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motion in their favor, involves au absurdity. And when one construction of the law will lead to absurd consequences, and another will not, it is the duty of the court to adopt the latter. One construction of the law in this case would have set the statute in motion at the time of the delivery of the goods from Baux to defendants if they had known that he was not the owner of them; but as they did not know that fact, the statute did not commence running until they sold or otherwise converted the goods. That is more favorable to the mala fide than to the bona fide purchaser. But that must be the obvious result if we apply to this case the rule contended for by the appellant. We are unwilling to give a conscious wrong-doer any advantage over a constructive wrong-doer. And the rule which we shall apply in this case will simply have the effect to put them on an equal footing. We shall hold, in accordance with the rule adopted in Maine, Michigan, Vermont and Massachusetts, that the defendants having acquired the possession of plaintiff's property by and through the tortious act of Baux and not other wise, such possession was tortious from its commencement, and constituted a conversion of the plaintiff's property, for which she might at any time within three years thereafter have maintained an action without previously making any demand, and that the omission to commence an action within that time constituted a bar to this action.

Judgment affirmed.

Myrick and McKee, JJ., dissented.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ADVERSE POSSESSION-OF WOODLAND-WHAT SUFFICIENT EJECTMENT NOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN RIGHTS FROM TRESPASSER-RULE OF DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS IN CUTTING TIMBER. — (1) In an action for damages for cutting timber from eleven acres of land claimed by plaintiff, plaintiff proved title to a farm of 122 acres, of which 22 acres (including the 11) were woodland. The chain of titlo commenced in 1847; plaintiff's father took a deed in 1855, and by descent and transfer from the widow and heirs of his father, he acquired title. The woodland was contiguous to the cultivated land, and was not fenced or inclosed, which was in accordance with the custom of the country. Wood was cut by plaintiff or his predecessors in title, from the 22 acres, for fuel, fencing and boards, every year since 1847, whenever required, and appropriated for the benefit of the farm. Defendant claimed title through a deed to ono W. from the State, in 1829, and a conveyance by W.'s heirs in 1877, to one M., who the same year conveyed to defendant, who cut the wood that year. It was in evidence that W. at one time lived on a farm contiguous to the 11 acres and to which they belonged. There was no proof that W. was ever in possession of the 11 acres or made any claim to them, and it was shown that he died some forty years previous to 1877. For thirty years no one but plaintiff or his predecessors cut wood from the land, and they paid taxes on the entire farm during that time. Held, sufficient to establish title by adverse possession in plaintiff, and the existence of a line of marked trees through the wood lot would not establish a claim against plaintiff's title. (2) Plaintiff was not bound to resort to ejectment or any other remedy to vindicate his rights, but was entitled to maintain an action for trespass. Machin v. Geortner, 14 Wend. 239. (3) The trial court held the rule of damages in such action to be the difference in the value of the farm with the timber on and the value after it was cut. Held no error. In an action to recover damages for such an injury done to the inheritance, it has been held that it is competent for a witness to give his opinion as to the value of the farm

with the timber on and the value after it was taken off. Van Deusen v. Young, 24 N. Y. 9. See, also, Easterbrook v. Erie Railway Co., 51 Barb. 94. Tho cases of Whitlock v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 36 Barb. 644: Cook v. Brockway, 21 id. 331, do not conflict with this rule. (4) In a case where tho damages are such as would necessarily and naturally result from the injury complained of, it is not necessary that they should be specially averred to authorize a recovery. Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267; Vaudershee v. Newton, 4 id. 132. Judgment affirmed. Argotsinger v. Vines et al., appellants. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided Oct. 12, 1880.]

