of copyright for such period as shall be defined in such order (not exceeding the term allowed in this country), to the authors, inventors and makers of books, prints, articles of sculpture, and other works of art, or any particular class of them, to be defined in such order, which shall, after a future time to be specified in such order, be first published in any foreign country, to be named in such order. And her Majesty is also empowered (g) by any order in council to direct that the authors of dramatic pieces and musical compositions, which shall, after a future time to be specified in such order, be first publicly represented or performed in any foreign country, to be named in such order, shall have the sole liberty of representing or performing in any part of the British dominions such dramatic pieces or musical compositions during such period as shall be defined in such order, not exceeding the period allowed in this country. Provision however is made for the entry of proper particulars of the subjects for which copyright shall be granted, in the register book of the Stationers' Company in London, within a time to be prescribed in each such order in council (h). And all copies of books wherein there shall be any subsisting copyright by virtue of this act, or of any order in council made in pursuance thereof, printed or reprinted in any foreign country except that in which such books were first published, are absolutely prohibited to be imported into any part of the British dominions, except with the consent of the registered proprietor of the copyright thereof, or his agent authorized in writing (i). But no such order in council shall have any effect unless it shall be therein stated, as the ground for issuing the same, that due protection has been secured by the foreign power named in such order in council, for the benefit of parties interested in works first published in the dominions of her Majesty, similar (g) Sect. 5. (i) Sect. 10. (h) Sects. 6, 7, 8, 9. to those comprised in such order (k). And every such order in council is to be published in the London Gazette as soon as may be after the making thereof, and from the time of such publication shall have the same effect as if every part thereof were included in the act (7). But nothing contained in the act is to prevent the printing, publication or sale of any translation of any book, the author whereof and his assigns may be entitled to the benefit of the act (m). And no copyright is allowed to any book, dramatic piece, musical composition, print, article of sculpture, or other work of art, first published out of her Majesty's dominions, otherwise than under this act. articles of ma nufacture. By recent statutes a copyright has been granted to Designs for designs for articles of manufacture for the term of three years, one year, or nine calendar months, according to the nature of the manufacture (n); and, in pursuance of these acts, a registrar of designs for articles of manufacture has been appointed, by whom all designs to be protected by the acts are required to be registered (0); and provision is also made for the transfer of the copyright in such designs by any writing purporting to be a transfer, and signed by the proprietor, and also for the registration of transfers in a prescribed form (p). PART IV. OF PERSONAL ESTATE GENERALLY. No estate for life. CHAPTER I. OF SETTLEMENTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. PERSONAL property is capable of being settled, but not in the same manner as land. Land being held by estates, is settled by means of life estates being given to some persons, with estates in remainder in tail and in fee simple to others. But personal property, as we have already observed (a), is essentially the subject of absolute ownership. The settlement of such property, by the creation of estates in it, cannot therefore be accomplished. And there is a striking difference in many cases between the effect of the same limitation, according as it may be applied to real or to personal property. As there can be no estate in personal property, it follows that there can be no such thing as an estate for life in such property in the strict meaning of the phrase. Thus if any chattel, whether real or personal, be assigned to A. for his life, A. will at once become entitled in law to the whole. By the assignment, the property in the chattel passes to him, and the law knows nothing of a reversion in such chattel remaining in the assignor. And this is the case even though the chattel be a term of years of such a length (for instance 1000 years) that A. could not possibly live so long (b). The term is considered in law as an indivisible chattel, and consequently incapable of any such modification of ownership as is contained in a life estate. term for life. An apparent exception to the above rule has long Bequest of a been established in the case of a bequest by will of a term of years to a person for his life in this case the intention of the testator is carried into effect by the application of a doctrine similar to that of executory devises of real estates (c). The whole term of years is considered as vesting in the legatee for life, in the same manner as under an assignment by deed; but on his decease the term is held to shift away from him, and to vest, by way of executory bequest, in the person to be Executory benext entitled (d). Accordingly, if a term of years be quests. bequeathed to A. for his life, and after his decease to B., A. will have, during his life, the whole term vested in him, and B. will have no vested estate, but a mere pos- Possibility. sibility, as it is termed (e), until after the decease of A.; and this possibility, like the possibility of obtaining a real estate, was formerly inalienable at law unless by will (f), though capable of assignment in equity (g). But by the act to amend the law of real property (h), How alienable. which repeals an act of the previous session passed for the same purpose (i), it is now provided that an executory and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest, in any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure, may be disposed of by deed. B. may therefore, during the life of A., assign his expectancy by deed; and such assignment will entitle the assignee to the whole term on A.'s decease. If, however, no such assignment should have been made, B. will become, on (c) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, 240. (d) Matthew Manning's case, 8 Rep. 95; Lampert's case, 10 Rep. 47. (e) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, 214, 215. (g) Fearne, Cont. Rem. 548. s. 6. (i) Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 5. Life interests in equity. the decease of A., possessed of the whole term, which will then shift to B. by virtue of the executory bequest in his favour. The mere circumstance, indeed, of the term being bequeated to A. for his life only, will operate to shift away the term on his decease (k), independently of the bequest to B.; so that, if there had been no bequest over to B., the interest of A would continue only during his life, and would then remain part of the undisposed of property of the testator. It may, however, be doubted whether the doctrine of executory bequests is applicable in law to any other chattels than chattels real (1). The strict and ancient doctrine of the indivisibility of a chattel, though still retained by the courts of law, has no place in the modern Court of Chancery, which, in administering equity, carries out to the utmost the intentions of the parties. In equity, therefore, under a gift of personal property of any kind to A. for his life, and after his decease to B., A. is merely entitled to a life interest, and B. has, during the life of A., a vested interest in remainder, of which he may dispose at his pleasure; and the Court of Chancery will compel the person to whom the courts of law may have awarded the legal interest, to make good the disposition. Accordingly, if the personal property so given should consist of moveable goods, equity will compel A., the owner for life, to furnish and sign an inventory of the goods, Ancient distinc- and an undertaking to take proper care of them (m). This gift of goods and doctrine, however, is comparatively of modern date; for a gift of the use formerly the Court of Chancery followed the rules of law of goods. in the construction of such gifts; and if a gift of moveable goods had been made to A. for his life, and after tion between a (k) Eyres v. Faulkland, 1 Salk. 231; Ker v. Lord Dungannon, 1 Dru. & War. 509, 528. (7) Fearne, Cont. Rem. 413. See, however, 1 Jarm. Wills, 793; |