cle of commerce so innocuous in its designed use and so unrelated in any way to any possible danger to the public health that the enactment must be considered as a merely arbitrary interference with the property and liberty of the citizen. It is plainly not enough that the subject should be regarded as debatable. If it be debatable, the legis

The plaintiff in error challenges the cor- contemplated uses; that is, that it indubirectness of this construction, but this ques-tably must be classed as a wholesome artition is simply one of local law with which we are not concerned. We accept the decision of the supreme court of the state as to the meaning of the statute, and, in the light of this construction, the validity of the act under the Federal Constitution must be determined. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 414, 41 L. ed. 489, 494, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130; W. W. Cargill Co. | lature is entitled to its own judgment, and v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 466, 45 L. ed. that judgment is not to be superseded by 619, 925, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Lindsley v. the verdict of a jury upon the issue which Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 73, the legislature has decided. It is not a case 55 L. ed. 369, 375, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, where the legislature has confined its acAnn. Cas. 1912C, 160; Purity Extract Toniction to the prohibition of that which is deCo. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 198, 57 L. ed scribed in general terms as unwholesome or 184, 186, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44.

The first Federal question is presented by the contention that the statute, as applied, effects a deprivation of property without due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the 14th Amendment.

injurious, leaving the issue to be determined in each case as it arises. The legislature is not bound to content itself with general directions when it considers that more detailed measures are necessary to attain a legiti mate object. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 288, 58 L. ed. 1312, 1316, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829. Legis.

protective power has many familiar illustrations. The present case is one of such particularization, where the statute-read as the [453] state court reads it—especially prohibits preservatives containing boric acid. The legislature thus expressed its judgment, and it is sufficient to say, without passing upon the opinions of others adduced in argument, that the action of the legislature cannot be considered to be arbitrary. Its judg

taken out of that category. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 51, 55 L. ed. 364, 365, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364; Circular No. 15 (June 23, 1904), Bureau of Chemistry; Food Inspection Decision 76 (July 13, 1907); Bulletin (December 31, 1914), Bureau of Chemistry;-U. S. Department of Agriculture.

The state has undoubted power to protect the health of its people and to impose relative particularization in the exercise of strictions having reasonable relation to that end. The nature and extent of restrictions of this character are matters for the legislative judgment in defining the policy of the state and the safeguards required. In the avowed exercise of this power, the legislature of Illinois has enacted a prohibition-as the statute is [452] construed-against the sale of food preservatives containing boric acid. And unless this prohibition is palpably unreasonable and arbitrary we are not at lib-ment appears to have sufficient support to be erty to say that it passes beyond the limits of the state's protective authority. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 686, 32 L. ed. 253, 257, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 91, 34 L. ed. 620, 623, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 395, 42 L. ed. 780, 792, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 246, 46 L. ed. 171, 175, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25, 49 L. ed. 643, 649, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 39, 53 L. ed. 75, 79, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547, 53 L. ed. 315, 319, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569, 55 L. ed. 328, 339, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 198, 57 L. ed. 184, 186, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331, 333, 58 L. ed. 985, 987, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 596. The contention of the plaintiff in error could be granted only if it appeared that by a consensus of opinion the preservative was unquestionably harmless with respect to its

It is further urged that the enactment, as construed, contains an unconstitutional discrimination against the plaintiff in error, but in this aspect, again, the question is whether the classification made by the legislature can be said to be without any reasonable basis. The legislature is entitled to estimate degrees of evil, and to adjust its legislation according to the exigency found to exist. And, applying familiar principle, it cannot be said that the legislature exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion in classification when it enacted the prohibition in question relating to foods and compounds sold as food preservatives. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 256, 52 L. ed. 195, 197, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89; Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 354, 52 L. ed. 236, 243, 28 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 114; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 78, 55 L. ed. 369, 377, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 235, 56 L. ed. 175, 179, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 700, 706, 58 L. ed. 803, 806, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 464; Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227, 58 L. ed. 1288, 1289, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 856; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 383, 384, ante, 628, 631, 632, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. We find no ground for holding the statute to be repugnant to the 14th Amendment.