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were husband and wife, were jointly indicted for receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen. The goods, which were stolen from R., were found in a room of which defendants had control, adjoining the room occupied by defendants and communicating with it by a door. In her husband's absence the wife, by words and active opposition, attempted to prevent the searching officers from entering the room where the goods were. At the trial the judge instructed the jury that in law the wife was presumed to be under the control of tho husband and to have been driven to the offense by him, and consequently should be acquitted, unless the evidence was, in their judgment, sufficient to overcome or rebut the presumption. Held, that there was no error in thus submitting the question of the wife's guilt to the jury. Marriage is no protection to the wife against conviction for a crime where she is shown to have taken an activo and willing art in its commission. 2 Lewin's C. C. 229; State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329; Cassin v. Delany, 38 N. Y. 178; Seiler v. People, 77 id. 411. It follows that when the husband is guilty of the offense charged, and the wife also, and coercion is shown not to exist and therefore each is liable to punishment, they may be jointly indicted and convicted; for in such a case the wife acts in her own capacity as one able to commit crime, and of her own accord and intent, as much so as would an unmarried person, and to that effect are the authorities. King v. Chedwick, 1 Kible, 575; King v. Thomas, Cas. temp. Hardwicke, 278; Rex v. Cross, 1 Raym. 711; Rex v. Stapleton, 1 Crawf. & Dix's C. R. 163; State v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 27; King v. Morris, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 1096; Reg. v. Ingraham, 1 Salk. 384; 1 Russ on Crimes, 20. In Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 1 Mass. 476, the contrary was held, but in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 2 Gray, 512, the court held that "a wife may be indicted jointly with her husband," and say "the authorities on this point, notwithstanding Commonwealth v. Trimmer, are too numerous and decisivo to be withstood. Whether sho can be convicted separately or jointly with him is a question to be determined by direct evidenco or by legal presumptions concerning the freedom of her action or the coercion of her husband." Barb. Cr. Law, 250; Waggoner v. Bill, 18 Barb. 321; State v. Parkerson, 1 Strobh. 169; Pennybaker v. State, 2 Blackf. 484. Tho court charged that "the possession of stolen goods immediately after the larceny, if under peculiar and suspicious circumstances, when there is evidence tending to show that some other persons stole the property, such possession not being satisfactorily explained, would warrant the jury in convicting the accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen." Held, not error. Rex v. Matthews, 1 Den. C. C. 596. Judgment affirmed. Goldstein et al., plaintiffs in error, v. People of New York. Opinion by Danforth, J.

[Decided Sept. 28, 1880.]

NEGLIGENCE

OBJECTS LIABLE ΤΟ FRIGHTEN HORSES - NOTICE TO CORPORATION. - Plaintiff's horse was frightened by a pile of stones, placed near the travelled part of a turnpike, under the direction of the turnpike company, for the purpose of repairing a bridge, and sprang in such a way as to injure himself and the wagon to which he was attached, and to injure plaintiff, who was driving. There was evidence showing that other horses had been frightened by the same pile. Held, that if the pile had a tendency to frighten horses and was of a dangerous character, although not technically a defect or obstruction in the highway, the turnpike company could be made liable for damages caused to travellers thereby, after notice of its character and neglect to remove the same. Waterford, etc., T. Co. v. People, 9 Barb. 161; Wendell v. Mayor of Troy, 39 id. 329; Davis v. City of Bangor, 42 Me. 522; Dimmick v. Town of Suffield, 30 Conn. 129; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. II. 199; Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 id. 18; Moore v. Town of Richmond, 41 Vt. 435; Shearm & R. on Neg. 445-466. Notice to a secretary of the company held sufficient. Judgment reversed on ground of admission in evidence of conversation between witness and third person. Eggleston v. President, etc., of Columbia Turnpike Road, appellants. Opinion by Earl, J.

[Decided October 5, 1880.]

SLAUGHTER

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE EXCLUDING HOUSES FROM FIXED AREA IN CITY-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION -POWER TO REGULATE INCLUDES POWER TO PROHIBIT REASON FOR STATUTE NEED NOT BE

