bombs were fired, but the town made no sign, the governor having taken the very obvious precaution of shutting up all the chiefs of the Austrian party. As the demonstration was altogether resting on the supposed readiness of the town to receive them, and it had never been intended to undertake the siege of an enemy's fortress with 1600 men, the troops were re-embarked, and Rooke took the squadron to the eastward, meaning to wait in the neighbourhood of the Hyères islands for the coming of the Brest fleet, which he had learned was on its way to Toulon. Bad weather, however, dispersed his ships, and they were barely collected together again when the French fleet was seen in the distance, too near Toulon to permit of its being overtaken-after the usual council of war-before it gained the shelter of the port. Burnet, of course, says that Rooke, by sailing in the opposite direction, took care not to overtake it; a statement that may have been made in ignorance, but has much more the appearance of being inspired by malice.

But the two divisions of the French fleet being now joined, it would clearly have been false strategy for Rooke to remain in the vicinity of the enemy's port with a greatly inferior force; he therefore left the Mediterranean with the view of falling back on Lisbon to await the reinforcements which he knew were coming to him; and on the 17th June, off Cape St. Mary, he fell in with Sir Clowdisley Shovell and his squadron. This additional force brought Rooke's fleet up to fifty-nine sail of the line-English and Dutch-so that he was now strong enough to meet the combined French squadron, should it put to sea from Toulon. But, as has already been pointed out, Rooke had

by no means a free hand as to his movements; and he was specially handicapped by that greatest hindrance to all prompt and vigorous action-frequent councils of war. Orders from home forbade him to attempt anything against the coasts of Spain, save with the approval of the Kings of Spain and Portugal, and as they had no troops to spare for a joint expedition, it appeared that there was nothing better to do than to sail to the eastward and look out for the French fleet, which had been reported off Malaga. No French fleet was to be seen, and Rooke, having watered his fleet near Malaga, was plying under the Barbary coast, when he received a pressing request from King Charles to make another attempt on Cadiz.

A council of war was of course held, and it was decided that such an enterprise was quite impracticable without troops; but it was suggested (it is not stated from whom came the happy thought) that, with the force at their disposal, an attack on Gibraltar might be successful. Rooke seems to have jumped at the idea. He immediately made his arrangements for putting it in execution, before another council of war should decide that it was impracticable; and, perhaps as a practical joke, entrusted the actual attack to Rear-Admiral Byng, who had voted against it.

The following is Rooke's official account of what happened,1 and it would be impossible to improve upon it :

"The 17th July, the fleet being then about seven leagues to the eastward of Tetuan, a council of war was held on board the Royal Catherine; wherein it was resolved to make a sudden attempt on Gibraltar. Accordingly the fleet sailed thither, and the 21st, got into that

1 London Gazette, No. 4045.

bay; and, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the marines, English and Dutch, to the number of one thousand eight hundred, with the Prince of Hesse at the head of them, were put on shore on the neck of land to the northward of the town, to cut off any communication with the country. His Highness, having posted his men there, sent a summons to the governor to surrender the place for the service of his Catholic Majesty; which he rejected with great obstinacy. The admiral, on the 22nd, in the morning, gave orders that the ships which had been appointed to cannonade the town, under the command of Rear-Admiral Byng and Rear-Admiral Vanderdussen, as also those which were to batter the south mole head, commanded by Captain Hickes of the Yarmouth, should range themselves accordingly; but the wind blowing contrary they could not possibly get into their places till the day was spent. In the meantime, to amuse the enemy, Captain Whitaker was sent with some boats, who burnt a French privateer of twelve guns at the mole. The 23rd, soon after break of day, the ships being all placed, the admiral gave the signal for beginning the cannonade; which was performed with great fury, above fifteen thousand shot being made in five or six hours' time against the town, insomuch that the enemy were soon beat from their guns, especially at the south mole head; whereupon the admiral, considering that by gaining the fortification they should of consequence reduce the town, ordered Captain Whitaker with all the boats armed, to endeavour to possess himself of it; which was performed with great expedition. But Captain Hickes and Captain Jumper, who lay next the mole, had pushed on shore with their pinnaces and some other boats, before the rest could come up; whereupon the enemy sprung a mine that blew up the fortifications upon the mole,1 killing

1 [It is perhaps more probable that this was the accidental explosion of a magazine. A mine tells of greater prevision than the garrison seem to have been capable of.]

two lieutenants and about forty men, and wounded about sixty. However, our men kept possession of the great platform which they had made themselves masters of; and Captain Whitaker, landing with the rest of the seamen which had been ordered upon this service, they advanced and took a redoubt, or small bastion, half-way between the mole and the town, and possessed themselves of many of the enemy's cannon. The admiral then sent a letter to the governor, and at the same time a message to the Prince of Hesse to send him a peremptory summons, which his Highness did accordingly; and on the 24th in the morning, the governor desiring to capitulate, hostages were exchanged; and the capitulation being concluded, the prince marched into the town in the evening, and took possession of the land and north mole gates, and the outwork.

"The town is extremely strong, and had an hundred guns mounted, all facing the sea and the two narrow passes to the land, and was well supplied with ammunition. The officers who have viewed the fortifications affirm there never was such an attack as the seamen made; for that fifty men might have defended those works against thousands. Ever since our coming to the bay, great numbers of Spaniards have appeared on the hills, but none of them have thought fit to advance towards us."

Thus was Gibraltar lost and won. It was taken by the English and Dutch in the name of King Charles III of Spain; and if that prince had been successful in gaining the Spanish crown, it is scarcely possible to doubt that Gibraltar would have been immediately restored to the Spaniards. As, however, he was not successful, at the peace of Utrecht it was formally ceded to England as part of the spoils of war, and has since remained in her hands, though she has had to fight for it more than once. On the other

hand, if Gibraltar had not been captured by Rooke, it is extremely unlikely that the question of ceding it to England would have been even mooted at the peace.

Immediately after the capture of Gibraltar, the Dutch admiral wanted to go home, and detached six ships to Lisbon, saying that he would soon follow them. Rooke went to Tetuan with the remainder of the allied fleet to take in water, and on his way back to Gibraltar, on the 9th August, he sighted the French fleet under the command of the Count of Toulouse, the high admiral of France, who had with him fifty-two sail of the line, some frigates, fire-ships, etc., and twenty-four galleys. Rooke had with him fifty-three sail of the line and a few smaller vessels. About these numbers, which are proved by nominal lists of the fleets, there can be no real doubt; though French writers, by counting the six ships which had been sent to Lisbon, have persistently represented the allied fleet as consisting of fifty-nine or sixty ships of the line. So far the two fleets may be described as fairly equal; but English writers have not failed to point out that the allies had only seven three-decked ships against seventeen in the French fleet; that the galleys were a very important auxiliary-not, indeed, for fighting, but for towing and for carrying reinforcements; and above all, that several of the Anglo-Dutch ships were short of ammunition, having expended much at Gibraltar without a possibility of having their supply renewed. At any rate it would seem that the one extra sail of the line was at least balanced by certain advantages on the side of the French; and the two fleets were not unevenly matched.

It was the 9th August when the two fleets first sighted each