returned to the courthouse for the purpose of conducting the trial. After the defendant had concluded his testimony, the prosecuting attorney again asked the court to adjourn to the hotel for the purpose of taking the testimony of the prosecuting witness in rebuttal. This was granted against the objection of the defendant. The prosecuting attorney made the request in each instance on the ground that the prosecuting witness was too ill to leave the hotel and come to the courthouse and give her testimony there. In several jurisdictions where the question has been raised it has been held, unless prohibited by statute, the trial court may in its discretion adjourn court to the home of a witness to take his testimony where the witness is unable to attend the trial at the courthouse. Davis v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 121 S. W. 429, and Selleck v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 157, 75 N. W. 975, 41 L. R. A. 563, 69 Am. St. Rep. 906. On the other hand, it has been held to be reversible error to adjourn the trial of a criminal case to the home of a witness against the objection of the defendant. Bishop's New Criminal Procedure (2d Ed.) vol. 2, § 1195. Adams v. State, 19 Tex. App. 1; Carter v. State, 100 Miss. 342, 56 South. 454, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 369; Funk v. Carroll County, 96 Iowa, 158, 64 N. W. 768. We think the trend of our decisions is toward, the latter rule. In Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54, the court said:

"The common law defines a court to be a 'place where justice is judicially administered,' and therefore to constitute a court there must be a place appointed by law for the adminis tration of justice, and some person authorized by law to administer justice at that place, must be there for that purpose. Then, but not otherwise, there is a court, and the judicial power of the state may be there exercised by the judge or person authorized by law to hold it; and if the law prescribed no time for holding the court, the judge might lawfully hold it when, and as often, as he chose. So, likewise, if the place was left to his election, instead of being fixed and prescribed by law, he might lawfully sit in judgment, where he pleased, within the territorial limits prescribed to his jurisdiction, but in this state both the time and place of holding the terms of the circuit court in each country are prescribed by law."

The court has recognized that in cases of emergency such as the destruction of the courthouse by fire the court itself may secure other quarters in the county seat for temporary use in the administration of justice. Hudspeth v. State, 55 Ark. 323, 18 S. W. 183; Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S. W. 16. In the case of Williams v. Reutzel, 60 Ark. 155, 29 S. W. 374, it is said that the object of the rule seems to be to obtain certainty and to

prevent a failure of justice through the parties concerned or affected not knowing the place of holding court. The manifold mischiefs that might arise from permitting a court to assume a migratory character and travel from place to place in the same locality or even in the same town are manifest. It is apparent that courts are held to determine the rights of all who are properly brought before them, and that numerous cases are pending in the same court at the same time. It would detract from the majesty of the law, lessen the dignity of courts, and cause trouble and injustice to litigants if the courts should be held at any other time or place than that provided by law. It follows, therefore, that the court erred in adjourning to the hotel to take the testimony of the prosecuting witness against the objection of the defendant.

Error is assigned because the court refused to allow the defendant to introduce testimony tending to show the insanity of the mother and sister of the prosecuting witness. There was no error in the ruling of the court. It is contended that the evidence was competent on the question of the credibility of the witness. No objection was made to the mental competency of the prosecuting witness when she testified, and no question was then raised as to her mental condition. To have permitted the defendant at the trial to have introduced evidence to prove the insanity of her mother and sister would have been collateral to the issue to be tried before the jury, and that was the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

Inasmuch as the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, we will declare the law applicable to the admission of evidence relating to the mental condition of the prosecuting witness. In the District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519, 2 Sup. Ct. 840, 27 L. Ed. 618, the court said:

"The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or a person affected with insanity is admissible as a witness if he have sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath, and to be capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in reference to the questions at issue; and whether he have that understanding is a question to be determined by the court, upon examination of the party himself, and any competent witnesses who can speak to the nature and extent of his insanity."

