Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 39 L. ed. 280, 15, ing that it was not intended to include Sup. Ct. Rep. 217; McClaine v. Rankin, claims accrued more than two years before 197 U. S. 154, 158, 49 L. ed. 702, 704, the amendment. The plain import of the 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, 3 Ann. Cas. 500; words is to the contrary. The Commission O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318, 58 has uniformly construed it as permitting L. ed. 980, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 596. Such all accrued claims, not already barred, to a statute was adopted and put in force be presented within the year named, and before any part of either claim fell we think they reasonably could not have within the bar of the local limitation. done otherwise. By The other contention turns upon the sense in which the words "the passage of this act" were used in the proviso. The act contained a concluding section saying, [425] from and after its passage;" but, on the day following its approval, its effective date was postponed by a joint resolution for sixty days; that is, from June 29 to August the act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 584, 590, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 8563, 8584, Congress amended § 16 of the act to regulate commerce by incorporating therein the following limitations: "All "this act shall take effect and be in force complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the Commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and a petition for the enforcement of an order for the pay-28, 1906. 34 Stat. at L. 838. If the act ment of money shall be filed in the circuit court 2 within one year from the date of the order, and not after: Provided, that claims accrued prior to the passage of this act may be presented [424] within one year." The words of the proviso make it certain that the amendment was to reach claims already accrued as well as those thereafter accruing. And while there doubtless was no purpose to revive claims then barred by local statutes, it is evident that Congress intended to take all other claims out of the operation of the varying laws of the several states and subject them to limitations of its own creation which would operate alike in all the states. This amendment is the third statute upon which the defendant relies, the contentions advanced thereunder being (a) that it prevented the Commission from considering any claim accrued more than two years prior to the amendment, and (b) that the year granted for filing claims which accrued before the amendment expired June 28, 1907. Either contention, if sound, would defeat all of the first claim in suit and the major part of the second. be separately considered and the proviso read in connection with the concluding section, we think it is apparent that the words named referred to the time when the act was to speak and operate as a law, and that the year given for filing accrued claims was to be reckoned from that time. In other words, the meaning was the same as if the proviso had said, "claims accrued heretofore may be presented within one year hereafter;" or "claims accrued before this act becomes effective may be presented within one year thereafter." It was not an instance where words referring to the date of passage were chosen to distinguish it from the effective date of the act, for the act was to take effect and be in force upon its passage, and therefore there was no occasion for such a distinction. And, coming to the joint resolution, we think it did not affect the sense of the words in the proviso. That was to be determined in the light of the situation in which they were used, and not by what subsequently happened. Not only so, but the purpose of the joint resolution was to cause the act to speak and operate at the The first contention is plainly not ten-end of the sixty days as if that were the able. The amendment contained a general time of its passage. In the meantime the provision limiting the time for invoking act laid no duty upon this or any other action by the Commission upon complaints claimant, and when the sixty days expired for damages to two years from the accrual it gave a full year for presenting accrued of the claim, and also a proviso saying that claims, and not a year less sixty days. See "claims accrued prior to the passage of this Re Howe, 112 N. Y. 100, 2 L.R.A. 825, 19 act may be presented within one year." N. E. 513; Harding v. People, 10 Colo. 387, The proviso was in the nature of a saving clause, and, while, as before observed, it 392, 15 Pac. 727; State ex rel. Churchill v. probably was not intended to revive claims Bemis, 45 Neb. 724, 739, 64 N. W. 348; which were then barred by applicable local Patrick v. Perryman, 52 Ill. App. 514, 518; laws, we think there is no warrant for say- Schneider v. Hussey, 2 Idaho, 8, 1 Pac. 343; Charless v. Lamberson, 1 Iowa, 435, 443, 63 Am. Dec. 457. It is not a question of notice, as in Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co. 187 U. S. 611, 615, 616, 47 L. ed. 328, 332, 333, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2 The Judicial Code, § 291, [36 Stat. at L. 1167, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, 1268], which became effective January 1, 1912, requires that the words "circuit court" be read "district court." 