MARCH, 1824.] DEBATES OF CONGRESS. was, about twenty years past, taken in by a caucus, and said I would not attend another. I had intended to have given a history of some, on different sides, but it is decided not to be in order. How the choice of Electors, by districts, could possibly prevent an election of President, as has been said by the gentleman from South Carolina, I cannot possibly perceive. The number of votes given by the districts would be equal to that now given. I do not understand how it can prevent an election. Every generation has its own notions in politics as well as in religion, Religious and political ideas are constantly changing. The Book of Judges gives a description of these changes, where it speaks of the departure of the people, after the death of Joshua. So we forgot the principles which produced the Revolution. My State, happily, is It enjoys about neither a large nor a small one. an equal population, and does not increase much. What benefit can the present provision of the constitution be if we can get no President by it? I hope the Senate will return to the consideration of the proposed amendments. On motion of Mr. VAN BUREN, the Senate then adjourned. MONDAY, March 22. Amendments to the Constitution-Caucus Sys tem. [SENATE, set in array against each other. Any attempt The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BENTON) The unfinished business of Friday last, being the consideration of the resolutions proposing amendments to the constitution, in relation to the election of President and Vice President, was again taken up. The question was upon Mr. MILLS's motion to postpone the whole sub-pressed. But the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. ject indefinitely. [The Chair, previous to the commencement of the discussion, intimated its intention to restrict the debate to the immediate question upon the indefinite postponeinent of the resolutions.] TAYLOR) says this is one of the great federal features of the constitution, which ought to be held sacred. Whether it be federal, or whether is be national, it is equally dangerous to the must be dreaded by all but those who wield it. liberties of the people. This enormous power Mr. DICKERSON, of New Jersey, said that he It must be dreaded by all but the influential was disposed to yield a cheerful obedience to the men in the great States, who may control those The small States ask the large to divest themdecision of the Chair, although he had not had States, and through them, the Union. the opportunity of replying to some pointed observations of the gentleman from South Caro-selves of this enormous power, by adopting a lina, (Mr. HAYNE,) which might be easily answered. He regretted that the subject had been introduced, as it was calculated to create much The discussion of it, unnecessary excitement. however, had given him no uneasiness, either as it respected himself, or his friends; and he was perfectly content to let it rest where it was. I shall, said Mr. D., confine myself to the mo- system of single districts, for the choice of Electors. The great States refuse to yield up any portion of this power, unless the small States consent to make a corresponding concession on their part. What is the power of the small States, when the election of a President devolves upon the House of Representatives? Thirty-one Representatives, from the thirteen small States, can, by possibility, elect the President, against the 182 Representatives: that is, about one-seventh of the Representatives may control the other six-sevenths upon the election of a President. And this is the other great federal feature of the constitution to which some gentlemen of late appear to be much attached. Under one of these great federal features of the constitution, the power of the small States may be completely SENATE.] Amendments to the Constitution-Caucus System. exercise? None. Ambitious individuals in the small States may casually derive an importance from their situation, in the exercise of this power, but this can be of no importance to the people of the State to which such individuals may belong. [MARCH, 1824. merged in the election by Electors. Under the then considered as a great calamity? There can other, the power of the great States may be as be none. What advantage can there be in recompletely merged in the election of a Pres-taining a power which it will be dangerous to ident, in the House of Representatives. Can any thing be more incongruous, more preposterous, more monstrous? The venerable gentleman from Virginia, who fears the national, but is charmed with the great federal features of our constitution, compares the operations of our Government to those of the steam engine; and he informs us of a variety of safety valves, by which the steam may pass off, without danger to the machine. I do not perceive the efficacy of those safety valves, in the dangerous operation of choosing a President of the United States. If we continue those two great federal features of our constitution, without modification, the engine will not bear the force to be applied; the steam will become irresistible; we shall increase the pressure, till we burst the boiler. The small States, in the House of Representatives, can choose a President against the voice of the large, and an attempt to alter the relative power of the States, in this particular, even with their own consent, for it cannot be otherwise, is considered as a deadly blow at the power of the small States-a power necessary to their existence. Is it necessary to the existence of the small States, that they should possess a power, under any circumstances, to impose a President upon the United States, against the voice of six-sevenths, or even against the voice of a majority of the people? Is it necessary to their existence that they should have more weight in such an election than their federal numbers would give them? The exercise of this extraordinary