Constitutional DemocracyOxford University Press, USA, 1996 M02 22 - 400 páginas Constitutional Democracy systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. This relationship is especially important at a time when Americans are increasingly disillusioned about government's fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet block and around the world are rewriting their constitutions. Political economist Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and other government systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyzes electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, bicameralism, citizenship, and separation of powers. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of political economy. |
Contenido
Democracy in America | 3 |
Democracy in Other Parts of the World | 21 |
The Constitutional Premise | 43 |
Why Have Government? | 50 |
The Nature of a Constitution | 59 |
Institutions to Reveal and Advance a Communitys Interests | 75 |
Direct Democracy | 95 |
Proportional Representation | 101 |
Bicameralism | 192 |
Rights | 209 |
The Market and the State | 225 |
Redistribution | 237 |
The Executive Branch | 247 |
Dictatorship | 263 |
The Judiciary | 279 |
Citizenship | 299 |
TwoParty Government | 114 |
The Two Systems of Representation Compared | 127 |
The Parliamentary Voting Rule | 152 |
The Referendum | 177 |
The Constitutional Convention | 314 |
Epilogue | 341 |
Términos y frases comunes
achieve actions allocative allocative efficiency allow arguments assembly assumption benefits bicameral Buchanan budget candidates Chap Chapter chief executive choice choose citizens citizenship coalition collective decision compromise Congress consensus constitutional contract constitutional convention constitutional rights constitutional stage contractarian corporatism corporatist decision-making costs defense deficits defined democratic direct democracy discussion district economic elected electoral example exists favor federal federalist function geographic governmental groups ideal point incentive income individuals interests issues judges judiciary legislative legislature ment normative number of votes optimal option outcomes Pareto optimal parliament parliamentary parliamentary system percent political institutions positions possible potential PR system preferences president principal-agent problem procedure produce programs proportional representation proposal protect redistribution referenda referendum representative democracy representatives seats simple majority rule social supramajority Switzerland tion two-party system U.S. Constitution unanimity rule unicameral United utility voters voting by veto voting rule welfare