It is not contended by the defendant that the prosecuting witness was mentally incompetent to testify in the case. His contention was that she was subject to insane delusions at times, and it was admissible in order to affect her credibility as a witness and to ex

plain her conduct to prove this fact by witnesses who had personal knowledge of her condition of mind or mental delusions as well as by her acts and conduct on the occasion in question. Wharton's Criminal Evidence (10th Ed.) vol. 1, § 370, A, B; Underhill on Criminal Evidence (2d Ed.) 203; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 492-497. See, also, People v. Enright, 256 Ill. 221, 99 N. E. 936, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 318, and note, and State v. Simes, 12 Idaho, 310, 85 Pac. 914, 9 Ann. Cas. 1216.

For the error indicated in the opinion, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

NOTE.-Adjourning Court to the Home of a Witness in Criminal Case.-The case of Selleck v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 157. 75 N. W. 975, 41 L. R. A. 563, 69 Am. St. Rep. 906, was a civil suit and the opinion was not unanimous, and it was said that the taking of testimony was somewhat similar to a view of the premises, which was thought to be within the discretion of the trial judge, and it was said: "While we may not be willing to go to the extent of some courts in upholding trials and adjudications had outside of the court house, yet the authorities are ample to support the proposition that the taking of the plaintiff's testimony in the manner indicated did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, nor nullify the judgment, but was at most an irregularity." There are several cases cited to this, one of them appearing to be a criminal case. State v. Peyton, 32 Mo. App. 522. This, however, was not in fact a criminal case but was scire facias on a bond forfeiture.

In a criminal case it is said there is a constitutional guaranty that persons accused of crime are entitled to a public trial, and this implies that it is to take place in open court at a place of holding court. O'Brien v. People. 17 Colo. 561.

In Carter v. State, 100 Miss. 342, 56 So. 454, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 369, the situation was greatly like that in the instant case, and where objection was made to the taking of testimony of a sick witness, il at her home. It was thought to be a reversible irregularity to do this.

An Iowa civil case held, that where a place for holding court is appointed and there is a regular court house, a court loses its jurisdiction to adjourn to a private house for the purpose of a trial. It was said that: "The danger to result from permitting the court, in the trial of a cause, at the instance of a party, against the objections of the other. to leave the place provided by law for the trial and go to another place is very manifest." Funk v. Carroll County, 96 Ia. 158, 64 N. W. 768. But an elder Iowa case said it was not improper even in a criminal trial held prior to the enactment of a statute providing that "courts must be at the place provided by law" for the court, jury and counsel to adjourn to a neighboring house to receive the testimony of a witness, if the prisoner was not put to substantial inconvenience. Hampton v. U. S., Morris 489.

And in State v. Tracy, 34 N. D. 498. 158 N. W. 1069, a criminal action, it was held that to take testimony, in a rape case at a hospital, situated at the country seat where the law recognizes that

conditions may arise where the court room provided by law may prove inadequate and the court may direct other quarters at the expense of the county, and the law also permits the jury to be taken from the court room to the place where an offense has been committed so that the jury may view such place, a court may in its discretion authorize testimony of a witness to be taken elsewhere, if no prejudice is shown to have resulted.

In People v. McWeeney, 259 Ill. 161, 102 N. E. 233, an order for injunction was held void because it was entered at an “armory;" since courts are not migratory and can only exercise their functions in the places appointed by law.

In Reed v. State, 147 Ind. 41, 46 N. E. 135, it was held that, where in a case of emergency steps are taken before a special judge in a room in the court house other than the court room, this was not error, where it did not appear in the case that the court was not regularly in session, with proper notice of the place of its sitting and with full opportunity for interested persons to be present.

A question such as is here considered does not necessarily pertain to jurisdiction, and, while a public trial involves trial at some recognized place as a court, yet there is no necessary inference of harm, where a court is vested with some discretion in an emergency. C.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

A Circuit Court Judge of Pennsylvania was systematically affronted by a lawyer, a political opponent. A friend asked him:

"Why don't you squelch the fellow? He needs it."

