amendments, be derived from the fact that legislative bodies, and especially Congress, are in their ordinary legislation in the habit of coupling diverse propositions in what is sometimes called an "omnibus bill," which is objectionable in itself. That cannot be used as a precedent in proposing constitutional amendments, which, we have admitted, is not an act of ordinary legislation, nor legislative in its character, but one done under a special power.

Furthermore the proposal of an article by which the States must adopt all or none of several distinct amendments of different natures, and having different objects, while it is contrary to sound principle, has not only no warrant in the language of the Constitution, but has no support in any practice under it. The first and fifth of the amendments which have been adopted might seem at first sight to countenance such a procedure. But it does not require a critical inspection to perceive that each is made an entire thing consisting of several particulars. The first is a prohibition upon Congress to interfere with the liberty of the citizen by an establishment of religion, or by prohibiting the free exercise of it, or by abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition for a redress of grievances. The fifth is a provision for the security of liberty and property, consisting of several particulars; namely, "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment by a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

Another, and a very grave objection to this article of amendment is, that the first and second propositions tend to change the fundamental relations of the United States, and the several States, by an interference with the internal concerns of the States, certainly not contemplated in the original Constitution. How far máy such a process of amendment be carried, under the congressional power to propose amendments, to be adopted

by three fourths of the people, or of the legislatures of the States?

If the people of the whole country had been a nation, from the Declaration of Independence, with power to adopt a Constitution for the whole country, without regard to that much abused thing called State rights (and such a power would have existed on that state of facts), and if the Constitution had been so adopted, then Congress, having general legislative power, might, notwithstanding the special provision of the Constitution respecting amendments to be proposed to the States, pass an act to ascertain the will of the people in regard to a convention for the purpose of amending the Constitution, and the convention if called, might put the Constitution into a new draft, and by a major vote of the whole people State rights might be obliterated.

But Congress, -under the Constitution, as it exists, adopted not by any nation, but by the peoples of the several States, who surrendered some of the powers of the States, and granted limited powers to the United States, among them this power to propose amendments, has no power to call such a convention, or to provide for any vote of the whole people upon the subject. Amendments are to be made only in the mode prescribed.

It will hardly be contended, even by the advocates of the ante-national theory, that Congress, under the special power to propose amendments, can send forth one for adoption by the legislatures, or even by the people, of three fourths of the States, which shall operate to extinguish the authority of the States, and turn them into counties of the United States. Why not? Because Congress is not authorized to propose, as amendments, provisions which will subvert the Constitution, and the States which gave it existence. That would not be an amendment of the Constitution, but the destruction of it. How far then, may the process of amendment be carried to the prejudice. of the fundamental principles which governed the relation of the United States to the several States on its original adoption, as shown by the instrument itself? I may not answer this question at the present time, but I commend it to your careful consideration.

It is worthy of remark here that this article is proposed to "the States lately in rebellion." It is transmitted to State au

thorities under the organization which has been had through the measures of the President. It is true that it is thus transmitted to those States by the Department of State; but the article appears to have been passed by the two Houses of Congress with the intention that it should thus be transmitted to those States, for consideration by these very State legislatures. It was intended to affect them more particularly than any other States, and the adoption of it by them was the very thing which was intended to be compelled by the refusal to admit their senators and representatives to seats in Congress.

Not only so, but the former amendment abolishing slavery was in like manner transmitted to those States, to be acted on by the legislatures under that reorganization through the action of the President, and was adopted by them, and the act of adoption received as effectual for the amendment of the Constitution.

Now these facts prove, conclusively, not only that the reorganization through the measures inaugurated by the President was rightful, enabling the people once more to proceed with their local elections, and thus to organize a legitimate legislature not only for local and State purposes, but also for all purposes connected with its existence as a State in the Union.

And if the people could thus elect a legislature which could receive and adopt an amendment to the Constitution, that legislature might well elect senators, and the people who constituted it could elect representatives in Congress.

A constitutional amendment can only be proposed for adoption to a State in the Union. The propositions by Congress, admit that they are in the Union. A denial after this, that these States are in the Union, by any person who assumes to reason upon the subject, fairly exposes such person to the suspicion of some little deficiency in the region of the cerebral organs, or of such an absorbing devotion to party as obscures any ordinary perception of an unwelcome political truth.

LECTURE III.

THE THREE DANGERS OF THE REPUBLIC.

[Law School of Harvard College, January, 1868. Dartmouth College, April, 1869.]

SOME brief recognition of that portion of the political excitements which have an immediate connection with the laws of the country, and which must exert an immense force, either for good or for evil, upon the institutions of government under which we live, seems to be not only appropriate, but perhaps to be demanded of an educational institution designed to prepare young men to take an active part in the administration of justice. Such men necessarily exercise a great influence upon the destinies of the country. If you may not control the course of current events, you may and must do much either in support of, or in opposition to, the measures which shape the future of the Republic.

Within the present term my attention was accidentally attracted to a leading editorial in the New York Evening Post, entitled, "Some Cheering Signs," in which three signs of encouragement were enumerated and discussed. The first two related to the President's discretion, and to changes in the Cabinet, and were of no material consequence. But the third was of a wider significance, containing a long extract from the New York World, upon which much commendation was bestowed. The mere fact that those two papers should agree upon any political subject, naturally created some surprise, which was not lessened upon an examination of the extract, which was introduced by the "Post" in this wise:

"In the third place, the democratic party, which conceives itself on the eve of a splendid national triumph - whether rightly or wrongly does not concern us here - in considering how it shall consolidate success, secure the future, and discharge the high responsi

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