S. 244, 52 L. ed. 191, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 86; Schwartz v. Duss, 187 U. S. 8, 47 L. ed. 53, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4. The service was made upon the highest of ficer of the corporation present in his official capacity in the state, while engaged in the transaction of the corporate business. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 27 L. ed. 222, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354; DeBeers Consolidated Mines v. Howe [1905] 2 K. B. 612; Haggin v. Comptoir d' Escompte de Paris, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 519, 58 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 508, 61 L. T. N. S. 748, 37 Week. Rep. 703. The defendant corporation was "doing business" in the state, not only at the time when the service was made, but also the transaction itself, out of which the suit grew, was a transaction consummated in the state where the suit was brought. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 58 L. ed. 1479, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 944; Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. ed. 164, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 57, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 57 L. ed. 486, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 245, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 77; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. R. Co. 4 Laters. Com. Rep. 408, 6 C. C. A. 653, 20 | U. S. App. 1, 57 Fed. 948, 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. ed. 940, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Actien-Gesellschaft [1902] 1 K. B. 342, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 284, 50 Week. Rep. | 226, 86 L. T. N. S. 472, 18 Times L. R. 229, 19 R. P. C. 46; La Compagnie Générale Transatlantique v. Law [1899] A. C. 433, 68 L. J. Prob. N. S. 104, 80 L. T. N. S. 845, 15 Times L. R. 424, 8 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 550; Goertz v. Bell [1904] 2 K. B. 147, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 448, 53 Week. Rep. 64, 90 L. T. N. S. 675, 20 Times L. R. 348; San Paulo R. Co. v. Carter [1896] A. C. 31, 65 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 161, 73 L. T. N. S. 538, 44 Week. Rep. 336, 60 J. P. 84, 452. ant railway company, at its office in Philadelphia, by handing a true and attested copy of the summons to the president, at such office. There is no question that the president was the proper officer to serve, and that he was duly served with process. The contention of the plaintiff in error is that the service is void and the court without jurisdiction because at the time of the service of process the defendant corporation was not doing business in the eastern district of Pennsylvania, wherein service was made. As this court has had frequent occasion to say, each case of this kind must depend upon its own facts, and the question is whether the defendant corporation had submitted itself to the local jurisdiction and was present therein so as to warrant service of process upon it. See St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Alexandria, 227 U. S. 218, and previous cases in this court cited on page 226, 57 L. ed. 486, 488, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 245. The district court found certain facts, from which it appears: The defendant is the successor to two electric railway companies, one of which was the Washington, [187] Alexandria, & Mount Vernon Railway Company, which issued the bonds upon which the present suit was brought. The defendant company operates electric railway lines from Mount Vernon to Alexandria, in the state of Virginia, and from that city to Washington, in the District of Columbia. Under the laws of Virginia, the defendant company might have offices outside the state. The Virginia office of the company, under the laws of Virginia, must be kept in that state, and was at Mount Vernon, where there was a ticket agent, and where the annual meetings of the stockholders were held. The company maintained a general office at Washington, District of Columbia, where the business of conducting the physi cal operation of the road was carried on through its manager. At the Washington Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of office the cash books of the company were the court: kept, showing daily receipts, collection of This case is here upon the single question accounts due, operating record, pay roll, of the jurisdiction of the United States time record, and statement of claims acdistrict court for the eastern district of cruing and their payment as made. No Pennsylvania to entertain the action. The books of the company concerning its busisuit was begun by the Real Estate Trustness were kept at the Mount Vernon office. Company of Philadelphia, against the Wash- The commercial account of the company ington-Virginia Railway Company, a corporation of the state of Virginia, to recover a judgment on certain bonds made by the Washington, Alexandria, & Mt. Vernon Railway Company, also a Virginia corporation, payment of which, it was alleged, had been assumed by the Washington-Virginia Railway Company. The summons in the action For some time prior to the merger, the was served upon the president of the defend-Washington, Alexandria, & Mount Vernon was kept at the Commercial National Bank, of Washington, District of Columbia, where the receipts from the operation of the road were deposited, and where checks for operating expenses were drawn on that bank. The company also kept three smaller accounts in Alexandria, Virginia. Railway Company maintained an office in delphia office. The president kept the official the Real Estate Trust Building, at Phila- seal of the company in Philadelphia. The delphia, which office was leased by the president and treasurer lived in Philadel president of that company, one Clarence phia. The president had his desk at the P. King, who subsequently became presi- office in the Real Estate Trust Building, dent of the merged company, and who was where he was