"Well," said the Judge, musingly, "up in my home town there's an ugly yaller dog that, whenever there is moonlight, sits on the stoop and howls until the town can't sleep, and generally keeps it up till daylight." Then he resumed his dinner. The friend in amazement inquired, "Well, what of it?"

"Well," said the Judge, slowly, "the moon keeps right on."-Christian Register.

This is a jury room secret that has come into circulation in some mysterious way:

"Look here," said one of the jurymen, after they had retired, "if I understand aright, the plaintiff doesn't ask damages for blighted affections or anything of that sort, but only wants to get back what he's spent on presents, pleasure trips and so forth."

"That is so," agreed the foreman.

"Well, then, I vote we don't give him a penny," said the other, hastily. "If all the fun he had with that girl didn't cover the amount he expended it must be his own fault. Gentlemen, I courted that girl once myself!"

2. Assault and Battery Arrest Without Warrant.-A person is not authorized to assault an officer upon his mere statement that he has a warrant for such person's arrest, and that he must consider himself under arrest, but the officer must make some physical attempt to make an unlawful arrest before such person can lawfully resist by force.-Harris v. State, Ga., 95 S. E. 268.

3. Attachment-Levy. Although part of chattels was not physically removed, where sheriff read writ of attachment to defendants and instructed their employes that they were keeping possession for him, there was sufficient levy to create lien as against mortgagee of property described as being at different place.Lee County Sav. Bank v. Snodgrass Bros., Iowa, 166 N. W. 680.

to collect attorney's fees provided for therein, such agreement would raise no presumption that attorney was authorized by client to make such settlement.-Evans v. Atlantic Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, Fla., Ga., 95 S. E. 219.

5. Imputable Knowledge. -Where attorneys were employed to ascertain whether there were suits pending affecting title to certain land, information acquired by such attorneys through examining court records is imputed to client.-Bunnell v. Holmes, Col., 171 Pac. 365.

6. Bailment-Gratuitous Bailee.-A gratuitous bailee, who is sent money for a certain purpose with written instructions, must be presumed to have acquiesced and consented to the written instructions, where he did not disavow the terms under which sent.-Bradford-Kennedy Co. v. Buchanan, Wash., 171 Pac. 228.

7. Bankruptcy-Illegal Agreement.-Agreement between two creditors to bid against each other at bankruptcy sale until certain figure was reached in order to induce other bids, and, if no higher bids were received, to buy property for their joint account and divide any profits, held not invalid. Schaap v. Robinson, Ark., 201 S. W. 292.

8-Renouncing Interest.-Where ownership of corporate stock, apart from any interest in land conveyed by corporation as appurtenant to stock, would be of no benefit to trustee in bankruptcy, and land could not be reached, trustee should renounce any interest which he might be entitled to assert against stock by virtue of contract by bankrupt and his wife for acquisition of stock and land.-In re Berry, U. S. D. C., 247 Fed. 700.

9.

Banks and Banking-Negligence.-Acts of officers of bank with capital of only $50,000 in lending $30,000 to a canning company in which they had stock, which had a capital of $10,000, and which continually operated at a loss, though they believed it would ultimately pay a profit, were so reckless as to constitute negligence for which they were liable to shareholders.-Magale v. Fomby, Ark., 201 S. W. 278.

10. Bills and Notes-Acceleration of Debt.Provision in a mortgage, securing a note payable two years after date that on default in any interest the whole should become payable related alone to a foreclosure, and did not accelerate time of payment of note, and action on note after first default was prematurely brought. -Alwood v. Harrison, Okla., 171 Pac. 325.

11. Attorney Fees.-Where note provides for the payment by the maker of principal, interest, and attorney's fees, the attorney's fees are a part of the principal debt.-Evans v. Atlantic Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, Fla., Ga., 95 S. E. 219.

12-Bad Faith.-If indorsee had actual knowledge when he took note that place of payment had been changed, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking instrument amounted to bad faith, under Rev. St. 1909, § 10026, he is not "holder in due course."-MeBank chanics' American Nat. v. Helmbacher, Mo., 201 S. W. 382.

