which copies of all bills introduced are placed in the rooms of the association at a very early day for the examination of members of the committee on law reform and of the association, as well as for the convenience of the profession throughout the State. Your committee recommends that a sub-committee of the committee on law reform be placed in charge of the matter of amendments to the Code, with instructions to examine the files from time to time, and in case of questionable legislation, to refer the same to the full committee on law reform to opinion as to at least portions of the common law, such enactment is possible and desirable; that the plan adopted by the English Parliament in the codification of the laws relating to bills and notes and partnership, can well be adopted at least by way of experiment in this State, and that steps should be taken in that direction for the purpose of determining experimentally whether such enactment is consistent with the best interests of the public. It is quite probable that action will be taken in that direction by the Commission of Statutory Revision during the present session of the Legislature, in sub take such action in the matter as may be desirable and necessary to prevent unwise or improper legis-mitting a draft of such proposed statute upon at least one subject. lation. Your committee is of the opinion that a careful examination should be made by competent authority of the provisions of the present Code of Procedure, as to the necessity and propriety of a partial revision and with a view to its condensation and simplification, and to inquire whether a rearrangement upon a more scientific basis would not make it more valuable and convenient. The question of selection of legislative counsel, so-called, for the purpose of examination and revision of bills presented to the Legislature with a view of their being put in proper form before passage, was discussed by the committee, and the president was appointed a sub-committee to consult with the proper authorities with regard to any legislation that might be necessary or desirable in the matter. But little however remained to be done in this direction by your committee, in view of the fact that very soon after the annual meeting of the association, at which the matter was discussed and recommended, section 23 of the legislative law was so amended as to provide that it should thereafter be the duty of the commissioners of statutory revision, on request of either house of the Legislature, or of any committee, member or officer thereof, to draft or revise bills, to render opinions as to the constitutionality, consistency or other legal effect of proposed legislation, and to report by bill such measures as they deem expedient. Your committee is however of the opinion that the powers and duties of the body charged with the examination of statutes before passage should be still more enlarged so that no bill may hereafter pass the Legislature until it has been carefully examined and approved as to form by the proper authority charged therewith. The action taken is a very long step in the right direction, but should be supplemented by a requirement that all statutes should be thus examined and approved. The remaining matter submitted to your committee relates to the enactment of the common law in statutory form. Mr. Collin, Mr. Linson and the president were appointed a sub-committee upon this subject, and report to your committee that in their Your committee recommends further discussion upon this subject, being of the opinion that a mid dle course of this character will best meet the views of the entire profession in view of the divided sentiment upon the question as to whether the laws should be reduced to statutory form or whether the common law should be allowed to remain in its present condition; more particularly in view of the fact that an enactment upon one or more subjects, now largely regulated by statute, may be made a test as to the propriety and desirability of further action. All of which is respectfully submitted. J. NEWTON FIERO, FRANK HISCOCK, I have read the proposed report of the committee and in general concur therein. As to the concluding portion however, with regard to the enactment of the common law in statutory form, I am one of the conservatives on the general subject of codification. I am not however extreme in my views on codification. I think there are some branches of the common law which could be put into statutory form with advantage, although I do not think the general body of the common law can be codified without causing more uncertainty and litigation than the common law at present produces. I am inclined to think that the law of bills and notes might, with propriety, be put into statutory form, and it is to a great extent the application of arbitrary rules rather than general principles. Whether the present time however is an appropriate one for attempting any further statutory work than is at present at hand in the shape of statutory revision, is, I think, open to question. My own preference would be that we should wait until the statutory commission has completed its work and the entire body of statutory law has been revised. By that time we should be in a position to take up, perhaps with advantage, the question of codification of the law of negotiable paper. W. B. HORNBLOWER. ADMISSION TO THE BAR. THE following is the report of the committee appointed at the annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association, on legislation on admission to the bar; ordered printed and distributed to the members of the association by the joint executive and law reform committee: To the Bar Association of the State of New York: The committee of the association which was charged with the duty of drafting a bill to provide a system for uniform examinations for admission to the bar, and submit the same to the Legislature, begs leave to submit the following report: Your committee met and organized at an early day, and proceeded with the consideration of the matters committed to its charge. After consultation with members of the bench and bar, a bill was drafted, meeting with the unanimous approval of your committee, and placed in the hands of Senator Roesch, chairman of the judiciary committee of the Senate, by whom it was