present two days in each succeeded by Frederick H. Treat, president week and went to Washington twice a week. of the defendant company at the time of While in Philadelphia, the president transthe service of this writ. The defendant acted such business of the company as company paid rental to Mr. King at the came to his attention, and conducted the rate of $50 per month, which covered the correspondence of the company upon official right of desk room for its president, treas- stationery, upon which appeared the adurer, and bookkeeper, and the [188] use of dress at the Real Estate Trust Building, and the furniture, fixtures, and telephone in the the words, "Office of F. H. Treat, President, office. No formal authority from the di- Philadelphia," or, "Office of the President, rectors appears for maintaining any office Philadelphia." The bills of the company, except that at Mount Vernon, Virginia, but after approval in Washington by the manthe by-laws of the company provide that its ager of the railway, were sent to Philadelstock shall be transferred only on the books phia for examination and approval, and of the company at the office of its treasurer. the checks for payment were drawn at the Upon application for listing its stock on Philadelphia office and forwarded to Washthe Washington Stock Exchange, the Washington. No one at the Washington office ington, Alexandria, & Mount Vernon Rail- had authority to draw checks. No money way Company, through its president, de- was paid out at the Washington office exclared that the principal office of the cept petty cash for daily expenses. company was located at Mount Vernon, Virginia, with branch offices at Washington and Philadelphia. After the merger, the defendant applied to the Philadelphia Stock Exchange for the listing of its securities, and declared in its application, "Stock is transferred at the Company's General Office, 1307 Real Estate Trust Building, Philadelphia, and registered by the Girard Trust Company, Philadelphia, Registrar," and declared its offices to be as follows: "Offices: With this finding of facts counsel for the plaintiff in error finds little fault. The objection is rather to the inference drawn by the court below from such facts. It is urged that the keeping of the books in Philadelphia was for the convenience of the president and treasurer, but it also appears that such books were required to be kept by the by-laws of the company. Among the uncontroverted facts it appears that the defendant company had an office in the city of Philadelphia, where the presi dent of the company lived, upon whom service was made, and that at this office the treasurer of the company, who also lived in Philadelphia, kept its regular books, and 1202 Pennsylvania ave- from this office was conducted a general cor "Principal, Mt. Vernon, Virginia. "General and Transfer, 1307 Real Estate Trust Building, Philadelphia. "Washington: nue." At the office in Philadelphia, the corporation kept its regular business ledgers, its stock transfer books and stock ledgers. The bookkeeper of the company had his desk in the office at Philadelphia, made his entries in the corporation books kept there, and conducted general correspondence in relation to the company's business at that office. The treasurer of the company maintained the only treasurer's office of the company there, and had there his desk, papers, and books. The company had four bank accounts in Philadelphia, into which accounts from time to time was deposited the surplus of cash not needed in the active operation of the company. Out of these accounts [189] were paid interest on mortgages, dividends, and the larger bills, by checks drawn at the Philadelphia office by the treasurer, and the deposit and check books on such banks were kept at the Phila respondence in relation to the business of the company. The company kept [190] four bank accounts in separate banks in the city of Philadelphia, where money was deposited and checked out in payment of mortgages, dividends, and the larger bills of the company. Such business of the company as required his attention at the Philadelphia office was there transacted by the president. Checks for payment of bills of the company at Washington were drawn at Philadelphia and forwarded to Washington. We think the mere recital of these facts makes it evident that the corporation was It had submitted itself It follows that the judgment of the District Court, maintaining its jurisdiction, must be affirmed. Commerce -state regulation Shipments into a state of intoxicating liquors, which, because intended solely for the personal use of the consignees, were not to be used in violation of the laws of the state as construed by its highest court, were not subjected to the operation of a law of such state forbidding carriers to bring intoxicating liquors into, or deliver them in, any dry territory, by the provisions of the Webb-Kenyon act of March 1, 1913 (37 Stat. at L. 699, chap. 90, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8739), prohibiting the interstate shipment or transportation of intoxicating liquor which is intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of the state into which the liquor is transported. [For other cases, see Commerce, III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 271.] A citizen of Kentucky has the constitutional right to use intoxicating liquors and to receive and possess them for that purpose. Adams Exp. Co. v. Com. 154 Ky. 471, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 342, 157 S. W. 908; Calhoun v. Com. 154 Ky. 70, 156 S. W. 1077; Martin v. Com. 153 Ky. 784, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 957, 156 S. W. 870; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 299, 61 S. E. 61, 14 Ann. Cas. 562; Eidge v. Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 394, 51 So. 246; State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 6 L.R.A. 847, 10 S. E. 283; Com. v. Smith, 163 Ky. 227, L.R.A.1915D, 172, 173 S. W. 340; Freund, Pol. Power, §§ 453, 454; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U. S. 439, 455, 42 L. ed. 1101, 1106, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674. The Webb-Kenyon law does not authorize the application of a state statute to an interstate shipment for lawful, personal use. Ala. Van Winkle v. State, Del., 91 Atl. 385; Adams Exp. Co. v. Com. 154 Ky. 462, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 343, 157 S. W. 908; Palmer v. Southern Exp. Co. 129 Tenn. 116, 165 S. W. 236; Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 215 Fed. 672; Ex parte Peede, Tex. Crim. Rep. —, 170 S. W. 749; Southern Exp. Co. v. State, 66 So. 115; Southern Exp. Co. v. High Decided Point, 167 N. C. 103, 83 S. E. 254; Bristol Distributing Co. v. Southern Exp. Co. (1915) Va. -; West Virginia ex rel. IN IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of Whit- Blue v. Adams Exp. Co. 219 Fed. 331; Adams ley County in the State of Kentucky to Exp. Co. v. Com. 160 Ky. 66, 169 S. W. 603. review a conviction of an express company If there is any doubt as to the construcfor bringing into and delivering in that tion or application of a statute, contemcounty an interstate shipment of intoxicat-porary history, which shows the evils intended to be remedied, may be referred to ing liquors. Reversed. by the courts. Argued May 10 and 11, 1915. The facts are stated in the opinion. - Johnson v. Southern P. Co. 196 U. S. 19, Messrs. Joseph S. Graydon and Law-49 L. ed. 370, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158, 17 Am. rence Maxwell argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error: The transactions disclosed in evidence constituted interstate commerce to which the Kentucky statute could have no application prior to the taking effect of the WebbKenyon law. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 223 U. S. 70, 56 L. ed. 355, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189. NOTE.-On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce- see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. 13 L.R.A. 107, and Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. 158. Neg. Rep. 412; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 36 L. ed. 226, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Dunlap v. United States, 173 U. S. 65, 43 L. ed. 616, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 319; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. Mr. James Garnett, Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause, and, with Mr. Robert T. Caldwell, filed a brief for defendant in error: The Webb-Kenyon act contemplates other interests than those of the consignee. On the power to prohibit or restrict one's Adams Exp. Co. v. Com. 154 Ky. 462, using intoxicating liquor, or having the same 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 342, 157 S. W. 908; Adams in his possession for his own use see note Exp. Co. v. Com. 160 Ky. 66, 169 S. W. 603; to Com. v. Campbell, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 172. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing On the right of prohibition as limited by the Federal Constitution and its Amend- Co. 223 U. S. 70, 56 L. ed. 355, 32 Sup. Ct. ments-see note to State v. Durein, 15 L.R.A. | Rep. 189; Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 215 Fed. 672; Van (N.S.) 923. 1267 State v. Patterson, 134 N. C. 612, 47 S. E. 808; State v. Herring, 145 N. C. 418, 122 Am. St. Rep. 461, 58 S. E. 1007; American Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, 49 L. ed. 417, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182; West Virginia v. Adams Exp. Co. C. C. A. —, L.R.A. 219 Fed. 794; Com. v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 172, 117 S. W. 383, 19 Ann. Cas. 159; Com. v. Smith, 163 Ky. 227, L.R.A. 1915D, 172, 173 S. W. 340; Calhoun v. Com. 154 Ky. 70, 156 S. W. 1077. Messrs. J. B. Snyder and W. B. Wheeler filed a brief as amici curia: The agreed statement of facts constitutes a violation of the law. West Virginia v. Adams Exp. Co. A. —, L.R.A.-,-, 219 Fed. 794. C. C. Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court: The Adams Express Company was indicted for violation of § 2569a of the statutes of the state of Kentucky, which, omitting the portions not essential to the consideration of this case, provides: "It shall be unlawful for any public or private carrier to bring into, deliver or distribute, in any county, district, precinct, town or city, where the sale of intoxicating liquors has been prohibited, any spirituous, vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquor, regardless of the name by which it may be called; and this act shall apply to all packages of such intoxicating liquors whether broken or unbroken. Any public or private carrier violating the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of violating the local option law and shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hunAnd dred dollars for each offense. the place of delivery of such liquors shall be held to be the place of sale; The charge of the indictment was that The Kentucky statute prohibiting the ship-business of a common carrier in Kentucky, the Adams Express Company, doing the ment of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes into dry territory, and making the place of delivery the place of sale, is a valid and constitutional enactment. Adams Exp. Co. v. Com. 129 Ky. 420, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1182, 112 S. W. 577; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 223 U. S. 70, 56 L. ed. 355, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189; State v. Herring, 122 Am. St. Rep. 461, note; Hart v. State, 112 Am. St. Rep. 437, note; did knowingly bring into and deliver in Whitley county of that state certain intoxicating liquors to one John Horshaw, contrary to law. This case, with [194] eighteen others, was heard in the circuit court of Whitley county, upon an agreed statement of facts, which stipulated that the Adams Express Company was engaged in the business in Whitley county, Kentucky, and between that county and the cities of Jellico and High Cliff, in the state of Tennessee. That on the dates named in the indictment the Adams Express Company knowingly Del.brought into, transferred, delivered, and United States ex rel. F. Zimmerman & Co. v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. 