SET FORTH.—(1) By the amended charter of the city of Albany (Laws 1870, chap.-) the common council is authorized to enact ordinances, among other things "to regulate the erection, use and continuance of slaughter-houses." Held, that under this the common council could pass an ordinance forbidding the slaughtering of cattle within prescribed limits within the city specifically named, and such an ordinance could not be assailed on the ground that authority to "regulate" slaughter-houses could not be construed to permit a total prohibition of them in particular areas or localities. The use of the word " regulate" in the statute is not confined merely to the manner in which the business of slaughtering animals is carried on. To regulate implies a power of restriction and restraint. It is the plain purpose of the statute to give to the common council the right to fix and determine the limits and localities within which new slaughterhouses may be erected and the areas from which they may be excluded, and to prohibit their continuance whenever and wherever they become sources of danger to the health and comfort of the community. In Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 100, a similar ordinance was assailed as being in restraint of trade, and it was held that a provision of the ordinance that ,' meat shall not be sold in a particular place is good, not being a restraint of the right to sell meat but a regulation of that right." The same authority held to dispose of an objection that the ordinance in question was void as being in restraint of trade following in that respect. Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Purce v. Bertram, Cowp. 209, and to justify the principle of the latter authorities in which the exercise of such powers by boards of health have been sustained. Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 662; Polinsky v. People, 73 id. 65. (2) An objection was raised to the ordinance that it punished the prohibited acts "without pretense or any form of proof that they were injurious to the well being of the town, or that prudence required its passage." Held, not tenable. Neither in the ordinance itself, nor in the indictment under it, is it necessary to explain the reasons for its enactment. It is of the nature of legislative bodies to judge for themselves, and the fact and the exercise of that judg

ment is to be implied from the law itself. Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 606; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; Rector of Trinity v. Stiggins, 1 Robt. 1. Judgment affirmed. Cronins, plaintiff in error, v. People of New York. Opinion by Finch, J. [Decided Oct. 12, 1880.]

CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS ABSTRACT.*

CONSIDERATION -COMPOUNDING A CRIME-NEED NOT BE FELONY TO AVOID CONTRACT. —A man having been arrested and lodged in jail upon a criminal prosecution against himself and his son, for obtaining goods under false pretenses, his wife agreed with the parties from whom the goods were obtained and who had procured the prosecution, that she would give a note with her husband for the value of the goods and for the costs made, and secure it by a mortgage of her real estate, if they would procure the abandonment of the criminal proceeding and the release of her husband. The note and mortgage were given and the prosecution was withdrawn. Held, on a bill to foreclose the mortgage, (1) that a court of equity would not enforce a contract of suretyship so procured; (2) that the note was void as being upon an illegal consideration. Town of Sharon v. Gager, 46 Conn. 189; Williams v. Bayley, L. R., 1 H. L. Eng. & Ir. App. 200; Davies v. Lond., etc., Ins. Co., L. R., 8 Ch. 469. To render such an agreement void it is not necessary that the crime compounded should be a felony. It is enough if it be a public offense. All the authorities hold that an agreement to compound a felony will not be enforced, and that any security based upon such a consideration is void. But as to misdemeanors a distinction has been made. Some authorities hold that those misdemeanors which are personal in their nature between the parties, such as bastardy and a common assault, unaccompanied with riot or intent to kill, may be compromised. Maurer v. Mitchell, 9 Watts & Serg. 69; Robinson v. Crenshaw, 2 Stew. & Port. 276; Price v. Summers, 2 Southard, 578; Holcomb v. Stimpson, 8 Vt. 141. The last case was a prosecution for bastardy, and the decision was placed on the ground that it was a civil suit. But where the offense is in whole or in part of a public nature, nearly all the authorities hold that no agreement to stifle a public prosecution for it can be valid. Fay v. Oatley, 6 Wis. 42; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 3 Cush. 454; Hinesborough v. Sumner, 9 Vt. 23; Bowen v. Buck, 28 id. 308; Shaw v. Reed, 30 Me. 105; Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 197; Clark v. Ricker, 14 id. 44; Kimbrough v. Lane, 11 Bush (Ky.), 550; Peed v. McKee, 42 Iowa, 649; Buck v. First National Bank, 27 Mich. 293; Gardner v. Maxey, 9 B. Monroe, 90; Kier v. Lehman, 6 C. B. 308. In the last case cited it is said: "If the matter were res integra we should have no doubt in holding that any compromise of any misdemeanor or any public offense was an illegal consideration to support a promise, and it is remarkable what very little authority, consisting rather of dicta thau decision, there is to support such considerations." McMahon v. Smith. Opinion by Loomis, J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-LIMIT OF DUTY AS TO HIGHWAYS-EVIDENCE-COMMUNICATIONS OF PATIENT