13.- -Negotiability. - Instrument signed by bank reciting deposit by one named "payable

Contract.

15. Brokers Defendant owner was not bound to accept from plaintiff broker a customer at a price less than that stipulated, atlhough he was at liberty to accept a less price from another customer.-Mullen v. Crawford, Iowa, 166 N. W. 694.

16.- -Producing Buyer.-Where real estate agent places his principal in touch with purchaser and thereafter principal terminates agency and completes sale to such purchaser, agent may recover his commission.-Johnson v. Columbia Mortgage & Trust Co., Mo., 201 S. W. 365.

17. Carriers of Goods-Bill of Lading.-When bank in good faith makes advances, whether as purchaser or lender, and receives bill of lading as security, its claim upon property covered by bill of lading is good as against claim of creditors

of shipper.-Painesville Nat. Bank of Painesville, Ohio, v. Hannan, Col., 171 Pac. 364. 18. Custody of Law.-A carrier is not responsible for goods taken from its custody by valid legal process, provided it gives the owner prompt notice of the suit, so that he may have an opportunity to protect his interest.-Morgan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., Wis., 166 N. W. 777.

19.

Carriers of Live Stock-Special Service.— That a station agent after telegraphing told a shipper that a train arriving during the night would carry his cattle did not constitute a contract for special service and a discrimination in violation of the Elkins Act.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stallings, Ark., 201 S. W. 294.

20. Carriers of Passengers - Employes. Where attitude of railroad company towards employes riding on railroad's gasoline speeders on their private business was, at most, one of permission, it was not liable to employe so riding, injured by defect in speeder, on theory of his being passenger.-Glover v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., Mont., 171 Pac. 278.

21. Misinformation.-Misinformation given by defendant railroad's agent that plaintiff's train would stop at their destination, resulting in failure of relative to meet them at nearby station when they alighted pursuant to their original plan, and then advised relative they would proceed to ultimate destination without his company, establishes no cause of action.Hutchison v. Southern Ry. Co., S. C., 95 S. E.

181.

22.- -Relation of Passenger.-Plaintiff who was injured by opening of front door of payas-you-enter street car while passing by such door to enter car at rear door, held not a passenger at time of injury.-Murray v. Cumberland County Power & Light Co., Me., 103 Atl. 66.

23. Chattel Mortgages-Bill of Sale.-Written bill of sale and contemporaneous agreement to retransfer the property on the seller's payment of the consideration were in effect a chattel mortgage and not a pledge,`under which, either party by agreement might have possession. Keppler v. Kelly, Tex., 201 S. W. 447.

24. Description of Property.-A mortgage, describing property as "live stock," including steers, cows, etc., would cover horses and mules, though not enumerated.-Lee County Sav. Bank, v. Snodgrass Bros., Iowa, 166 N. W. 680.

25.

Commerce-Interstate Traffic.-Conductor of work train unloading ties to repair track used for interstate traffic is employed in interstate traffic under federal Employers' Liability Act, although at the time of the accident he was not engaged in distributing ties, but was returning from work in charge of such train.Eley v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., Iowa, 166 N. W. 739.

26. Constitutional Law-Equal Protection.— Gen. St. Fla. 1906, § 2218, providing for the allowance of attorney's fees to plaintiff in suits to enforce mechanics' liens, held unconstitutional, as denying to defendants in such suits the equal protection of the laws.-Union Terminal Co. v. Turner Const. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 247 Fed. 727.

27. Legislative Intent.-Where the intent of the Legislature is plain, it is immaterial that a taxation statute is unfair, where there is no claim that it is so unfairly discriminating as to be unconstitutional.-Great Western Accident Ins. Co. v. Martin, Iowa, 166 N. W. 705.

con

28. Contracts-Attorney Fees.-Where tract for sale of grain, with receipt for advancements, provided for attorney's fees but there was subsequent verbal agreement, which did not provide for attorney's fees, and receipt was satisfied by subsequent transactions between parties, holder could not recover attorney's fees, though maker still owed him money on account. -Born v. Union Elevator Co., Ind., 118 N. E. 973. 29. Evidence.-Where party denied making contract to do specific amount of dye work, but stated that he only agreed to do best he could on account of scarcity of dye, evidence concerning amount of dye he had on hand was admissible as explanatory circumstance.-Ess-Arr Knitting Mill v. Fischer, Md., 103 Atl. 91.