introduced in that body, and Assemblyman Daniel F. Martin, chairman of the committee on codes of the Assembly, by whom it was there introduced. Hearings were had from time to time before the judiciary committee of the Senate, which were attended by the president of the association and other members of the committee, resulting in the adoption of amendments to the bill from time to time, so that, as reported by that committee, it reads as follows: "Section 56. A citizen of the State, of full age, applying to be admitted to practice as an attorney or counsellor in the courts of record of the State, must be examined and licensed to practice as herein prescribed. A State Board of Law Examiners is hereby created, to consist of three members of the bar, of at least ten years' standing, who shall be appointed from time to time by the Court of Appeals, and hold office as members of such board for the term of three years. Such court shall prescribe rules providing for uniform system of examination, which shall govern such Board of Law Examiners in the performance of its duties. There shall be examinations of all persons applying for admission to practice as attorneys and counsellors at law at least twice in each year in each judicial department, and at such other times and places as the Court of Ap peals may direct. Every person applying for such examination shall pay such fee as may be fixed by the Court of Appeals as necessary to cover the cost of such examinations. Only one examination fee shall be required. Such board shall certify to the General Term of the department in which each candidate has resided for the past six months every person who shall pass the examination, provided such person shall have in other respects complied with the rules regulating admission to practice as attorneys and counsellors, which fact shall be determined by said board before examination. Upon such certificate, if the General Term shall find that such person is of good moral character, it shall enter an order licensing and admitting him to practice as an attorney and counsellor in all the courts of the State. Race or sex shall constitute no cause for refusing any person examination or admission to practice. Any fraudulent act or representation by an applicant in connection with his application or admission shall be sufficient cause for the revocation of his license by the General Term granting the same." The bill failed of passage in the Senate upon the last day of the session by reason of its having been laid aside for examination at the request of a senator, and not having again been reached before the hour of final adjournment. The bill, as reported by the Senate judiciary committee, was favorably reported by the Assembly committee on codes, with the active cooperation and assistance of Hon. William Sulzer, speaker of the Assembly, who took much interest in forwarding the bill, and was passed by the Assembly. The bill, as finally amended, is the result of careful examination and investigation by members of the profession in the Legislature, as well as on the part of members of the association. Especial mention should be made of Hon. Charles T. Saxton, who as a sub-committee of the committee on the judiciary, gave the matter much time and attention, and it is due to his watchful care and active inter est in the matter that so much progress was made in that body. In view of the fact that the bill met such general approval, and only failed of passage by accident in one house, after having passed the other, your committee recommend that it be presented to the Legislature at an early day, and pressed to its passage on behalf of the association. A communication to the chief judge of the Court of Appeals, and the reply thereto, is hereto annexed as part of this report. Mention should be made of the fact that your committee has had the hearty cooperation of the faculty of all the law schools of the State, as well as of the regents of the University, and the plan to secure Hon. CHARLES ANDREWS, Chief Judge Court of Appeals: DEAR SIR-During the legislative session of 1893 a bill was presented and urged on behalf of the New York State Bar Association as an amendment to section 56 of the Code, a copy of which I herewith transmit to you, the purpose of which is to obtain a uniform system of examinations for admission to the bar. The act passed the Assembly, but after being reported by the judiciary committee of the Senate, failed of passage in that branch by reason of want of time before adjournment. I am requested by the committee having the matter in charge, and also by the joint executive committee and committee on law reform of the association, to submit the bill to the members of the Court of Appeals for suggestion, criticism or approval. The association has manifested much interest in the matter, and the proposed bill is regarded by it as being in the interest of a higher standard of attainment for admission to the bar. I am, very respectfully yours, The Hon. J. NEWTON FIERO, President State Bar Association: DEAR SIR-I have your favor of the 18th December, and have examined the proposed bill for securing a uniform system for the examination of law students, and have only to say that, in my opinion, the best sentiment of the profession will favor any improved method of making examination a real test of fitness of candidates for admission to the bar. As a member of the court upon which, by the proposed bill, important duties are devolved in carrying out the scheme, I prefer to go no further than to say that its general purpose has my cordial approval. Very truly yours, TAXATION-LIEN FOR STREET IMPROVEMENT-EXEMPTION OF ORPHANS' HOME. KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS, JUNE 1, 1893. KILGUS V. TRUSTEES OF THE ORPHANAGE OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD. SAME V. TRUSTEES OF THE CHURCH HOME. Homes for orphans, created and maintained only for the purpose of public charity, are by section 9, article 1, chapter 92, General Statutes, exempted from taxation for governmental purposes, as well of the city of Louisville as of the Commonwealth, but they are liable for their proportionate part of local assessment for improvement of streets upon which they abut. A special act exempting an orphans' home in the city of Louisville from "assessment and