that the true extent of his powers was displayed and his Promethean eloquence thrilled and subjugated all who heard. "When I am on my feet I speak everything that is in my mind," he said. Others have surpassed him in the forensic art of pleading, in the rhetorical art, and in literary graces, but Chatham, speaking everything that was in his mind, was the greatest antagonist in debate the British Parlia ment has known.

While the persuasive part of his speech was a kind of consummate conversation, expressed in sentences clear, simple, forceful, of an admirable rhythm, there were moments of sublimity and inspiration such as no other English orator has known, daring flights of imagination that held his audience with suspended breath. "His words," said Lyttleton, "have sometimes frozen my young blood into stagnation, and sometimes have made it pace in such a hurry through my veins that I could scarce support it." Grattan said finely, "Great subjects, great empires, great characters, effulgent ideas, and classical illustrations, formed the material of his speeches.' A natural loftiness of mind was his most characteristic virtue; it was at times clouded over by passion and rivalry, but he loved best the contemplation of serious and noble things. It is clear from the detached sentences in his handwriting found among his papers that religion was to him a matter not merely of outward observance but of his innermost thought. There were no doubt histrionic elements in his nature, but a profound sincerity was the true *Chatham Correspondence, iv., App. 3.

spring of his actions. He would have been still greater if all his conduct had been marked by perfect simplicity, but though his motives may have been obscured so that even Burke misunderstood them, they were of a noble kind. It was with genuine relief, if with an ostentation of Stoical content, that he laid his greatness by and sought relief and rest in a home where he could put his armour on one side and teach his children to love God and their country; it was by a supreme effort against the exhaustion of age and infirmity that he returned to warn his country against the awful destiny of separation.

Two phrases of his own best illustrate his character and his career. He speaks of that sense of honour which "makes ambition virtue," and he writes of those "who, wherever they are, carry their country along with them in their breast. I mean those feelings for its general honour, and those large and comprehensive sentiments for the common happiness of the whole, which everywhere, and more particularly in our island, constitute alone just patriotism." ✔ Chatham, dying in the midst of the Civil War he had tried to avert, is the last of those great men whom England and America can both claim; to both States he rendered signal service, and not the least part of that service is the memory of a nature moulded in the very form of honour, an eloquence never suborned to mean causes, a lover of his nation who immeasurably strengthened her power and elevated the ideals of her public life.

T

APPENDIX.

HE one "historical mystery" in connection with

Lord Chatham is the question how far he knew

the terms of the secret treaty arranged between France and Spain in August, 1761, at the time of his resignation in October, 1761. There is a tradition that he had secret information, and imparted that information to the Cabinet. An article in the Quarterly Review, October, 1899, suggests that this information was received through Louis Dutens, secretary to the British embassy at Naples, where knowledge of Spanish plans might very probably be obtained. A copy of the treaty in the Newcastle papers is said, by the writer of this article, to bear marks of having passed through Pitt's office in Cleveland Row. I am unable to judge the probability of the last statement, but from other evidence I find it difficult to believe that Pitt placed before the Cabinet any exact information concerning the treaty. If he possessed the information himself, he must surely have imparted it to his colleagues. In published memoirs there is little evidence, but the Newcastle Papers contain much that bears directly and indirectly upon. the question. It was known that a treaty between

France and Spain existed, but not that a breach with Great Britain and the invasion of Portugal were contemplated.

In his memorandum on the Cabinet of September 18, 1761, Newcastle mentions "Intercepted letters from Fuentes and Grimaldi," and "The Convention signed the 15th of August only."* But that nothing more than the probability of an intimate union between France and Spain had been disclosed is clear from the questions Hardwicke invites Newcastle to put to Stanley in his letter of September 30th. At the next Cabinet of October 2d, Newcastle says that Pitt referred to "the papers he had in his bag (meaning my Lord Bristol's letter and Mr. Wall's paper)." This must have been Bristol's letter of August 31st, which contained the accounts of Wall's admission that France had "spontaneously offered to unite her forces with those of Spain to prevent English encroachments in America on Spanish territory." Pitt may have used this admission as an argument that Spain meant war, but if he had possessed secret information would he not have lain other papers before the Cabinet? On October 13th, Hardwicke tells Newcastle that he has seen Pitt. "I observed that he did not assert the resolution of Spain to declare war against us nearly so strong as he did at the Council; but put it upon their secret union with France, and that they would assist France with money underhand." § On October 20th, Newcastle has seen the Spanish ambassador: "I asked him whether they intended to break with us. He did not directly answer the question, but talked as if that could not be their intention as their

*Add. MSS. 32928, f. 228.

+ Ibid., f. 440. Ibid., 32929, f. 18. § Ibid., 32929, f. 227.

conduct had showed, notwithstanding their Family Treaty of 1743, which, he said, the last time I saw him, contained all the stipulations in this treaty with regard to their reciprocal engagements. On December 1st the Comte de Mello, Portuguese ambassador to the Court of St. James's, communicated the news that France, Spain, and Naples had made a secret treaty, to which they demanded Portugal's accession, with the intention of closing the ports of the four nations against Great Britain. This was of course the secret design which Pitt dreaded, but it is placed beyond doubt that he did not communicate intelligence of it to his colleagues when we read Newcastle's comment upon this disclosure. "Our affairs with Spain seem bad. I think Mello's account can't be true." ↑

The truth seems to be that, without special or secret knowledge, Pitt judged the future of Spanish policy better than his colleagues. There were indications visible to all the Ministers that France and Spain were united. Pitt declared that this meant war; his colleagues would not be convinced. When the rupture had come, Hardwicke made the following comment: "I am now convinced that the intercepted letter in the summer from Choiseul to D'Avrincourt in cypher, wherein mention was made of training on the negotiations between England and France till the latter end of September, when the flota should be arrived, deserved more weight to be laid upon it than we were willing to allow it at that time." This letter from Choiseul explains Pitt's eagerness to declare war on Spain before the flota of silver ships should arrive.

* Add. MSS. 32929, f. 406.

↑ Ibid., 32931, f. 425.

Ibid., 32932, f. 367.