206, but of the meaning and operation of, it show that complaint was then made that the statute. [426] It follows from these views that the complaint, which was filed with the Commission July 17, 1907, was seasonably presented, and that no part of either claim was barred at that time. And, as the action in the district court was begun within a year after the date of the order for reparation, the defense predicated upon the statute of limitations must fail. With a single exception, the other questions pressed upon our attention center about the use and effect of the reports and orders of the Commission as evidence,-a subject concerning which the courts below differed. The pertinent provisions of the act to regulate commerce are these: Section 14 requires the Commission, upon investigating a complaint, to make a written report thereon "which shall state the conclusions of the Commission, together with its decision, order, or requirement in the premises," and, if damages be awarded, "shall include the findings of fact on which the award is made." Section 16 requires the Commission, upon awarding damages to a complaining party, to make an order directing that "the sum to which he is en titled" be paid within a fixed time; and then, after authorizing a suit to enforce payment, if the order be not obeyed, provides: "Such suit shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." At the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the reports and orders of the Commission and asked that the facts stated in the findings and orders be taken as prima facie true. An objection was interposed to the admission of the reports upon the ground that they contained various statements which it was claimed were not findings of fact, and therefore were not admissible. A colloquy ensued [427] between court and counsel in which counsel for the plaintiff conceded that portions of the reports should be eliminated, and suggested that this could be done in the charge to the jury. As a result of the colloquy the reports were received in evidence, the court observing that it would indicate to the jury what portions were to be considered. The reports were not read at the time, but, when the evidence was concluded, counsel for the plaintiff, as the record recites, "read to the jury what he stated to be material portions" of them. The record does not more definitely identify what was read; nor does anything was read that should have been omitted, or that the court's attention was drawn to the subject at the time of charg. ing the jury, either by a request for a particular instruction thereon, or by excepting to the absence of such an instruction. The court's charge apparently proceeded upon the theory that the portions of the reports which had been read to the jury were properly before them. In these circumstances the objection cannot now be considered. If it was not obviated by excluding the supposedly objectionable portions of the reports from what was read to the jury, it was waived by the failure to direct the court's attention to the subject when the jury was charged. Another objection which was directed against the orders as well as the reports is that they contain no findings of fact, or, at least, not enough to sustain an award of damages. The arguments advanced to sustain this objection proceed upon the theory that the statute requires that the reports, if not the orders, shall state the evidential rather than the ultimate facts; that is to say, the primary facts from which, through a process of reasoning and inference, the ultimate facts may be determined. We think this is not the right view of the statute, and that what it requires is a finding of the ultimate facts,—a finding which, as applied to the present case, would disclose (1) the relation of the parties [428] as shipper and carrier in interstate commerce; (2) the character and amount of the traffic out of which the claims arose; (3) the rates paid by the shipper for the service rendered and whether they were according to the established tariff; (4) whether and in what way unjust discrimination was practised against the shipper from November 1, 1900, to August 1, 1901; (5) whether, if there was unjust discrimination, the shipper was injured thereby, and, if so, the amount of his damages; (6) whether the rate collected from the shipper from August 1, 1901, to July 17, 1907, was excessive and unreasonable, and, if so, what would have been a reasonable rate for the service; and (7) whether, if the rate was excessive and unreasonable, the shipper was injured thereby, and, if so, the amount of his damages. Upon examining the reports as set forth in the record, we think they contain findings of fact which meet the requirements of the statute, and that the facts stated in the findings, if taken as prima facie true, sustain the award of the Commission. True, the findings in the original report are interwoven with other matter, and are not expressed in the terms which courts generally employ in special findings of fact, but there is no difficulty | what was said in that case. On the con trary, the plain import of the findings is that the amounts awarded represent the claimant's actual pecuniary loss; and, in view of the recital that the [430] findings were based upon the evidence adduced, it must be presumed, there being no showing to the contrary, that they were justified by it. It is also urged, as it was in the courts below, that the provision in § 16 that, in But it is said that the reports disclose actions like this, "the findings and order that the Commission applied an erroneous of the Commission shall be prima facie eviand inadmissible measure of damages, and dence of the facts therein stated" is retherefore that no effect can be given to the pugnant to the Constitution in that it inaward. What the reports really disclose is fringes upon the right of trial by jury and that the Commission, “upon consideration of operates as a denial of due process of law. the evidence adduced upon the hearing upon This provision only establishes a rebutthe question of reparation" found (a) that table presumption. It cuts off no defense, by reason of the unjust discrimination re-interposes no obstacle to a full contestation sulting from [429] giving the rebate to of all the issues, and takes no question of the Lehigh Valley Coal Company Meeker fact from either court or jury. At most, & Company were "damaged to the extent therefore, it is merely a rule of evidence. of the difference" between what they actual- It does not abridge the right of trial by ly paid from November 1, 1900, to August jury, or take away any of its incidents. 