taxation under the revenue laws of the Commonwealth, or under any ordinance, resolution or other act of the city of Louisville," and providing that its property "is hereby freed from future charge and payment of taxes to the State and to the city," exempts the property of the home from the ordinary taxation levied for the support of the State and the municipal government; but it must pay its proportionate part of assessments made for local improvements, such as the improvement of streets upon which it abuts A statute should never be so construed as to exempt a particular person or corporation from taxation for any purpose, unless the language used clearly and expressly requires it to be done. A PPEAL from Louisville Chancery Court. H. S. Barker and Lane & Burnett, for appellants. Strother & Gordon, for appellees. LEWIS, J. These two actions, brought by appellant against appellees, respectively, were tried and determined by the lower court together, as will be done on this appeal. The object of each is enforcement of lien on a lot of land for proportionate cost of improving an adjacent street by appellant in pursuance of an ordinance of the general council, and under contract with the city of Louisville. There is no question made in either action about his compliance with terms of that contract, nor as to correctness of the amounts assessed and fixed. But the ground relied on as a defense in each case is exemption from such assessment existing in virtue of special acts of the General Assembly. It appears that in 1858 H. P. Johnson conveyed to W. Cornwall and others, in trust, a lot upon which to establish an orphan asylum, to be used as a free home for educating and instructing indigent orphan boys in useful arts and trades. And in 1872 "An act to incorporate the trustees of the Orphanage of the Good Shepherd in the city of Louisville " was passed, whereby W. Cornwall and others, then trustees under the deed mentioned, were declared a body corporate, to whom the several County Courts of the Commonwealth were authorized to bind orphans upon terms agreed to. Section 6 of that act is as follows: 66 That all property now held for the benefit of said orphanage, and all which hereafter may be so held, shall be and the same is hereby exempted from assessment and taxation under the revenue laws of the Common wealth, or under any ordinance, resolution or other act of the city of Louisville, and all such property is hereby freed from future charge and payment of taxes to the State and to the city." In 1872 John P. Morton conveyed to James Craik and others a lot upon which were to be erected buildings suitable for a church home for females, an infirmary for females, an infirmary for males, and a chapel. And subsequently "An act to incorporate the Church Home for Females and Infirmary for the Sick" was passed, whereby James Craik and others were created a body corporate. Section 3 of that act is in the same language as section 6 of the first-mentioned act just quoted, differing from it only in application. The two institutions just created, being manifestly intended for purposes of purely public charities, were by section 9, article 1, chapter 92, General Statutes, independent of the special acts, exempted from taxation for governmental purposes as well of the city of Louisville as of the Commonwealth. But taxation for ordinary purposes of government does not properly comprise local assessment for construction of a street, and as a consequence exemption by statute from the first does necessarily and properly involve exemption from the latter. Accordingly, in Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508, it was held that exemptions made in the General Statutes in favor of church property apply only to taxation for general purposes of government-State, county and municipal —and that therefore property of that church was liable for payment of its proper proportion of cost of constructing the particular street there in question. In Zable v. Louisville Baptist Orphan Home, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 385, the appellant, a contractor, sued to enforce a lien on property of appellee for its proportion of the cost of constructing an adjacent alley, from which the latter claimed exemption in virtue of a special act of the Legislature. In that case the following extract from Bur roughs on Taxation was quoted and approved: "The word 'tax' or 'taxes' does not include local assessments unless there be something in the statute in which it is found to indicate such an intention. The question frequently arises in the construction of statutes exempting persons or corporations from payment of taxes, and the almost unbroken current of authority is that such expression does not include local assessment." The question therefore in this case is whether the two acts relied on by the appellees respectively were intended by the Legislature to exempt their property from local assessment. "The provision of the special act is as follows: property, money, estate and rights of said corporation shall be exempt from all taxation whatever." But it was there held the word 'tax' did not embrace local assessment, and that something more was needed to show such was the legislative intention. The language of the two acts we are considering is however somewhat different from that of the act first mentioned; for it is in both of them provided the property shall be exempt from assessment and taxation under the revenue laws of the Commonwealth, and also under ordinances of the city of Louisville. But the word "assessment," which means levying a tax or determining the share of tax to be paid by each individual, relates as well to taxes for support of the government as to taxes, or rather enforced contributions, for the construction of streets or other local improvements; for the act of assessing must precede collection in either case. 66 It does not therefore seem to us that the word 'assessment," ," used as it is in the two special statutes without qualification or explanation, necessarily or fairly indicates legislative intention to exempt the property of appellees from any other than ordinary taxation for support of the State and municipal governments. And not being clearly and expressly exempted from due proportion of the cost. of constructing adjacent streets, it