BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE.

1. To hold drawer. All drafts, whether foreign or inland bills,
must be presented to the drawee within a reasonable time, and in case
of non-payment, notice must be given promptly to the drawer to
charge him. Montelius et al. v. Charles, 303.

TIME OF PRESENTMENT.

2. Where a bill of exchange, payable on sight, is immediately put
in circulation, there is no fixed period in which it must be presented
for payment in order to hold the drawer. The only rule is, that it
must be presented in a reasonable time, and what is a reasonable time
depends upon the peculiar facts of each case viewed in the light of
commercial usage. Ibid. 303.

3. In this case, the draft, drawn upon a bank in Chicago, was
mailed on the same day it bore date, to the proper address of the
payee, in Dacotah territory, and was received by him after some de-
lay in the mail, and he, upon the first opportunity, put the same in
circulation, and it was kept in circulation, and no delay was suffered
other than that incident to the transaction of business in a sparsely
populated territory, and the same was presented for payment thirty-
five days after its date, and payment being refused, it was protested,
and notice given by mail to the drawer, and it was held that the
drawer was liable. Ibid. 303.

BONDS.

OF OFFICIAL BONDS.

And the liability thereon. See OFFICIAL BONDS, 1 to 7.

BURDEN OF PROOF. See EVIDENCE, 17.

CARRIERS.

GENERAL RULE OF LIABILITY.

1. Where a transportation company receives goods for transpor
tation, they assume all the duties of common carriers, and their lia-
bility must be determined by the obligations which are imposed upon
that character of bailees. And the rule is, that such persons are
insurers against every loss except when occasioned by the act of God
or the enemies of the country. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co. v.

Kahn et al. 520.

DUTY AS TO ROUTE.

2. It seems that the duty of a common carrier, in the absence of
any special contract, is to transport the property to the place of des-
tination by the most usual, safe, direct and expeditious route, and
failing in any of these, unless prevented by inevitable accident, he
must be held liable for loss. Ibid. 520.

3. Destruction by fire not necessarily inevitable accident. Where the
common carrier received goods at Worcester, Mass., to transport to
the consignee at Mattoon, Ill., and carried them by way of Chicago,
instead of the most usual and direct route by way of Indianapolis,
and while stored in Chicago awaiting a reshipment, they were
destroyed by the great fire on the 9th of October, 1871: Held, that
the carrier was not excused from liability on the ground of inevita
ble accident, as there was no compulsion to take the goods through
Chicago. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co. v. Kahn et al. 520.
WHEN LIABILITY TERMINATES.

3. In case of reshipment. Where common carriers take goods being
transported by them, from the cars, and place them in a warehouse
for reshipment, and they are there destroyed by fire, the goods still
being in transit, their liability as insurers continues, and they are
liable. Their liability as insurers does not terminate until the goods
have reached their destination and have been stored in a safe ware-
house. Ibid. 520.

LOSS BY FIRE-NOT "THE ACT OF GOD."

5. Where a carrier undertakes to transport goods, he will be held
liable for their loss or destruction, unless the same was caused by the
act of God or the public enemy. By the term "act of God," is meant
something superhuman, or something in opposition to the act of
man. Loss by fire, as in the great Chicago fire, therefore, will not
relieve the carrier from his undertaking. Merchants' Dispatch Co.
v. Smith et al. 542.

DUTY IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF STOCK.

6. Where a railroad company accepts stock for transportation, it
is bound to take reasonable care of it, and if, from the want of such
care, loss ensues, the company will be liable to the owner. Toledo,
Wabash and Western Railway Co. v. Hamilton et al. 393.

7. It is as much the duty of the servants of a railway company to
provide water, at suitable points on the line of its road, for the use
of stock, as it is their duty to carry such stock; and where hogs,
while being transported, died for want of water, it was held that the
company was liable. Ibid. 393.

REBATE ON FREIGHT CHARGES.

8. Of a contract in respect thereto. Where the plaintiff, having sold
a large lot of corn, to be delivered in Boston at a certain price, the
purchaser agreeing to advance the regular freight, which was 80%
cents per hundred pounds, as a part of the price, made a special con-
tract with a railroad company to allow him rebate of 5% cents per
hundred, which the company was to pay him, and the corn was
shipped, a part at 80 cents, as agreed, and on which the company

CARRIERS. REBATE ON FREIGHT CHARGES. Continued.

paid the plaintiff back 51⁄2 cents per hundred, and a part was billed
through at 75 cents per hundred, without the shipper's consent: Held,
that the company was liable to the shipper for 5% cents per hundred
on the latter portion of the corn. Toledo, Wabash and Western Rail-
way Co. v. Elliott et al. 67.

CHANCERY.

BILLS OF INTERPLEADER.

1. Relief in favor of a depositary. Where county bonds issued in
aid of a railway company were placed in the hands of a depositary,
as escrows, to be delivered to the obligee upon the performance of
certain conditions thereafter by the obligee, but otherwise to be
returned to the county, and it was claimed by the obligee that he had
performed, and was entitled to their delivery, which fact was dis-
puted by the county, a decree on a bill of interpleader filed by the
depositary, dismissing the bill without prejudice, was held erroneous,
as it failed to settle the rights of the contending parties, and relieve
the depositary of his responsibility. Alley et at. v. Board of Super-
visors of Adams Co. 101.

RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS FOR FRAUD.