power of choosing a President, in the House of Representatives, has occurred but once in six and thirty years, and even that afforded no peculiar advantages to the small States. On the contrary, it put in jeopardy their very existence. A combination among six of the large States can completely control the residue of the States upon the election of President by the Electors, and this power may be called into operation every four years, and may be continued without interruption, as long as those States can agree as to their dividends, while the small States can only come in for a casual exercise of their extraordinary power, when the great States disagree among themselves, and which has happened but once since the establishment of our Government. This power, however, which may be casually exercised by the small States, must and will lead to combinations among the large States, to prevent a resort to the House of Representatives; a regard to their own interests imposes upon them the necessity of such combinations; an anomalous case of a necessity on the part of the strong to combine against the weak. Of what advantage is this power to the small States, which has been exercised but once since the establishment of our Government, and was There is a power, however, vested in the small States, beyond their numerical strength, upon which their existence depends-their equal vote in the Senate of the United States. But this is a power, not to give the small States an undue influence in the choice of a President, not to enable them to impose laws upon the large States, but a preventive power-a power to arrest the progress of laws which might infringe their rights or interests. It is a species of veto, by which the Senators of twelve States, however small the population of those States, can affectually prevent the passing of any law which they may think against their interests. Without this power, the small States must immediately fall a prey to the large. Whether this principle of veto should have been carried further by the constitution, it is unnecessary now to inquire. Fortunately, there is one point on which this principle of veto rests in a single State-it is for the preservation of that sacred part of our constitution-the equal vote of the States in the Senate; the only part which is put beyond the reach of alteration. By the 5th article of the constitution, no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate; and, as no amendment to the constitution can take place, which will not apply equally to all the States, it is evident that the small States never can lose this right, unless they unanimously consent to it. All the fears, therefore, of the gentleman from Missouri, that the small States, by giving up a portion of power in choosing a President, shall endanger their equal vote in the Senate, are without foundation. While a single principle of the constitution is left, this right will remain inviolate. The gentleman from South Carolina seems to think the proposition now offered a perfectly novel one. True, it has never before been presented as an amendment to the constitution; but it is as old as the constitution itself. On the 17th July, 1787, it was agreed unanimously, in the Federal Convention, that the President should be elected by the National Legislature; and for a long time this was thought the safer mode, even in the first instance of choosing a President, by this enlightened and patriotic assembly of statesmen, some of whom, at least, entertain no hostility to the power of the small States. It was not then discovered that such an election would endanger the existence of the Union. The gentleman from South Carolina thinks there would be great danger from the influence of the departments of the Government, and of the Executive, upon the two Houses of Con MARCH, 1824.] DEBATES OF CONGRESS. gress, in their choice of a President. But, would not this influence operate as strongly, nay, much more so, upon the House of Representatives, voting as States upon that question, under the present system? The gaining one member of the joint meeting would be no more than gaining one vote out of the two hundred and sixtyone, while the gaining one member in the House of Representatives might be gaining a When a twenty-fourth part of the whole. State has but one Representatives, this would be obviously the case, as it would be, when the Representatives of a State should be so divided as that the change of one would give the vote of the State to one candidate or to the other-so that, by possibility, the gaining of thirteen votes might change the fate of a Presidential election; take it from one candidate, and give it to another. In the latter case, the danger would be truly formidable; in the former, it would be no greater than resorting a second time to the Electors. Mr. TAYLOR, of Virginia, said he was opposed As to the question of a Congressional caucus His honorable friend and colleague (Mr. BAR [SENATE. BOUR) had stated that he (Mr. TAYLOR) had The meeting to which the gentleman had al- Mr. T. said that he had not previously mentioned the word caucus in this debate, nor should he have now done so, had he not been personally called upon; but that, if the resolutions for amending the constitution should be taken up, it would be necessary to consider that subject as having a tendency towards that consolidated and concentrated form of government towards which we were verging with awful rapidity. At this juncture, its thorough examination would produce an excitement inconsistent with a discreet consideration of the amendments; and therefore he concurred in the proposed postponement. Mr. KELLY, of Alabama, next took the floor, and began with observing that he would endeavor, so far as it was practicable, to withdraw the subject under debate from the fog with which it had been enveloped, and to conforin SENATE.] Amendments to the Constitution-Caucus System. [MARCH, 1824. assumed