INTRODUCTION. A SCIENCE advances with certainty, only when the plan of inquiry, and the objects of our researches, have been clearly defined; otherwise, a small number of truths are loosely laid hold of, without their connexion being perceived, and numerous errors, without being enabled to detect their fallacy. For a long time the science of Politics, confined, in strictness, to the investigation of the principles which lay the foundation of the social order, was confounded with Political Economy, which unfolds the manner in which wealth is produced, distributed and consumed. Wealth, nevertheless, is essentially independent of political organization. Under every form of government, a state, whose affairs are well administered, may prosper. Nations have risen to opulence under absolute monarchs, and have been ruined by popular councils. If political liberty be more favourable to the development of wealth, it is indirectly; in the same manner that it is more favourable to general education. In confounding in the same researches the essential principles of good government with those on which the growth of wealth, either public or private, depends, it is by no means surprising that authors should have involved these subjects in obscurity, instead of elucidating them. Steuart, who has entitled his first chapter "Of the Government of Mankind," is liable to this reproach. The sect of "Economists" of the last century, throughout all their writings, and J. J. Rousseau in the article "Political Economy" in the Encyclopédie, lie under the same imputation. Since the time of Adam Smith it appears to me that these two very distinct inquiries have been uniformly separated; the term Political Economy* being now confined to the science * From Oxos, a house, and vous, a law; Economy, the law which regulates the household. Household, according to the Greeks, comprehending all the goods in possession of the family; and political extending its application to society or the nation at large. Political Economy is the best expression that can be used to designate the science discussed in the following treatise; which is not the investigation of natural wealth, or that which nature supplies us with gratuitously and without limitation; but of social wealth exclusively, which is founded on exchange and the recognition of the right of property; both social regulations. which treats of wealth, and that of Politics, to designate the relations existing between a government and its people, and the relations of different states to each other. The wide range taken into the field of pure Politics, whilst investigating the subject of Political Economy, was supposed to furnish a much stronger reason for including in the same inquiry agriculture, commerce and the arts, the true sources of wealth, and upon which laws have but an accidental and indirect influence. Thence how many interminable digressions! If commerce, for example, constitutes a branch of Political Economy, all the various kinds of commerce form a part; and as a consequence, maritime commerce, navigation, geographywhere are we to stop? Every department of human knowledge is connected. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain their points of contact, or the articulations by which they are united; by this means, a more exact knowledge will be obtained of whatever is peculiar to each, and where they run into one another. In Political Economy, agriculture, commerce and manufactures are considered only in reference to the increase or diminution of wealth; and not the processes employed in these operations. This science indicates the cases in which commerce is truly productive, where whatever is gained by one is lost by another, and where it is profitable to all; it also teaches us to appreciate its several processes, but simply in their results, at which it stops. Besides this knowledge, the merchant must. also understand the processes of his art. He must be acquainted with the commodities in which he deals, their qualities and defects, the countries from which they are derived, their mode of transportation, the values to be given for them in exchange, and the method of keeping accounts. The same remark is applicable to the agriculturist, to the manufacturer, and to the practical man of business; for to acquire a thorough knowledge of the causes and consequences of each phenomenon, the study of Political Economy is essentially necessary to them all; and to become expert in his particular pursuit, each one must add thereto a knowledge of its processes. These different subjects of investigation were not, however, confounded by Dr. Smith; but neither he, nor the writers who succeeded him, have guarded themselves against another source of confusion, here important to be noticed, inasmuch as the developments resulting from it, may not be altogether unuseful in the progress of general knowledge, or in the prosecution of our particular inquiry. In Political Economy, as in natural philosophy, and in every other study, systems have been formed before facts have been established; the place of the latter being supplied by bold assertions. More recently, the excellent method of philosophizing, which, during the last half century, has so much contributed to the advancement of every other science, has been applied to the conduct of our researches in this. Has not this method itself, however, been employed, before really knowing in what its excellence consists, and, consequently, before being acquainted with all the advantages to be derived from it? It is, in general, correctly enough said, that it consists in admitting only facts carefully observed, and the consequences rigorously deduced from them; thereby effectually excluding those prejudices and authorities which, in every department of literature and science, have so often been interposed between man and truth. But, is the whole extent of the meaning of the term facts, so often made use of, understood? It appears to me, that by this word must be understood, not only objects that exist, but events that take place; at once presenting two classes of facts: it is, for example, one fact, that such an object exists; another fact, that such an event takes place in such a manner. Objects that exist, in order to serve as the basis of certain reasoning, must be seen exactly as they are, under every point of view, with all their qualities. Otherwise, whilst supposing ourselves to be reasoning respecting the same thing, we may, under the same name, be treating of two different things. The second class of facts, namely, events that take place, consists of the phenomena exhibited, when we observe the manner in which things take place. It is, for instance, a fact, that metals, when exposed to a certain degree of heat, become fluid. The manner in which things exist and take place, constitutes what is called the nature of things; and a careful observation of the nature of things is the sole foundation of all truth. Hence, a twofold classification of sciences, namely, into those which may be styled descriptive, and impart an accurate knowledge of certain objects and their properties, as in botany and natural history; and into those which may be styled