admitted was entirely consistent with the view that the original package referred to was simply the small package in the envelop which the state had described, and no error can be charged to the state court in so regarding it. Nothing appeared as to the character [455] of the shipment from Minnesota to Illinois, and it would be wholly unjustifiable to assume that, in commercial shipments into the state, the small package was segregated or separately introduced. If these small packages were associated in their shipment into the state, as they naturally would be, and were subsequently sold The remaining contention is that the stat- separately or in various lots, these separate ute as applied violates the commerce clause. packages, although respectively in the origiTreating the article as one on a footing with nal envelops, would not be classed as "origadulterated food, the power of the state to inal packages" within the rule invoked, so prohibit sales within its borders is broadly as to escape the local law governing doasserted on its behalf. On the other hand, the mestic transactions. We have repeatedly plaintiff in error insists that the compound so held, in cases not materially different in is not an adulterated [454] food, and was this respect. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. not charged to be such, but was an article S. 343, 45 L. ed. 224, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; of commerce manufactured in another state; | Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261, 49 and that whatever may be the power of the | L. ed. 471, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233; Purity Exstate of Illinois over manufacture and sale tract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, apart from interstate commerce, the state 199-201, 57 L. ed. 184, 186–188, 33 Sup. Ct. could not prohibit its introduction and sale Rep. 44. The testimony offered by the plainin the course of interstate commerce. It tiff in error, and treated as received, taken is not necessary, however, to deal with the in connection with what had already been question in the scope thus suggested. The proved as to the character of the packages sole ground for invoking the commerce put up for retail sale, fell far short of the clause in order to escape the restrictions proof required to constitute a defense upon of the state law is sought to be found in the the ground that the state law, otherwise doctrine with respect to sales in original valid, was applied in contravention of the packages. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. commerce clause. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 22, 23, 43 L. ed. 49, 57, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75. The record, however, is wholly insufficient to support the contention. The stipulation of facts read in evidence by the state set forth that the defendant had sold in Chicago "two packages" of the compound. The state then introduced in evidence an "envelop used for inclosing the compound." This, among other things, bore a statement that the content of "this package is sufficient for four quarts." And it set forth prices as follows: "Retail Price. 1 Package, 10c. 3 Packages, 25c. 7 Packages, 50c. 15 Packages, $1." The clear inference from this evidence was that the compound was offered for sale at retail in small packages (in envelops) suitable for the consumer. The defendant made an CLARK offer of proof, and in lieu of the offered testimony it was conceded that the witness, if sworn, would testify that the compound mentioned in the statement of claim "is an article of commerce sold in Illinois, in the original package manufactured and made in Minnesota." As to the nature of the pack- 1. Unjust discrimination in the matage, nothing more was shown. All that waster of coal-car distribution to a mine owner

It should be added that no question is presented in the present case as to the pow er of Congress to make provision with respect to the immediate containers (as well as the larger receptacle in which the latter are shipped) of articles prepared in one state and transported to another, so as suitably to enforce its regulations as to interstate trade. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 135, 57 L ed. 754, 767, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 984, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431. It does not appear that the state law as here applied is in conflict with any Federal rule. Judgment affirmed.

[456] PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD
COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

BROTHERS COAL MINING COM-
PANY.

(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 456-473.)

Interstate

powers -
tribution.

Commerce Commission
redressing unjust car dis-

1

may be redressed by the Interstate Com- See same case below, 241 Pa. 515, 88 Atl. merce Commission where the coal, although | 754.

sold f. o. b. cars at the mine, was to be transported to other states.

[Matters as to Interstate Commerce Commis

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Francis I. Gowen and John G.

sion, see Interstate Commerce Commission, Johnson argued the cause, and, with Mr. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] F. D. McKenney, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

Interstate Commerce

powers tribution.

Commission

redressing unjust car dis

The award of the Interstate Commerce

Black, Judgm. §§ 526, 688; 3 Cyc. 729; Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. v. Penn Ref. Co. 70 C. C. A. 23, 137 Fed. 343.

2. The ascertainment of the damages Commission is a bar to any other proceedoccasioned by a carrier's rules as to caring in respect to the cause of action which distribution, which are unduly discrimina- formed the basis of the award. tory, is as much within the scope of the Interstate Commerce Commission's authority, under the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 382, chap. 104, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8573), §§ 8, 9, 13, 16, as though the damages were due to the exaction of unreasonable rates. [Matters as to Interstate Commerce Commission, see Interstate Commerce Commission, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] State courts-jurisdiction-suit against interstate carrier

- effect of prior action of Interstate Commerce Commission redress for unjust car distribution.

Messrs. A. M. Liveright and A. L. Cole argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error:

The award made by the Interstate Commerce Commission is not a bar.

Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 229 Pa. 61, 140 Am. St. Rep. 700, 78 Atl. 28; Judson, Interstate Commerce, 2d ed. p. 489; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 236 U. S. 412, ante, 644, P.U.R. 1915D, 1072, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 328.

It will hardly be contended seriously that an order of the Commission which merely establishes a rebuttable presumption constitutes a bar.

3. A shipper who has demanded and obtained a ruling from the Interstate Commerce Commission that a carrier's practice in the matter of the distribution to mine owners of cars intended for the interstate transportation of coal was unjustly discriminatory cannot maintain an action in 23 Cyc. 1226; Southern P. R. Co. v. Unita state court to recover damages under a ed States, 168 U. S. 1, 48, 42 L. ed. 355, state statute with respect to the same trans-376, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; New Orleans action, although the Commission may not v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371, 397, 42 yet have made its award of damages, since L. ed. 202, 211, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905; Last the express requirement, in the act of Feb- Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 157 ruary 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 382, chap. U. S. 687, 39 L. ed. 861, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8573), § 9, of an 733, 18 Mor. Min. Rep. 205. election between a proceeding before the Commission and a suit in the Federal courts, leaves no room for the conclusion that there is an option to resort to a state court in the first instance, and the suit on reparation orders, authorized by § 16, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 554, chap. 309, Comp. Stat 1913, § 8584), either in the state or Federal court, may be brought only after the Commission's award has been made.