a much wider range than the strict rules of order would authorize; he himself was not then in the chair; and that he conceived it to be his duty, at this point, to confine the discussion to the precise question before the Senate. Mr. KELLY said it was his intention to have replied to some of the opinions heretofore expressed in debate, in favor of the meeting alluded to; but, as the Chair had decided that it was not in order to do so, he should submit to the decision, and take his seat. Mr. BARBOUR, who was in the chair when the discussion alluded to commenced, felt it his duty to explain the reasons which had induced him to allow a wider latitude to that debate than had been indicated to be proper, by the Chair, at this time. It was in consequence of his peculiar situation, in connection with that meeting, that he had refrained from calling gentlemen to order who had introduced its discussion. He considered that it was better that the liberty of debate should be sometimes abused, than that it should be curtailed-the more especially, as every gentleman stood answerable before the country for any remarks he might make in this Senate. After the lapse of a few minutes, and after another gentleman had risen to speak, the VICE PRESIDENT observed, that the gentleman from Alabama was entitled to the floor, if he chose to progress. to the rule of debate prescribed by the Chair. | He remarked that the whole discussion on this caucus question had arisen from a want of forbearance on the part of the gentlemen who had advocated that measure. The gentleman from New York (Mr. KING) had been charged with a change of opinion on the subject of the constitutional amendments, and had risen in his defence, and justified his disposition to delay acting on the subject at this crisis, on account of the central power which now presumed to select candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the United States. Whether he actually used the cabalistic and portentous word, caucus, or not, I hold it, said Mr. K., immaterial. He certainly spoke of a central power that had arisen in this Government, not known to the constitution, and unfriendly to the liberties of the nation; and whether he called it a caucus or not, he certainly did, said Mr. K., assure the gentlemen that he had no unfriendly feelings towards any person who differed from him in opinion. Now, said Mr. K., this remark was received with the most extraordinary sensitiveness on the part of these gentlemen; they had, with an ultra chivalrous esprit du corps, immediately rushed into a contest on the caucus question, and had entered into arguments in support of that measure. Mr. K. repeated, that a very small portion of forbearance, in that stage of the debate, would have prevented the discussion altogether; but, as gentlemen had Mr. KELLY then rose, and observed that he thought proper to assume a different course, it understood himself to have been deprived of the had certainly become necessary that their re-floor by the decision of the Chair; to which the marks should be answered and their arguments VICE PRESIDENT replied, that the merits of the refuted. This had been done by the gentleman question before the Senate might be discussed, from South Carolina, in respect to the argu- and that the gentleman might progress. Mr. ments which were urged on the other side, be- KELLY then observed, that he would not atfore he addressed the Senate. But other argu-tempt to evade the decision of the Chair, and ments had still been advanced, and to these, Mr. K. said, he would now proceed to reply. Waiving, for the present, the constitutional question, he would notice the argument of the necessity of a caucus as a party measure. Now, without arguing how far a caucus could be justified on that ground, he would say that such a measure could certainly not be justified as a party measure, where only a small minority could be got to unite in it. He had always understood that the very first principle of the Republican party, to which he belonged, was, that a majority only could act or speak for the party, and this, indeed, seemed to be a sacred principle, that could in no case be disregarded. But the gentlemen of the present day have conquered the difficulty that embarrassed Archimedes: when he stood a solitary Colossus on the vortex of mechanical science, he exclaimed, "Give me a place to stand, and I'll move the world." Gentlemen have stricken from this sentence the "dos pou sto," and the article "kai," and retain only the "ton kosmon kinezo." They now propose to raise the world without a fulcrum-here Mr. K. was called to order by the Chair. The PRESIDENT said that, in his opinion, the debate had, on the former days, that if he could not be permitted to reply to political doctrines preached here for home consumption, he had no wish to speak. Mr. BRANCH, of North Carolina, asked the indulgence of the Senate for the purpose of submitting, for their consideration, a few thoughts in relation to the important subject-matter under discussion. He said it was due to the State he had the honor in part to represent, for him to support the amendment to the constitution, which proposes to establish a uniform mode for the appointment of Electors of President and Vice President, and to himself, to oppose the indefinite postponement of the various propositions now pending. With the sentiment of the Legislature of the State he most heartily concurred. In entering on the subject, he said that he should endeavor to conform to the decision of the Chair, and that he would not intentionally bring into discussion matter foreign from the true question before the Senate; for he firmly believed that the decision of the presiding officer was correct, and ought to be enforced. It would become necessary for him, however, to animadvert on the constitution as it is at present, and to call the attention of the Senate MARCH, 1824.] Amendments to the Constitution-Caucus