Opinion of the Court. or give away any of the liquors mentioned in section one hereof to minors, without the written consent of such minor's parent, guardian or master, or who shall sell or give away any of said liquors named in section one to an intoxicated person, or one who is in the habit of getting intoxicated, or who shall violate any of the provisions of the ordinances of this city relative to groceries or spirituous and intoxicating liquors, or who shall fail, neglect or refuse to observe and obey all orders of the city council respecting his grocery and business done therein, shall be deemed to have violated this ordinance and the condition of his or their bond, and for each and every of the acts of violation, aforesaid, shall forfeit and pay to said city the sum of $100, which may be recovered in an action of debt, or as damages in a suit on his or their bond." The cause was tried in the circuit court, and the defendant found guilty of two violations, and the damages assessed at $200, for which sum judgment was rendered, and for costs. The defendant appealed. Messrs. COLE & SIMMONS, for the appellant. Mr. E. P. PILLSBURY, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court: There are but two grounds of reversal insisted on in the argument filed on behalf of appellant, and they may be briefly disposed of. First-It is argued that by section 28 of the charter of the city of Macomb, a digest of the ordinances of the city is required to be published in one year after granting the charter, and a like digest within every period of five years thereafter; and that this duty has been disregarded by the city, as the last digest of its ordinances was published on the 13th of November, 1868 Opinion of the Court. Whether it is intended to insist that the city has thereby forfeited its charter, or only that the ordinances, a digest of which has not been published within five years, are void, is not entirely clear. If the former is intended, it would seem to be a sufficient answer that the question of whether the charter has been forfeited can only be raised in a direct proceeding for that purpose-by scire facias or quo warranto. If, however, as is more probable, it is only intended to be claimed that the ordinances are void, it will be readily seen that this requirement in the charter belongs to that class of legislation which is held to be directory merely. It is not declared in the section under consideration, that the ordinances shall be void if not thus published, nor is there any other language used showing that such publication was to be a condition precedent to the further exercise of municipal powers by the city. The publication seems designed merely for the convenience of those whose duties or necessities require that they should be familiar with the ordinances, it being entirely independent from that required prior to the ordinance being in force as a municipal law-which is shown by the record to have been properly made. A familiar common law rule, repeatedly recognized by this court, is: "Where a statute specifies the time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others, it will be considered as directory merely, unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the language used by the legislature, shows that the designation of the time was intended as a limitation of the power of the officer." This applies with equal force where, as in the present instance, the act to be done requires the co-operation of several officers. Second-It is claimed that, under the ordinance by virtue of which the suit is brought, appellant, if liable at all, could only be sued on his bond, which he was required to execute to secure his faithful compliance with the law and ordinances while engaged in his business. Syllabus. We fail to appreciate the force of this argument. The ordinance, as copied in the record and published in appellant's abstract, is explicit in its language, that the penalties thereby imposed "may be recovered in an action of debt, or as damages in a suit on his or their bond." The causes for which these penalties may be imposed are distinctly stated; and they are none the less offenses under the ordinance because they are also breaches of the conditions of the bond. The judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. 76 53 26a 67 76 53 126 262 76 53 52a 470 CYRUS FANNING, for use, etc. v. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE. 1. EXEMPTION—from garnishment. The delivery of property in the hands of a garnishee to an officer, to be sold under execution against the owner, will not impair the rights of such owner in claiming the same as exempt from sale, but he may make such claim the same as though the property was taken from him. 2. SAME money in the hands of garnishee exempt. Where a judgment debtor had no other property than such as was specifically exempt from levy and sale, but had less than $100 on deposit in a bank, which was sought to be reached by garnishee process, it was held, that he might claim the same as exempt under the clause of the statute which exempts $100 worth of other property suited to his condition in life, to be selected by him, and on such selection that it could not be reached in the hands of the garnishee. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. CYRUS EPLER, Judge, presiding. Mr. WILLIAM H. BARNES, for the appellant. Messrs. CASSELL & KELLOGG, for the appellee. 76 53 61a 496 Opinion of the Court. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court: This was a proceeding to reach money in the First National Bank of Jacksonville, by garnishee process, which had been deposited in the bank by Cyrus Fanning. James W. Ash obtained judgment in the circuit court of Morgan county against Cyrus Fanning, for the sum of $166.36, upon which an execution was issued, and returned nulla bona. On the 19th day of May, 1873, garnishee process was issued and served upon the bank. The answer filed by the bank shows that Fanning had on deposit the sum of $80.60. It was also set up in the answer, that after the garnishee process had been served it received a notice, in writing, from Fanning, that he claimed the money on deposit as exempt under the statute, and directing the bank to pay it to no person without his order. The defense that the money was exempt under the statute, and not liable to garnishee process, was interposed. The evidence contained in the bill of exceptions shows the rendition of the judgment against Fanning, the issue and return of execution, the deposit of the money, and that Fanning was the head of a family, residing with the same, that he owned no property except a small quantity of household goods, which were included in the list of specific articles exempt. The circuit court rendered judgment against the bank, for the use of the judgment creditor, for the amount of money on deposit, to reverse which this appeal has been prosecuted. The only question presented by the record is, whether the money on deposit in the bank was subject to be reached by garnishee process. The statute exempting from execution, writ of attachment, and distress for rent, personal property owned by the debtor, among other clauses of exemption contains the following: "$100 worth of other property, suited to his or her condition in life, selected by the debtor." See Revision of 1874, page 499. Opinion of the Court. In order to arrive at a correct construction to be placed upon this provision of the statute, in its application to the case under consideration, a reference to chapter 62, of the statutes of 1874, entitled Garnishment, seems to be necessary. Section 20, of the last named act, Statutes of 1874, page 553, provides, that when any garnishee has any goods, chattels, choses in action, or effects other than money, belonging to the defendant, or which he is bound to deliver to him, he shall deliver the same to the officer who shall hold the execution in favor of the plaintiff in the attachment suit or judgment, which shall be sold by the officer, and the proceeds applied and accounted for in the same manner as other goods and chattels taken on execution. Section 21 provides, if the goods in the hands of the garnishee are pledged for the payment of money to him, the plaintiff in the action may pay the money for which they are held, and then the garnishee shall deliver the goods to the officer, to be sold as provided for in section 20. Section 23 provides, all goods, etc., received by the officer under the preceding sections, shall be sold in the same manner as if they had been taken on an execution in any other manner. It was, no doubt, contemplated by the legislature, when these sections were adopted as a part of our statute, that cases would arise where property would be found in the possession of a garnishee, belonging to a defendant, and hence ample provision was made, when such did occur, that it might be taken and sold. But where property is found in the hands of a garnishee, and delivered over to an officer to be sold, the officer would hold it for sale in the same manner as if it had been found and taken from a defendant in execution in the first instance, nor would the rights of a defendant in claiming the property as exempt from sale be changed or impaired. If any portion of the property thus obtained was exempt under the statute exempting $100 worth of property from |