1, 1901, and what they would have paid Nor does it in anywise work a denial of had they been dealt with on the same basis due process of law. In principle it is not as was the Coal Company; and (b) that unlike the statutes in many of the states, by reason of being charged an excessive and whereby tax deeds are made prima facie unreasonable rate from August 1, 1901, to evidence of the regularity of all the proJuly 17, 1907, Meeker & Company were ceedings upon which their validity depends. "damaged to the extent of the difference" Such statutes have been generally susbetween what they actually paid and what tained. Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472, they would have paid had they been given 476, 14 L. ed. 228, 230; Marx v. Hanthorn, the rate which the Commission found would 148 U. S. 172, 182, 37 L. ed. 410, 413, 13 have been reasonable. In this we perceive Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 nothing pointing to the application of an U. S. 51, 59, 47 L. ed. 70, 74, 23 Sup. Ct. erroneous or inadmissible measure of dam- Rep. 20; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 525, ages. The Commission was authorized and as have many other state and Federal required by § 8 of the act to regulate com- enactments establishing other rebuttable merce to award "the full amount of dam- presumptions. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. ages sustained," and that, of course, was to v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42, 55 L. ed. be determined from the evidence. If it 78, 80, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 226, 31 Sup. Ct. showed that the damages corresponded to Rep. 136, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463, 2 N. C. the rebate in one instance and to the over- C. A. 243; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic charge in the other, the claimant was en- Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 81, 55 L. ed. 369, 378, titled to an award upon that basis. The 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Internation- Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437, 56 L. ed. al Coal Min. Co. 230 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 497, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248; Luria v. United 1446, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 893, is cited as hold-States, 231 U. S. 9, 25, 58 L. ed. 101, 106, ing otherwise, but it does not do so. There 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. An instructive case a shipper, without proving that he sustained any damages, sought to recover from a carrier for giving a rebate to another shipper, and this court, referring to 98, said (p. 203): "The measure of damages was the pecuniary loss inflicted on the plaintiff as the result of the rebate paid. Those damages might be the same as the rebate, or less than the rebate, or many times greater than the rebate; but unless they were proved, they could not be recovered. Whatever they were they could be recovered." There is nothing in either report of the Commission which is in conflict with upon the subject is Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505, 23 Am. Rep. 381, where, in an elaborate opinion by Chief Justice Gray, a statute making the report of an auditor prima facie evidence at the trial before a jury was held to be a legitimate exercise of legislative power over rules of evidence, and in nowise inconsistent with the constitutional right of trial by jury. And in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 382, 24 L.R.A. 141, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 683, 41 Am. St. Rep. 278, 37 N. E. 247, a like ruling was [431] made in respect of a statutory provision similar to that now | fact, the allowance is excessive. Whether, before us. as matter of law, it is objectionable, is another question. Complaint is made because the court refused to direct a verdict for the defendant, Section 8 provides that a carrier violatbut of this it suffices to say that the ruling the act shall be liable to any person ing was undoubtedly right, because the plaintiff's evidence, including the findings and orders of the Commission, tended to show every fact essential to a recovery upon both claims, and there was no opposing evidence. The district court made an allowance of $20,000 as a fee for the plaintiff's attorneys, and directed that it be taxed and collected as part of the costs, the allowance being expressly apportioned in equal amounts between the services in the proceeding before the Commission and the services in the action in court. Complaint is made of this on the grounds (a) that the allowance is, in any view, excessive, (b) that the act does not authorize an allow ance for services before the Commission, and (c) that the provision authorizing an allowance for services in the action is invalid as being purely arbitrary, and as imposing a penalty merely for failing to pay a debt. Without considering whether the mere amount of an allowance under the statute can ever be re-examined here (see Rev. Stat. § 1011, Comp. Stat. § 1672; Martinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U. S. 670, 672, 28 L. ed. 862, 863, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48, 48 L. ed. 608, 612, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 31, 25 L. ed. 531, 534; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Winter, 143 U. S. 60, 75, 36 L. ed. 71, 80, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, 8 Am. Neg. Cas. 690), we are clear that it cannot be in this instance. The record discloses that the allowance was predicated upon an exhibition of a transcript of the proceedings before the Commission and upon a statement made in open court, in the presence of counsel for the defendant, of the services rendered before the Commission and in the action. But the transcript and statement have not been made part of this record, and so we cannot know what was shown by them, and cannot judge of their bearing upon the amount of the allowance. Besides, it does not appear that the defendant offered any evidence tending [432] to show what would be a reasonable allowance, or that it in any way objected or excepted to the amount of the allowance when it was made. The only exception reserved was addressed to the allowance of any fee for the services before the Commission or for those in the action. In this situation the defendant is not now in a position to claim that, as matter of injured for the damages he sustains, "together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case." And § 16, relating to actions to enforce claims for damages after the Commission has acted thereon, provides: "If the petitioner shall finally prevail, he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit." In our opinion the services for which an attorney's fee is to be taxed and collected are those incident to the action in which the recovery is had, and not those before the Commission. This is not only implied in the words of the two provisions just quoted, but is suggested by the absence of any reference to proceedings anterior to the action. And that nothing more is intended becomes plain when we consider another provision in § 16, which requires the Commission, upon awarding damages, to make an order directing the carrier to pay the sum awarded "on or before a day named," and then declares that, if the carrier does not comply with the order "within the time limit," the claimant may proceed to collect the damages by suit. The Commission is not to allow a fee, but only to find the amount of the damages and fix a time for payment; and, if the carrier pays the award within the time named, no right to an attorney's fee arises. It is only when the [433] damages are recovered by suit that a fee is to be allowed, and this is as true of the provision in § 8 as of that in § 16. The evident purpose is to charge the carrier with the costs and expenses entailed by a failure to pay without suit,-if the claimant finally prevails, and to that end to tax as part of the costs in the suit wherein the recovery is had a reasonable fee for the services of the claimant's attorney in instituting and prosecuting that suit. It follows that the district court erred in matter of law in allowing a fee for services before the Commission. The contention that the provision for an attorney's fee for services in the suit is invalid as being purely arbitrary, and as imposing a penalty for merely failing to pay a debt, is without merit. The provision is leveled against common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, a quasi public business, and is confined to cases wherein a recovery is had for damages resulting from the carrier's violation of some duty imposed harmless error admission in the public interest by the act to regulate | Appeal 2. The presence of irrelevant matter in the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission admitted in evidence in a reparation suit brought under the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563), as amended by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563), by a shipper against a carrier, is harmless error where the case made by the evidence rightly admitted was such as, in the absence of any clearly entitled the shipper to a verdict for opposing evidence, and there was none,the amount claimed. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 50205050, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 435.] February 23, 1915. It results from what has been said that Argued October 13 and 14, 1914. Decided the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the District Court must be modified by eliminating the allowance of $10,000 as an attorney's fee for services before the Commis sion, and affirmed as so modified. It is so ordered. 1. The admission in evidence, in a reparation suit brought by a shipper against a carrier under the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563), § 16, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8584), of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission N WRIT of Certiorari to the United Third Circuit to review a judgment which See same case below, 211 Fed. 785. Messrs. John A. Garver and William A. Glasgow, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Messrs. Joseph W. Folk and Charles W. Needham filed a brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. John G. Johnson argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Edgar H. Boles, Frank H. Platt, and George W. Field, filed a brief for respondent. For contentions of counsel, see their briefs reported in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. ante, 644. as [435] Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court: This is a companion case to that just decided, and involves a claim for reparation similar to the second claim in that case, and arising out of the same rate. In this instance the shipper was Henry E. Meeker, who had succeeded to the business of Meeker & Company, the shippers |