TO PHYSICIAN. -(1) The limit of duty on the part of a town, with regard to the condition of its highways, falls far short of making them absolutely safe under all circumstances, even for those who use them properly. And where the use is one that reasonable care and prudence could never have anticipated, there is no duty on the town at all in reference to it. And it makes no difference that the injury in such a case is * To appear in 47 Connecticut Reports.

it may be regarded as evidence of malice in the original speaking of the words, and may thus tend indirectly to increase the damages, but it is not of itself a cause for which damages may be directly assessed. Williams v. Miner, 18 Conn. 472; Swift v. Dickerman, 31 id. 289. Ward v. Dick. Opinion by Granger, J. CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

COMMON CARRIER-LIEN FOR FREIGHT ON GOODS SHIPPED BY CONSIGNEE OF OWNER-WHEN LIEN ATTACHES.

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A firm which was engaged in buying and

the result of defects in a highway for which a town would be responsible in case of injury to individuals in the lawful and proper use of it. In Gregory v. Adams, 44 Gray, 242, it is said: "This is the measure and extent of the obligation of towns in reference to the support and maintenance of public highways. They are not required to make preparations for the safety or convenience of those who undertake to use those ways in an unusual or extraordinary manner, involving peculiar and special peril and danger, whether it be in respect to the kind or character of animals led or driven, or the magnitude or construction of carriages used, or the bulk or weight of prop-selling wheat and in chartering vessels to transport the erty transported. And if any person undertakes to use or travel upon a public highway in an unusual or extraordinary manner, or with animals, vehicles or freight not suitable or adapted to a way opened and prepared for the public use in the common intercourse of society and in the transaction of usual and ordinary affairs of business, he then takes every possible risk of loss and damage upon himself; and he can have no remedy against the town to recover recompense for injuries sustained, although they be the direct result of defects and imperfections in a way for which it would be responsible in case of injury to individuals in the lawful and proper use of it." See, also, Blodgett v. City of Boston, 8 Allen, 237, and cases there referred to. (2) The plaintiff, who was riding upon a load which broke through a town bridge, had received a personal injury when it broke through. In an action against the town for such injury, held, that his statements to a physician who attended upon him for the purpose of giving him treatment, with regard to the character and seat of his sufferings, were admissible. Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322; Howe v. Plainfield, 41 N. H. 135; Perkins v. Concord R. R. Co., 44 id. 223; Kent v. Town of Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Kern. 416; Denton v. Tho State, 1 Swan, 279. Wilson v. Town of Granby. Opinion by Loomis, J. NEGLIGENCE - OBSTRUCTING NATURAL STREAMARTIFICIAL INCREASE IN VOLUME OF STREAM BY ACT OF ANOTHER. - The defendant had constructed a covered channel for a small brook that ran through his premises in the city of N. This channel proved insufficient for the flow of all the water that came down tho brook in times of heavy rain, and by its obstruction caused tho water to overflow upon and injure the adjoining premises of tho plaintiff. The city, since the defendant's channel was made, had constructed several sewers and drains which emptied into the brook above his premises, by which a considerable quantity of sewage, and of surface water that it was claimed would have gone in other directions, was let into the brook. In a suit for the damage to the plaintiff's property it was held, (1) that the defendant was not liable for any damage beyond that caused by the natural flow of the water, including its increased flow from heavy rains and other ordinary natural causes; (2) that it was no reason for holding the defendant liable for more than this that the proportion of the damage done by the overflow of the natural water of the brook was difficult of ascertainment; (3) that the defendant and the city could not be regarded as joint tort-feasors. Sellick v. Ilall. Opinion by Granger, J. SLANDER-DAMAGES — SUBSEQUENT REPETITION OF SLANDEROUS WORDS - EVIDENCE OF MALICE. In an action of slander the plaintiff can recover damages only for the slanderous words charged in the declaration. Where the same slander has been since repeated, evidence of the repetition is admissible for the purpose of showing malice in the original speaking, but not as a ground in itself for additional damages. Where a defendant maliciously and for the purpose of spreading and perpetuating the slander, pleads the truth of the words in justification and fails to prove it,