210 Fed. A citizen of Kentucky has no constitutional right to receive and possess intoxicating liquors for his own use except as provided by law. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273. The purpose of all legislation limiting and prohibiting the sale of liquor is to discourage and prevent its use. West Virginia v. Adams Exp. Co. C. C. A. —, L.R.A.—, 219 Fed. 794. of a common carrier and did such business distributed certain spirituous liquors, to wit: whisky, in local option territory and where the local option law was in force, as charged in the indictment. That before bringing such liquors into such territory the consignees of said liquors, being the persons named in the indictment, sent orders by mail for such liquors to dealers at Jellico and High Cliff, in the state of Tennessee, and paid the purchase price of said liquors to said dealers at the places named in Tennessee. That upon receipt of the orders, the dealers, at their respective places of business at Jellico and High Cliff, Tennessee, for the purpose of filling such orders delivered to the Adams Express Company the several packages of liquor, directing the Express Company to carry and deliver the same to such persons; that the Adams Express Company did thereupon carry said packages of liquor from Jellico and High it is the effect of the act of Congress of March 1, 1913, 37 Stat. at L. 699, [196] chap. 90, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8739, known as the Webb-Kenyon act, to require a different result. That act provides: An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Cliff, in Tennessee, into Whitley county, Kentucky, and there delivered the same to the consignees thereof, who were the persons who had made the orders and to whom the indictment charged the defendant with delivering and distributing the liquors mentioned. That the liquors were intended by said consignees for their personal use and were so used by them, and were not intended by them to be sold contrary to law, and were not so sold by them. That the trans- Be it enacted, etc., that the shipment or actions and all of them described occurred | transportation, in any manner or by any since the enactment and going into effect means whatsoever, of any spirituous, vi. of the act of Congress known as the Webb-nous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicatKenyon law [37 Stat. at L. 699, chap. 90, ing liquor of any kind, from one state, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8739]. territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country into any state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor is intended by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited. The Express Company requested a peremptory instruction [195] for a verdict of not guilty because the shipments of liquor were interstate shipments and constituted interstate commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. That the liquors being for the personal use of the consignees respectively § 2659a is repugnant to the Constitution of Kentucky, and if the indictment was authorized by the act of Congress known as the Webb-Kenyon law, that law is in con travention of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution. This request for a peremptory instruction for the defendant was refused. The court instructed the jury that if it believed from the evidence that the Adams Express Company, as a common carrier, brought any spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors into Whitley county, being local option territory in the state of Kentucky, and there delivered the same to the persons named in the indictment, then the defend ant was guilty and its punishment should be fixed at not less than $50 nor more than $100; and that upon the whole case, if they had any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the company, they should find a verdict of not guilty. The defendant duly excepted to the giving of these instructions and to the refusal to grant its prayer for a peremptory instruction. The company was convicted, and fined in the sum of $50. That amount not being sufficient to give the court of appeals of the state jurisdiction, a writ of error was taken from this court to the circuit court of Whitley county. The Kentucky statute now under consideration was before this court in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 223 U. S. 70, 56 L. ed. 355, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189. In that case it was held that, as applied to interstate shipments, the statute was void as an attempt by the state to regulate commerce among the states. Such must still be the fate of the statute unless Before entering upon a consideration of the meaning of this act, it is well to have in mind certain principles of constitutional law, and, as well, certain legislation of Congress upon this subject in force at the time when the Webb-Kenyon act was passed. The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress authority to regulate commerce among the states, to the exclusion of state control over the subject. This power is comprehensive, and subject to no limitations, except such as are found in the Constitution itself. This general principle runs through all the cases decided in this court considering the matter, and has never been questioned since Chief Justice Marshall, for the court, delivered the judgment in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23. Applying this general principle, [197] it was held by this court in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, that the state of Iowa, in the absence of congressional permission, had no authority to prohibit the sale of liquor in original packages in the hands of importers from other states in that state, and the court there declared that, whatever the individual views of its members might be |