agreed that one-half of the corn should be delivered in Chi-
cago: Held, in a suit by the vendee for damages growing out of a

failure to deliver the corn at Mason City, that the subsequent agree-
ment furnished no excuse for not delivering at Mason City, unless it
was shown that the subsequent agreement was complied with by the
vendors. Cease v. Cockle, 484.

ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACT BY ONE PARTY.

7. Effect thereof upon the rights of the other party. Where a con-
tractor for building a railroad had agreed in his contract with the
company to take the bonds of a county which had made an uncon-
ditional subscription, and that they should be applied to payment of
work done in that county alone, and upon the representation of this
fact the county authorities issued their bonds and placed them in the
hands of a third party, and the contractor having abandoned the
work, the company, on settlement with him, gave him an order on
the depositary for $2000 of these bonds, which was for work done out
of the county, in full pay for what the company owed him: Held,
that after the contract was abandoned, the contractor was no longer
bound by it, and had a right to look for payment to any assets of the
company, and was not estopped from taking an order for a portion of
the county bonds for what was owing him for work done elsewhere
than in the county. Morgan County et al. v. Thomas et al. 120.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

8. As distinguished from a penalty-construction of a contract in
that regard. See LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, 1 to 5.

COMPENSATION OF AGENT FOR SALE OF LAND.

9. When a right of action accrues. See ACTIONS, 1.

REBATE ON FREIGHT.

10. Of a contract in respect thereto. See CARRIERS, 8; RAIL-
ROADS, 3.

RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS FOR FRAUD.

11. In chancery.

See CHANCERY, 2, 3, 4.

OF CONTRACTS BY MARRIED WOMEN.

CONTRIBUTION.

AS BETWEEN CO-SURETIES.

See MARRIED WOMEN, 1 to 4.

1. Right to contribution from estate of deceased co-surety. Where
one of the sureties upon the bond of a school commissioner, which
was joint and several, died, and after his death the surviving surety
was compelled to pay for the default of the principal, it was held, that
the survivor had a right to compel a contribution from the estate of
the deceased co-surety. Conover v. Hill et al. 342.

REMEDY IN CHANCERY.

2. To enforce contribution between sureties. The general jurisdic-
tion of courts of equity over matters of account, includes cases of