1

same to Europe, to be there sold by the master for the
benefit of the firm, and who also acted as agents for
farmers for shipping wheat, which was known to de-
fendant, chartered defendant's ship to take wheat to
Europe. The ship proceeded to the port of V. and
took on board wheat belonging to plaintiff, which had
been consigued by him to the firm at that place. The
wheat was shipped in the name of the firm and de-
fendant received it not knowing that it belonged to
any one else. Afterward the firm became insolvent
and broke the charter party by not completing the
loading of the ship. Held, that defendant had a lien
on the wheat for his freight and that plaintiff could
not retake the wheat from defendant upon payment
of the expense of loading and unloading the same.
The firm had authority, when plaintiff put his wheat
in its hands, to ship it in their own names, and plaint-
iff was chargeable with knowledge that he had placed
his property in the hands of his agents for the very
purpose of enabling them to make such contracts as
might bo necessary and proper for transmitting it to
Europe for sale on his account. He knew that in exe-
cution of tho agency they had to make contracts to
which the law would attach a lien upon the property.
When, therefore, the factors shipped the wheat in
their own names, they were the only persons to whom
the defendant could look, and with whom he dealt in
receiving it. In the absence of knowledge that it be-
longed to the plaintiff, they, as shippers, were to him,
in contemplation of law, the owners. From them and
for them ho received it as a common carrier for car-
riage; and the legal rights and duties of both parties
became fixed by law the moment tho wheat was placed
on board the ship. Having received it for the purpose
of carriage, the defendant became bound to the ship-
pers for the safe transportation and delivery of the
wheat at the port of destination, and he was entitled
to a lien on it for payment of his freight and charges
on the completion of the voyage. Bulkely v. Naum-
keag Steam Cotton Co., 24 How. 391. This lien was
created the moment the goods were shipped and de-
fendant might retain the wheat until his freight was
paid. Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. 555; McCardier v.
Chesapeake Ins. Co., 8 Cr. 39; Certain Logs, 2 Sumn.
596. Although the insolvency of the firm, before the
ship was laden but after the wheat was placed on
board, may have ended the transaction between them
and the plaintiff as to the shipment and sale of the
wheat, and dispensed with its carriage, yet the plaintiff
was not entitled to the possession until he extin-
guished, or offered to extinguish, the lien which had
attached to it. The defendant was not bound to reland
it and deliver it to the plaintiff at the port of outfit
without tender or payment of the freight, or such
other charges as were liens upon it. Story on Bailm.,
§ 585; Campbell v. Connor, 70 N. Y. 424; Hutch. on
Car., § 476, note; Abbott on Shipp. 595. Hayes v.
Campbell. Opinion by McKee, J.
[Decided Aug. 26, 1880.]

NOTICE RECORDING ACTS -HUSBAND AND WIFE-
PURCHASE BY DEBTOR OF SURETY'S LAND UNDER
MORTGAGE SALE. A wife owned separate real estate

and mortgaged the samo to L. to secure a debt owed by her husband to him. L. foreclosed the mortgage and at the sale the land was purchased by B. for the husband, with his money. Thereafter B. conveyed the same to the husband, who afterward, in consideration of an old debt, conveyed the same to defendant. The deed giving the wife title, the mortgage, and all the subsequent conveyances, were on record. Held, that the husband, in taking title under the foreclosure sale, took in trust for his wife, and that defendant took title subject to such trust. The wife in mortgaging her separate property to secure the payment of her husband's debt to L., became, as between herself and husband, a surety only. Spear v. Ward, 20 Cal. 674; Loomis v. Wheelwright, 3 Sandt. Ch. 155; Bank of Albion v. Burns 46 N. Y. 170: 1 Bish. on Mar. Wom. 604. The husband, in purchasing through B. at the foreclosure sale, was but paying his own debt; and he took and thereafter heid the title to the property in trust for plaintiff. Fitch v. Cotheal, 2 Sandf. Ch. 29. In 1 Story's Eq. Jur., § 403, it is said: "In America it is uniformly held that the registration of a conveyance operates as constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers of any estate, legal or equitable, in the same property. To the same effect are the statutory provisions. The record was at least sufficient to put defendant upon inquiry; and he was bound, at his peril, to inform himself as to the facts. Ramsdell v. Fuller, 28 Cal. 37: Neison v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 366; Bank of Albion v. Burns, 46 N. Y. 170. Hassey v. Wilke. Opinion by Ross, J. [Decided Aug. 18, 1880.]