System. [SENATE to the pernicious practices which had obtained | Secretary, or, at all events, I will provide you and grown up under it, which threatened, ulti- with a good berth, suited to your wants, if not mately, to subvert the liberties of the people. to your capacity. And thus we shall barter It was the duty of an able surgeon to probe the away the rights and privileges of the people, at wound to the bottom, that he might be the the expense of the best interests of the country, better enabled to devise and apply an effective and the charter of our liberties. The mischief remedy. is abundantly manifest. Let us not, then, turn a deaf ear to the admonitions of duty and the voice of an enlightened community, but rather let us have the magnanimity to return-to leave the things which belong to the constitution, even though, in doing so, we part with some of our influence. The President and Congress were intended, by the wise framers of our constitution, to act as checks, each upon the other; but, by the system at present practised, they lose the benefit of this salutary provision. For, as has been observed by my honorable colleague, the Congress have always made the President, and will continue to do it. Yes, sir, the voice of that orthodox and experienced statesman has said so, and I have no reason to doubt the correctness of his assertion. It would not be denied, he said, that it was the intention of the Convention which framed the constitution to give to the people the election of their Chief Magistrate. But what have we been told by my highly esteemed friend and colleague, (Mr. MACON,) who is certainly high authority? Why, that the President had, since the days of General WASHINGTON, been always elected by Congress. This, said Mr. B., is the most alarming declaration, and surely it becomes necessary that something should be done to prevent that from taking place in future. The constitution provides that the President shall be elected by the people, through their Electors; but we find that a plan has been found out, setting aside this provision-the President is to be chosen, and the people are called upon only to conform to the will of their rulers. Now, if these unconstitutional proceedings are to be continued, and the President hereafter is to be chosen by Congress acting in caucus, it is manifest that the constitution will not only be practically altered, but that a door will be opened to the greatest abuses and corruption. We will soon find that the President will be chosen only by means of intrigue and management with the members of Congress. Is not the mischief, therefore, abundantly evident? Either make some alteration, so as to give efficiency to the vote of the people, or let them no longer be deluded with the fallacious idea that they exercise the power themselves. It is not worth while to disguise the fact from ourselves. We all see it. Indeed, it must be manifest to the most superficial observer, that the different departments of the Government, instead of acting as checks on each other, are naturally drawn to play into each other's hands; particularly the Executive and Congress. The gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. DICKERSON,) to whom I have listened with much pleasure, has failed to assign any reason why it is unsafe to return the election to the Electors. I must therefore presume, said Mr. B., that none exists. Let us then, said Mr. B., throw off this usurped authority, and return to the people the rights of which they have been wrongfully shorn. From whence do the members of Congress derive the power to elect the President of the United States? I hazard nothing, said Mr. B., in saying, that the power is not to be found in the constitution, and that it is, consequently, an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the people: the more alarming, inasmuch as it is exercised in the corrupt atmosphere of Executive patronage and influence. Make me President, and I will make you a Minister, a It ought not to be said, observed Mr. B., that we are incapable of acting on this important subject calmly and dispassionately. Our present session is comparatively unlimited; it is, in truth, the long session; our table is not burdened with important business; we sit but two or three hours in the day, and but five days out of the week; this objection cannot, therefore, be sustained. And as to the Senate of the United States, composed of gentlemen advanced in years, possessing a character, and justly, too, for their discretion and intelligence, being hurried away by passion or excitement, I cannot, said Mr. B., believe it for a moment. We are all convinced that no alteration can be made in time to affect the approaching Presidential election. Hence, whatever excitement may be felt, it will not be of a pernicious character, but will rather tend to elicit the best and most effectual remedy. If we suffer the present propitious moment to pass by, what may we expect? Why, sir, that the nation will again fall into a state of apathy, and that nothing will be done until the people are again called on to elect another Chief Magistrate, when we shall have to deprecate the recurrence of all the mischief at present complained of, and which threatens such alarming consequences to the peace and security of society. Mr. MACON rose in explanation of the allusion made by his honorable colleague to his remark, that the President had always been, with the exception of General Washington, elected by Congress. He repeated the observation, with a firm conviction of its correctness, that this had been the case, and, in his opinion, it always would be the case. If the members of Congress did not act in caucus, they would influence the people in some other way. The people were always writing to the members to get their opinion upon the different candidates, and their opinions would have great effect. Mr. M. said he was willing to alter the constitution, but Congress, |