experimental, and unfold the manner in which events take place, as in chemistry, natural philosophy and astronomy. Both departments are founded on facts, and constitute an equally solid and useful portion of knowledge. Political Economy belongs to the latter; in showing the manner in which events take place in relation to wealth, it forms a part of experimental science. * But facts that take place may be considered in two points. of view; either as general or constant, or as particular or variable. General facts are the results of the nature of things in all analogous cases; particular facts as truly result from the nature of things, but they are the result of several operations Experimental science, in order to establish why events take place in a certain manner, or to be able to assign a particular cause for a particular effect, to a certain extent must be descriptive. Astronomy, in order to explain the eclipses of the sun, must demonstrate the opacity of the moon. Political Economy, in like manner, in order to show that money is a means of the production of wealth, but not the end, must exhibit its true nature. modified by each other in a particular case. The former are not less incontrovertible than the latter, even when apparently they contradict each other. In natural philosophy it is a general fact, that heavy bodies fall to the earth; the water in a fountain, nevertheless, rises above it. The particular fact of the fountain is a result wherein the laws of equilibrium are combined with those of gravity, but without destroying them. In our present inquiry, the knowledge of these two classes of facts, to wit, of objects that exist, and of events that take place, embraces two distinct sciences, Political Economy and Statistics. Political Economy, from facts always carefully observed, makes known to us the nature of wealth; from the knowledge of its nature deduces the means of its creation, unfolds the order of its distribution and the phenomena attending its destruction. It is, in other words, an exposition of the general facts observed in relation to this subject. With respect to wealth, it is a knowledge of effects and of their causes. It shows what facts are constantly conjoined; so that one is always the sequence of the other, and why it is so. But it does not resort for any further explanations to hypothesis: from the nature of particular events their concatenations must be distinctly perceived; the science must conduct us from one link to another, so that every intelligent understanding may clearly comprehend in what manner the chain is united. It is this which constitutes the excellence of the modern method of philosophizing. Statistics exhibits the production and consumption of a particular country, at a designated period; its population, military force, wealth, and whatever else is susceptible of valuation. It is a description in detail. Between Political Economy and Statistics there is the same difference as between Politics and History. The study of Statistics may gratify curiosity, but it can never be productive of advantage when it does not indicate the origin and consequences of the facts it has collected; and by indicating their origin and consequences, it becomes at once Political Economy. This doubtless is the reason why these two distinct sciences have hitherto been confounded. The work of Dr. Adam Smith is but an immethodical assemblage of the soundest principles of Political Economy, supported by luminous illustrations, and of the most ingenious researches in Statistics, blended with instructive reflections; but it is not a complete treatise of either science, but an irregular mass of curious and original speculations and of known and demonstrated truths. A perfect knowledge of Political Economy may be obtained, inasmuch as all the general facts which compose this science may be discovered. In Statistics this never can be the case; this latter science, like history, being a recital of facts, more or less uncertain, and necessarily incomplete. Of the statistics of former periods and distant countries, only detached and very imperfect accounts can be furnished. With respect to the present time, there are few persons who unite the qualifications of good observers, with a situation favourable for accurate observation. The inaccuracy of the statements inquirers are compelled to have recourse to, the restless suspicions of par ticular governments and even individuals, their ill-will, and their indifference, present obstacles often insurmountable, even by the toil and care taken by them in order to collect minute details with exactness; and which, after all, when in their possession, are only true for an instant. Dr. Smith accordingly avows that he puts no great faith in political arithmetic; which is nothing more than the arrangement of numerous statistical data. Political Economy, on the other hand, whenever the principles which constitute its basis are the rigorous deductions of undeniable general facts, rests upon an immoveable foundation. General facts are undoubtedly founded upon the observation of particular facts; but upon such particular facts as have been selected from those most carefully observed, best established, and witnessed by ourselves. When the results of these facts have uniformly been the same, the cause of their having been so satisfactorily demonstrated, and the exceptions to them even confirming other principles, equally well established, we are authorized to give them as ultimate general facts, and to submit them with confidence to the examination of all competent inquirers, who may be again desirous of subjecting them to experiment. A new particular fact, if insulated, and the connexion between its antecedents and consequents not established by reasoning, is not sufficient to shake our confidence in a general fact, for who can say that some unknown circumstance has not produced the difference noticed in their several results? A light feather is seen to mount in the air, and sometimes remain there for a long time before it falls back to the ground. Would it not, nevertheless, be erroneous to conclude that this feather is not affected by the universal law of gravitation? In Political Economy it is a general fact, that the interest of money rises in proportion to the risk run by the lender of not being repaid. Shall it be inferred that this principle is false, from having seen money lentat a low rate of interest upon hazardous occasions? The lender may have been ignorant of the risk, gratitude or fear may have induced sacrifices, and the general law, disturbed in this particular case, will resume its entire force the moment the causes of its interruption have ceased to operate. Finally, how small a number of particular facts are completely established, and how few among them are observed under all their aspects! And in supposing them well established, well observed, and well described, how many of them prove nothing, or directly. the reverse of what is intended to be maintained by them! Hence, there is not an absurd theory or extravagant opinion that has not been supported by an appeal to facts;* and it In France, the minister of the Interior in his exposé of 1813, a most dis |