CRIMINAL LAW.

CONSPIRACY-TO MAKE LIABLE, PARTY MUST CONSENT TO CRIMINAL ACT-NO IMPLIED ASSENT-UN

LAWFUL ACT NOT OF DANGEROUS CHARACTER.- It may be stated, as a general proposition, that no one can be properly convicted of a crime to the commission of which he has never expressly or impliedly given his assent. Where the accused was present and committed the crime with his own hands, or aided and abetted another in its commission, he will be conceded as having expressly assented thereto. So, where he has entered into a conspiracy with others to commit a felony, or other offense, under such circumstances as will when tested by experience, probably result in the unlawful taking of human life, he will be presumed to have understood the consequences which might reasonably have been expected to follow from carrying into effect the purpose of the unlawful combination, and also to have assented to the doing of whatever would reasonably or probably be necessary to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, even to the taking of life. But further than this the law does not go. If the accused in such case has not expressly assented to the commission of the crime which happened to be the result of attempting to carry into effect the purpose of the conspiracy, and the unlawful enterprise was not of such character as would probably involve the necessity of taking life in carrying it into execution, then there can be no implied assent, and consequently no criminal liability for the unexpected result. If the unlawful act agreed to be done is dangerous or homicidal in its character, or if its accomplishment will necessarily or probably require the use of force and violence which may result in the taking of life unlawfully, every party to such agreement will be held criminally liable for whatever any of his co-conspirators may do in furtherance of the common design, whether he is present or not. But where the unlawful act agreed to be done is not of a dangerous or homicidal character, and its accomplishment does not necessarily or probably require the use of force and violence which may result in the taking

of life unlawfully, no such criminal liability will attach merely from being a party to such an agreement. 1 Bish. Crim. L. (6th ed.) § 641; Hawkins' P. C., book 2, chap. 29, §§ 19, 20, 21; Foster, 369, 370; Regina v. Franz, 2 F. & F. 580; Regina v. Horsey, 3 id. 278; Regina v. Luck, id. 443; Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 655, 673; Regina v. Tyler, 8 C. & P. 616; Regina v. Lee et al., F. & F. 63; Regina v. Turner et al., 4 id. 339; Rex v. Hawkins, 3 C. & P. 392; Watts v. The State, 5 W. Va. 532; Rex v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437. Illinois Sup. Ct., Sept. 22, 1880. Lamb v. People of Illinois. Opinion by Mulkey, J.

LARCENY-TO BE PRINCIPAL MUST BE CONCERNED IN ORIGINAL TAKING. A person cannot be a principal in a theft unless he is concerned in the original taking. It is often said that theft is a continuous offense, but cases wherein this doctrine is announced, upon examination, are generally found to be those in which a theft is perpetrated in one county, State or country, and the stolen property is then carried by him into another. In accordance with established principles at common law, which the statutes of all our States have embodied, it is universally held that the thief may be prosecuted either in the locality of the original caption or in that to which the property has been carried, upon the principle that the legal possession of the true owner continues, notwithstanding the larceny, during each moment of the fraudulent possession of the thief, and the offense is continuous so long as the property is in course of transportation or in the actual possession of the thief. It does not follow, inevitably, that any person who joins in the enterprise, after the original caption is perfected, is necessarily a principal in such original caption. The better doctrine seems to be, that in order to bring the latter within the category of a principal he must have been concerned in the original theft. Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 10 Mass. 153. He need not be actually present at the taking, if the act was committed in pursuance of a commou intent and a previously-formed design, in which his mind united and concurred with that of the actual taker. Welsh v. Stato, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 413; Scales v. State, 7 id. 361. Texas Ct. of Appeals, June 16, 1880. Cohea v. State of Texas. Opinion by Clark, J.