[For other cases, see Courts, VI. a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

The Pennsylvania statute of 1883 involved in this case was passed in aid of and in exercise of the police power of the state.

Puritan Coal Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 237 Pa. 453, 85 Atl. 426, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 37; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Richmond & A. R. Co..

v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co. 169 U. S. 311, 42 L. ed. 759, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 40 L. ed. 1105, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 934; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 40 L. ed. 849, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714; Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U. S. 579, 54 L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. ed. 166, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1086; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, 58 L. ed. 988, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Louisville & N.

R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 518, 46 | discrimination, assessed the damage at L. ed. 298, 306, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95; West- $41,481 and trebled the amount, making ern U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. $124,443. Motions in arrest of judgment 218 U. S. 406, 54 L. ed. 1088, 36 L.R.A. and for a new trial and for judgment non (N.S.) 220, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 59, 21 Ann. obstante veredicto, upon the grounds above Cas. 815; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, stated (and others), were denied. Judg. 56 L. ed. 1182, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Wad- ment for the total amount of the verdict ley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. was entered and [460] was affirmed by the 651, ante, 405, P.U.R.1915A, 106, 35 Sup. supreme court of the state, 241 Pa. 515, 88 Ct. Rep. 214. Atl. 754. And this writ of error has been sued out.

Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought in January, 1912, by the Clark Brothers Coal Mining Company (defendant in error) in the court of common pleas of Clearfield county, Pennsylvania, to recover damages for inadequate and unjustly discriminatory car service and supply. The complaint related to the action of the defendant company with respect to cars required for the transportation of coal from the plaintiff's mines known as Falcon, Nos. 2, 3, [459] and 4, in Clearfield county, and Falcon, Nos. 5 and 6, in Indiana county, Pennsylvania, between October, 1905, and April 30, 1907. A statute of Pennsylvania (act of June 4, 1883, P. L. 72, 4 Purdons 3906; see Const. [Pa.] 1873, art. 17) prohibits undue or unreasonable discrimination by any common carrier "in charges for or in facilities for the transportation of freight within this state or coming from or going to any other state," and provides that the carrier guilty of unjust discrimination shall be liable "for damages treble the amount of injury suffered."

It clearly appeared that the proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the mines Falcon Nos. 2, 3, and 4, embraced substantially the same claim as that litigated in this action. As the trial judge said: "It" (the plaintiff) "did get an award of damages for what we understand to be practically the same subjectmatter." That proceeding was instituted by the plaintiff in June, 1907. Its petition, among other things, alleged that it had been, and was, "engaged in mining and shipping coal to points and places of delivery and to the coal markets beyond the state of Pennsylvania," and that it had, during all the period mentioned, to wit, "from the 15th day of October, 1905, to the date of the filing of this complaint," orders for coal to be mined and shipped "beyond the lines of said state." It complained of the rating of its mines by the defendant and also of unjust and unreasonable discrimination against it in the daily distribution of cars "for the transportation of its coal into the interstate markets," that it had suffered "great loss and damage in On behalf of the defendant (plaintiff in its business as a producer, shipper, and error) the jurisdiction of the court to enter- seller of bituminous coal" in the interstate tain the action was challenged upon the coal trade, and that such damage amounted ground that, with respect to car distribu- in the aggregate to $36,401.12. It prayed tion, the defendant was subject to the act to for hearing, for an ascertainment of the regulate commerce, and that the claim of the damages which it had sustained in its inplaintiff was cognizable only by the Inter-terstate business by reason of unreasonable state Commerce Commission or by the courts of the United States. It was urged further that in a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had been instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant prior to the beginning of this action, the Commission had found that the method of car distribution practised by the defendant with respect to the plaintiff's mines known as Falcon, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, was unjustly discriminatory, and that the Commission had made an award of damages accordingly; and that by reason of this proceeding and the action of the Commis- "Under a rule announced by it on Februsion the plaintiff was precluded from main-ary 1, 1903, [461] the defendant seems to taining the present action so far as it have charged all railroad cars, regardless of related to the alleged loss sustained with re- ownership, and private cars not owned by spect to the mines last described. the operator loading them, against the disThe trial court overruled these conten-tributive share of each mine, but it treated tions of the defendant. The jury, finding its own fuel cars as a special allotment in

preferences given to its competitors, as alleged, and for a determination of the proper basis of car distribution to be observed. After hearing, the Commissioner made its report on March 7, 1910. 19 Inters. Com. Rep. 392. On the same day, the Commission rendered its decision in Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (19 Inters. Com. Rep. 356), involving similar questions as to the method practised by the defendant in distributing "its available coal-car equipment." Upon this point, the Commission there said:

addition to the distributive share. On March | Coal & Mining Company, was placed on an 28, 1905, a notice was sent to shippers of equal footing with the mines of the Berbituminous coal from mines on the lines of wind-White Coal Mining Company in the the defendant, advising them that thereafter all railroad cars, regardless of ownership, and all private cars not owned by the operator loading them, should be considered as cars available for distribution, except its own company fuel cars and fuel cars sent upon its lines by foreign companies and specially consigned to particular mines.