2. Where the complainants exchanged a house and lot for defend-
ant's farm, which he represented as incumbered by a mortgage of
$2500, and which the complainants were to assume, and pay the
defendant $700, and convey to him also a half section of land in
Kansas, and it appeared that there were judgment liens upon the
farm to the amount of $1300, and that the defendant owned only five-
sixths of the farm, the other one-sixth being outstanding, all of which
the defendant knew, but concealed the fact from the complainants:
Held, this was such a fraud as authorized the complainants to rescind
the agreement upon discovery of the fraud. Thomas v. Coultas et ux.
493.

3. Where one of the contracting parties is guilty of fraud, the
other may, without offering to perform his part of the contract, rescind.
It is only in cases free from fraud that a party must put the other in
default by performing, or offering to perform, before he can rescind.
The fraud vitiates the contract, and absolves the party upon whom it
is practiced, from performance. Ibid. 493.

4. Where a party filed a bill to rescind a contract for the exchange
of lands, on the ground of fraud in concealing the fact of there being
judgments which were liens on defendant's lands at the time, the
discharge of such liens, after bill filed, will not affect the complain-
ants' rights in the least. The filing of the bill in such a case is a
rescission, and an election to recover back the property given in
exchange, and the complainant, after that, could not revive the con-
tract without the defendant's assent. Ibid. 493.

CHANCERY. Continued.

COMPELLING CREDITOR TO RESORT TO PARTICULAR FUND.

5. In favor of another creditor who can not reach the entire fund.
The rule in equity of compelling a first resort to a particular one of
two funds for a creditor's benefit who can reach but one of them, will
not be enforced when it trenches upon the rights or operates to the
prejudice of the party entitled to the double fund, or works injustice.
Sweet et al v. Redhead, 374.

6. Where A and B executed a deed of trust on 80 acres of land to
secure a note given by them, and afterwards, for the purpose of
releasing 10 acres of the same, in use for a cemetery, B and his wife
gave their trust deed on 17 acres owned by B to secure the payment
of the same note, and it appeared that, at the time of the execution
of the last named deed of trust, A and B had given two other mort-
gages on the 80-acre tract, one to C for $1500, and the other to D, the
then holder of the note secured by the first deed of trust, for $2500;
that the mortgage to C had been foreclosed and sold to E; and after
the execution of the several deeds of trust and mortgages, the com
plainant purchased the 17-acre tract, and who then filed his bill to
compel D and the trustee to sell the 80-acre tract before the 17-acre
tract: Held, that the complainant, having purchased after the giving
of the two mortgages, had no higher equity than the holders under
the mortgages, and that, as the sale of the 80-acre tract first might
destroy the mortgage securities, it would be unjust and inequitable
to so decree. Ibid. 374.

SETTING CAUSE DOWN FOR HEARING.

7. It is only where no replication is filed that the court is required
to set a chancery cause for hearing. Where a replication is filed, the
law sets the case for hearing without any order of the court. Thomas
v. Coultas et ux. 493.

OVERRULING EXCEPTION TO MASTER'S REPORT.

8. Effect of decree in pursuance of report. Where the master in
chancery reported in favor of the relief sought by complainants, 10
which the defendant excepted, and the court decreed relief on the
report as made: Held, that this was, in effect, an overruling of the
exception. Ibid. 493.

EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESERVED.

9. There is no rule better settled in this State than that the com-
plainant, to maintain a decree in his favor, must preserve the evidence
on which it is based, in the record, and failing to do so the decree
will be reversed. Driscoll et al. v. Tannock et al. 154.

SETTING ASIDE DEED OF WOMAN.

10. Procured through undue influence of her husband. See MAR-
RIED WOMEN, 5.

CHANCERY. Continued.

TO ABATE OR PREVENT A NUISANCE.

11. Remedy-whether at law or in chancery. See NUISANCES, 3, 4.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN CO-SURETIES.

12. Remedy in chancery—and herein, of the sufficiency of a bill there-
for. See CONTRIBUTION, 2, 3.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES. See MORTGAGES, 2 to 8.

CHURCHES.

EMPLOYMENT OF A SEXTON.

1. Liability to pay him. Where the plaintiff was employed as
sexton of a church organized under the statute, by a majority of the
trustees, and as such performed services for nearly a year, it was held,
that he was entitled to recover for his services, and the fact that the
ladies of the Altar Society were to contribute one-half of the sum will
not affect the right to recover the whole from the church, nor will the
fact that the officers of the church violated its by-laws in contracting
the indebtedness. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church of East St.
Louis v. Abst, 252.

2. It matters not whether the by-laws of a church were observed
in the employment of one as sexton, if the church accepts the ser-
vices and work done by him. In such case it will be liable to pay
for the same. Ibid. 252.

TEMPORAL AFFAIRS OF A CHURCH.

3. Defined. The temporal affairs of a church are understood to be
the revenues, lands and tenements, in other words, secular posses-
sions, with which it is endowed. The hiring of a sexton to perform
the duties incident to his office, has nothing to do with the manage
ment of the temporalities of the church. Ibid. 252.

COLLECTOR'S BOND. See OFFICIAL BONDS, 1 to 7

COMMON LAW.

HOW FAR AFFECTED BY STATUTE.

1. Presumption. It is a general rule, that statutes are not to be
presumed to alter the common law farther than they expressly de-
clare. Cadwallader v. Harris, 370.

COMPENSATION OF COUNTY OFFICERS.

UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. See FEES AND SALARIES, 4 to 8.

CONSIDERATION.

FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.

1. What constitutes. To a declaration upon a promissory note,
the defendant pleaded that he was induced to enter into and make