PERJURY -EVIDENCE- TESTIMONY OF TWO WITNESSES NECESSARY TO CONVICT.-It is a general rule that the testimony of a single witness to the falsity of the matter on which the perjury is assigned is insufficient to convict on a charge of perjury. Two witnesses are not essentially requisite, for if any material circumstance be proved by other witnesses in confirmation of the witness who gives the direct testimony of perjury, it may turn the scale, and warrant a conviction. "When there are several assignments of perjury, it does not seem clearly settled whether, in addition to the testimony of a single witness, thero must be corroborative proof with respect to each, but the better opinion is that such proof is necessary, and that, too, although all the perjuries were committed at one time and place." 1 Greenl. Ev., § 257 a. Thus A, in an affidavit, stated that he had paid all the debts proved under his bankruptcy except two. On an indictment for perjury on this affidavit, one of the assiguments was that A had not paid all the debts proven except two, and another that certain other creditors were not paid in full. In support of the indictment several creditors were called, who each proved the non-payment of his own debt. Held, that this was not sufficient to warrant conviction, and that as to the non-payment of each debt, it was necessary to have the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and some circumstance to supply the place of a second witness. Regina v. Parker, 1 C. & M. 639; 41 E. C. & E. R. 346. See 2 Russ. on Cr. 654. The weight of authority and the general rule require that where an indictment contains

several assignments of perjury, in order to convict on any one there must be either two witnesses or ono witness and corroborative evidence to negative the truth of the matter in such assignment. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., Jan., 1880. Williams v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Opinion by Trunkey, J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CONTRACT-REPRESENTATIONS INFLUENCING CON

DUCT-MUTUALITY INTEREST IN LANDS-STATUTE

OF FRAUDS, § 4— EXECUTED CONSIDERATION.-A representation, which influences the conduct of a person to whom it is made, is not legally enforceable against the person who makes it unless it operates either as a contract or as an estoppel. The plaintiff, as heir-atlaw of an intestate, claimed the title deeds of the intestate's farm, of which the defendant had taken possession on his death. The defendant counter-claimed a declaration that she was entitled to a life estate in the farm, and to retain the title deeds for her life. The jury found that the defendant was induced to serve the intestate as his housekeeper without wages for many years, and to give up other prospects of establishment in life, by his promise to make a will leaving her a life estate in his farm, if, and when, it became his property. Held, first, that the finding, taken with the facts, amounted to a finding that there was a contract to the abovo effect between the intestate and the defendant, and that such a contract being based on a good consideration (whether it could or could not have been enforced by the intestate) was binding on him and his estate; and secondly, that since the contract had been completely performed on the defendant's part, section 4 of the statute of frauds did not apply; and that the defendant was entitled to the declaration asked in the counter-claim. Cases referred to: Packard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469; Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 Cl. & Fin. 45; Loffus v. Mayo, 3 Giff. 592; Luders v. Anstey, 4 Ves. 501; Prole v. Soady, 2 Giff. 1; Coles v. Pilkington, L. R., 19 Eq. 574; Coverdale v. Eastwood, L. R., 15 Eq. 21; Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. C. 185; Maunsell v. Hedges, 4 H. L. C. 1039; Caton v. Caton, L. R., 2 H. L. 127; Dashwood v. Jermyn, 12 Ch. D. 776. Exch. Div., June 2, 1880. Alderson v. Maddison. Opinion by Stepheu, J. L. R., 5 Ex. D. 293.

