except under special circumstances (s), and that, notwithstanding the legacies be in colonial currency (t), but subject to some exceptions (u). The preceding rules and their various exceptions, with the subjects in immediate connection with them, will be discussed at large under the following arrangement: SECT. I. Of interest on specific legacies. SECT. II. Of interest on general legacies where time of 1.-Where the legacy is a gross sum, and principal 2.-Where only a life interest is given. SECT. III. Of interest on legacies, where the legatee is ee ee 4 a child of the testator, or one towards whom he has placed himself in loco pa rentis; and, SECT. IV. Of interest on general legacies, where time de Sec 3. of payment is named by testator. 1.-Where the legatee is a child of the testator, and 2.- Where maintenance or interest is expressly given, 3. Where given generally, but amount or rate not 4.- Where the maintenance is left to the discretion of trustees. 5.-Where the legatee is one towards whom the testator has placed himself in loco parentis. SECT. V. Of interest where legatee is the widow, natural child, grandchild, niece, or other stranger. (s) Bate v. Scales, 12 Ves. 402; Ibid. 127; 11 Ib. 92, 581. (t) Bourke v. Ricketts, 10 Ves. 330. (u) Raymond v. Brodbelt, 5 Ves. 199. 1.- Where the widow. 2.- Where a natural child. 3. Where grandchild, niece, or other stranger. any other class of strangers to the testator, B.-Where such consent can be obtained. or some of whom must absolutely take the SECT. VI. Of interest where the legacy is contingent or payable in futuro, and though the interest is not expressly given, an intention to give it, in the shape of maintenance, fairly inferrible. SECT. VII. Of interest when given by immediate bequest for maintenance, and the parent of ability to maintain the child, not allowed to be so applied, except, 1.- Where to refuse its application would work a hardship or injustice. 2.-Where the maintenance or interest a gift to the parent to be applied for the children's benefit. 3.-Where not a bounty to the children, but in execution of a trust in contract. SECT. VIII. Of interest allowed as maintenance of an infant under 11 Geo. 4 and 1 Wm. 4, c. 65, s. 32. SECT. IX. From what time interest on legacies allowed as maintenance. SECT. X. Of interest, where a particular or residuary fund is given upon a contingency, so that the intermediate interest is undisposed of. 1.—Where there is a previous life estate. SECT. XI. Of interest, where a particular or residuary fund is given by immediate bequest, with a condition to devest it upon a contingency with a limitation over to another. SECT. XII. Of interest, where a residue is given so as to be vested immediately, but payable upon a future contingent event, with a condition devesting it in favour of a legatee over. SECT. XIII. Of interest, where a residue of personal estate consisting of a mixed fund, is given to one for life, and after his death. to one or more persons in remainder, and herein 1.-Where the residue is given to trustees in trust to convert and invest it, there being no trust for accumulation. 2.- Where there is neither express trust to convert, nor trust for accumulation. 3.-Where there is a trust to convert and invest the produce in real estate to be settled on one for life, with remainders over, and no trust for accumulation, but a direction to apply the income of the funds invested until laid out in real estate, as the rents (if the real estate were purchased), would be applied. 4.-Where there is such a trust to invest in real estate to be so settled, with a trust for accumulation until investment in real estate. 5.-Where there is no trust for conversion of the residue but it is to be enjoyed in specie. SECT. XIV. Of interest on annuities. SECT. XV. Of the rate or quantum of interest allowed on legacies; and herein, of legacies in colonial currency. Interest on specific legacies. SECT. I. Of interest on specific legacies. The law considers specific legacies as severed from the bulk of the testator's property, by the operation of the will, from the testator's death, and with their increase (z) and emolument specifically appropriated for the benefit of the legatee from that period; so that interest is computed on them from the death of the testator, and it is immaterial whether the enjoyment of the principal is postponed by the testator or not. In the case of Sleech v. Thorington, before stated (a), Sir Thomas Clarke, in deciding that the bequest of India bonds was not specific, ordered that the Master should compute the interest which they would have carried froin a year from the testator's death, because he considered them as a bequest of quantity only; for if they were specific, it would be from the death. So also in Barrington v. Tristram, before also stated (b), Lord Eldon, at the conclusion of his judgment respecting the bequest of the 5,000% three per cents. given in trust for the children of Mrs. Tristram, said, "This being a specific legacy of stock, the dividends are due for maintenance from the death" (c). In Apreece v. Apreece (d), a testator gave to Robert Farquhar and his wife 50%. each for a ring. Under the usual direction to compute interest on all such legacies as carried interest, the Master had not computed interest on these legacies considering them specific; but upon a motion for liberty to except to the Master's report, Lord Eldon, C., clearly held, that the legacies were not specific; and that the legatees therefore were entitled to interest within the terms of the decree. In Bristow v. Bristow (e), the testatrix gave to a charity the sum of 1,700 four per cents., standing in the name of two trustees, which she directed to be paid within twelve calendar months after her decease. The stock had not been transferred, and the executors had received two half-yearly dividends on the stock which had accrued during the twelve months which elapsed since the testatrix's death, and which the executors claimed as part of the general estate on the ground they were not bound to transfer the stock until the end of the twelve months. But Lord Langdale, M. R., held the legatees entitled to the dividends from the death. (z) See Jacques v. Chambers, 2 (a) Page 214; 2 Ves. sen. 563. (c) See also Howe v. Lord Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 147. (d) 1 Ves. & Bea. 364. It is deemed unnecessary in this place to cite more cases in On general te support of a rule so well established as the above; but they gacies, no time of payment will incidentally occur in prosecuting the subject of the present named. chapter. We therefore proceed to inquire, when interest is due on general legacies, where the time of payment is not appointed by the testator. SECT. II. Of interest on general legacies, where time of payment is not named by testator. 1. Where the legacy is a gross sum, and the principal given. The law, as was observed in a former chapter (e), allows the executor one year from the death to ascertain and settle the testator's affairs; and it presumes that at the expiration of that period, and not before, all debts, &c., have been satisfied, and that the executor is able to apply the residue among the legatees (f). Before this period, therefore, a general legacy is not considered due, nor can the legatee claim it, although the exe cutor may, if he thinks fit, pay it sooner: so that no interest accrues due for delay in payment of the principal, until after the expiration of the year from the death. When, therefore, no time is named, and in the absence of any contrary intention to be collected from the will, as the legacy itself is payable at the end of the year from the testator's death, if the executor do not pay it then, interest becomes due to the legatee from that period. The general rule is stated in Sleech v. Thorington, before mentioned; and, indeed, it is unnecessary to cite cases establishing a rule so abundantly proved by the numerous exceptions to it, which will be discussed in the ensuing pages of the present chapter. In the case of Hutchin v. Mannington (g), Lord Thurlow spoke of the known practice of the Court to compute interest upon legacies from the year's end after the testator's death. In the case of Pearson v. Pearson (h), where legacies of Bank stock and Government stock were given generally, without any time of payment named, to Mrs. Vicars and her son, one of the questions was, whether, as the fund was productive, interest was not payable from the death; and Lord Redesdale decided, that (e) Vol. I. Chap. XIV. p. 841. 325. VOL. II. X (g) 1 Ves. jun. 366, supra, p. 604. 1. Where le gay a gross sum, and prin cipal given. |