cannot be held so exempt without violating a well-established rule of construction; for, as said in Sedgwick on Statutory and Common Law, 344, statutes under which exemptions from common burdens are claimed “are regarded with a jealous eye, and strictly con strued." In support of the construction we have given the two statutes in question, we cite the case of State v. Mayor and Common Council of Newark, 35 N. J. 157. There the Protestant Foster Society claimed exemption from the cost of constructing or improving streets under its charter, by which it was enacted that the property of the society "shall not be subject to taxes or assessments," which is nearly the same language used in the two statutes we are considering. But the court in that case held that the word "taxes" must, in the absence of any clear indication to the contrary, be understood to refer exclusively to the ordinary public taxes, and that the word "assessment " has reference to burdens of the same general character as those expressed in the word "taxes," and was not intended to include local assessments for municipal purposes. In our opinion, a statute should never be so construed as to exempt a particular person or corporation from taxation for any purpose, whereby the burden falls so much heavier on others having no In Zable v. Louisville Baptist Orphan Home the greater interest at stake or duty to perform, unless In a prosecution under Revised Statutes, section 3486, for seducing an unmarried woman under eighteen years of age under promise of marriage, it is not error to refuse to allow defendant to answer a question as to whether it was his honest intention to marry the prosecutrix, and if he is now ready to do so, or to instruct as to defendant's good faith in making the promise to marry, as, by plain provision of the statute, an offer to marry is no bar to the prosecution. Testimony that the witness is acquainted with prosecutrix, and has never heard any thing against her character, is competent evidence of her character, and he need not base his knowledge on what is "generally said" of her. Where defendant's testimony is immaterial, it is not necessary to instruct the jury as to his competency. Where, in a prosecution for seduction, the prosecuting attorney, in argument to the jury, remarked that the return of the writs by the officers showed that defendant ran away, and skipped out, and the prosecuting witness had to work in a factory to support herself and child, and the court rebuked him, there is no error, as it will be presumed that the rebuke warned the jury to disregard the statement. Edmonston & Cullen, for appellant. R. F. Walker, Attorney-General, for the State. BURGESS, J. The defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery county for seducing and debauching one Mattie Owens, an unmarried female of good repute, and under eighteen years of age. The case is in this court on his appeal. The facts developed by the testimony are that during December, 1890, and January, 1891, defendant boarded at the home of the prosecutrix, at Danville, Montgomery county, Mo. That defendant and the prosecutrix were engaged to be married. The prosecutrix testified that, on December 26, defendant asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. She replied, "It was not right," when he said, "It wouldn't be no harm. engaged," and she then consented. That they had sexual intercourse twice during January, 1891, and each time they had about the same conversation. We are That the parents of the prosecutrix refused to permit defendant to come to the home of the prosecutrix, and refused to permit her to marry defendant. That defendant always expressed a willingness to marry her, and never refused. The mother of prosecutrix testified that she forbade her daughter marrying defendant, and ordered him not to come on the place again. That she told her daughter she had rather see her dead than marry defendant. That she and her husband offered to settle the case for less than $100. Letters written by defendant to prosecutrix were identified, and read in evidence, in which defendant renewed his offer to marry her. The testimony gives the prosecutrix a good reputation for chastity and virtue. The indictment is well enough, and good under the section of the statute under which it was drawn, containing, as it does, all necessary averments. State v. Eckler, 106 Mo. 585; State v. Primm, 98 id. 368. It is contended by counsel for defendant that the court committed error in allowing the witnesses MacMahan and Bellamy to testify to the reputation of the prosecutrix, because they were not qualified to do so. This contention is not sustained by the record, which discloses the fact that each one of these witnesses testified that he was acquainted with Mattie Owens- one of them (Bellamy), that she went to school to him in 1890 and they both testified that they had never heard any thing against her. In passing upon a similar question by this court, Sherwood, J., said: "That reputation may, with justice, well be called good, which no slander has ever ventured to even so much as question. A. blameless life, oftentimes, though not always, gives origin to such a reputation. But when it can be said of a man, by those well acquainted with him, that they never heard his reputation as to truth and morals discussed, denied, or doubted, it is equivalent to passing upon him the highest encomium. The authorities abundantly establish that the person testifying need not base his knowledge on what is 'generally said' of the person whose character is in question, but may base his knowledge of the reputation of such person on evidence of the negative nature above noted." State v. Grate, 68 Mo. 22, and authorities cited. Defendant was introduced as a witness in his own behalf, and asked whether or not it was his honest intention to marry the prosecuting witness, if he had always held himself in readiness and willing to marry her, and if he was not then ready and willing to do so. These questions were all objected to by the State, the objections sustained, and the defendant duly excepted. It is urged with much earnestness that the court should have permitted these questions to be answered, as the answer thereto would have shown that defendant acted in good faith in promising to marry Mattie Owens, and was |