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INFANT FRESH PROMISE.-In July, 1875, the plaintiff and defendant (both being then under the age of twenty-one) mutually agreed to marry one another. The engagement continued without any definite understanding as to when the marriage was to take place, until March, 1879, when (both having attained the age of twentyone) the defendant asked the plaintiff, in the presence of her father, to fix the wedding-day. She fixed it for the 5th of June, to which the defendant assented, but ultimately he broke his promise. In an action for this breach of promise, in which it was agreed that the damages should be assessed, subject to the opinion of the court as to whether or not that which took place in March, 1879, was evidence from which the jury might and ought to infer a fresh promise to marry after the defendant had attained twenty-one, within section 2 of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874 (37 and 38 Vict., ch. 62), or a mere ratification of the original void promise. Held, by Denman and Lindley, JJ., that what took place in March, 1879, when the wedding-day was fixed, was a fresh promise made after the defendant came of age, and upon a good consideration. By Lord Coleridge, C. J., that it was a mere ratification of the original promise made by the defendant during his minority, and not a binding promise within the statute. Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 433, and Northcott v. Doughty, 4 C. P. D. 435, commented upon. Cases

PROMISE TO MARRY RATIFICATION OR

referred to: Harris v. Wall, 1 Ex. 122; Rowe v. Hopwood, L. R., 4 Q. B. 1; DeThoren v. Att'y-Gen., 1 App. Cas. 686. Com. Pleas Div., June 23, 1880. Ditcham v. Worrall, L. R., 5 C. P. D. 410.

INJUNCTION PUBLICATION INJURIOUS TO TRADE.— It is not necessary to prove actual damage in an action to restrain the issue of a circular which is calculated to do serious injury to the plaintiff's business. Ch. Div., May 7, 1880. Thomas v. Williams. Opinion by Fry, J., 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 91.

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-CONDITIONAL SALE OF A HORSE DELIVERED - DEATH OF HORSE BEFORE

SALE BECAME ABSOLUTE.-A horso was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant upon condition that it should be taken away by the defendant and tried by him for eight days, and returned at the end of eight days if the defendant did not think it suitable for his purposes.. The horse died on the third day after it was placed in the defendant's stable, without fault of either party. Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for the price, as for goods sold and delivered. Com. Pl. Div., March 13, 1880. Elphick v. Barnes. Opinion by Denman, J. L. R., 5 C. P. D. 321.

CORRESPONDENCE.

IS IT A JOKE?

Editor of the Albany Law Journal

Mr. William Eggleston, in the Preface of his work on Damages, just published, says: "In submitting this work to the profession, I feel great anxiety as to its reception by the public." And well he may, for of all the outrages ever perpetrated upon the patient lawbook-buying public, this is the acme in what is known as padding. During the recent presidential compaign there appeared a neat littlo publication comprising somo 37 sheets of pure white paper, entitled, "Life and Public Services of Winfield Scott Hancock. Every lawyer who received a copy of said book was highly amused, and pronounced it a huge joke. Little did the publishers of that unique book dream, however, that they wero establishing a precedent to be handed down and slavishly followed by future generations, and I seriously question, Mr. Editor, whether there will be found among the bench and bar of this State, a single legal-bibliomaniac willing to vote the 58 pages of plain white paper, found in Mr. Eggleston's work, any thing save an unmitigated outrage upon the legal profession. Yours, etc..

WILLIAM J. C. BERRY, Librarian N. Y. Bar Association. FORM OF BALLOTS.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

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I note what you say in last JOURNAL about the electoral ballot. It would be well for some level-headed legislator to revise the whole legislation about ballots, for it is now muddled. The Revised Statutes (1 R. S. [5th ed.] 427, § 9), required ballots to be "endorsed." The amendment, Laws 1880, chapter 553, section 1, requires them to be "indorsed." 1 Revised Statutes (5th ed.), 429, § 15, requires ballots for electors to be "indorsed. Chapter 366 of 1880, section 2, says: Every ballot shall have a caption (as provided by law)." This implies that some previous law required a " caption." What law? That is a conundrum, which the draughtsman of that act should answer. else can! I believe the above refers to all the legislation about the form of ballots, except chapter 513, Laws of 1855, relating to the city of New York, which provides that the ballot for electors shall be "the same as now prescribed by law," and when folded shall be indorsed or show on the outside the words "president," etc., and the same words "when folded, shall be indorsed or show on the outside," etc., are used

No one

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