30. Corporations-Acceptance of Stock.-Corporate stock purchased from funds of partnership to knowledge of such corporation taken in one partner's name made him "holder" under a provision that "holder" could retire stock in exchange for products of corporation, and it could not be compelled to accept such stock for products sold partnership.-National Sewer Pipe Co. v. Smith-Jaycox Lumber Co., Iowa, 166 N. W. 708.

31. -Election of Officers.-Where stock was assigned to assignee as collateral for assignor's note, assignee could surrender certificate and receive certificate in own name, on which he might vote stock at corporation elections under by-law limiting voting right to those in whose names stock stood on the books.-Hardman v. Barrow, Ga., 95 S. E. 209.

32. -Ratification.-Where person held out by a corporation as its manager employed plaintiff.

who deposited $500 for privilege of earning commissions and as a fund to pay his wages, at $20 per week and commissions, for 6 months to sell automobiles for the corporation, which opened an account and accepted the benefits of the contract, it ratified it, and was liable to plaintiff for the balance of the deposit, on his wrongful discharge after 11 weeks. Bertholf v. Fisk, lowa, 166 N. W. 713.

33. Covenants-Mutual Mistake.-Where lots not owned by grantor were included in the deed by mutual mistakes, there was no breach of covenants of warranty and seisin.-Maxwell v. Wayne Nat. Bank, N. C., 95 S. E. 147.

34. Dedication-Street Plat.-Plat presented by owner of land to common council of city, duly acknowledged, and representing strip of land named as street running east and west across owner's land, was plat of street within meaning of Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8900.-Interstate Iron & Steel Co. v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 118 N. E. 958.

35. Deeds-Description of Land.-Deed of land of which S. O. died possessed, lying on waters of the Little South fork of Cumberland river in W. county, containing 365 acres, was sufficiently definite to pass title.-Foster v. Roberts, Ky., 201 S. W. 334.

36. Exception and Reservation. Where deed divided farm between owners in common, a provision that grantor should have half income from gravel in certain lots held exception, and not reservation, in view of fact that the income had previously been divided equally between owners, and that gravel deposit constituted enterprise distinct from that of farming.-Worcester v. Smith, Me., 103 Atl. 65.

37. Sufficiency of Writing.-A writing signed and sealed by the parties styled, "Memorandum of Agreement," containing the words, "It is further agreed that the said Price will convey to the said Peyton all the mining rights and privileges of his land," is not a deed of conveyance, but only an executory contract to convey. -State v. Morris, W. Va., 95 S. E. 197.

conveying

38. Undivided Interest.-Deed part of a survey, and containing 640 acres more or less, being a one-half undivided interest out of the survey, held to convey an undivided onehalf interest in the survey and not any specific number of acres undivided out of the survey.Read v. Blaine, Tex., 201 S. W. 415.

39. Divorce Alimony.-Decree for alimony is a decree not merely for payment of money, but for its payment in discharge of marital duty of maintenance, and is enforceable by attachment for contempt.-Smith v. Smith, W. Va., 95 S. E. 199.

40. Increase of Alimony.-Amount ordered to be paid as temporary alimony may be increased to meet wife's need from changed circumstances because of necessary surgical operation with its expenses.-Rotge v. Rotge, Colo., 171 Pac. 360.

41.- -Waiver.-A wife without means of support should not be held to waive her right to review a decree divorcing her from her husband and ordering her from his house by the forced acceptance of monthly allowances made in the decree, not appreciably larger than previous allowances pendente lite.-Spratt v. Spratt, Minn., 166 N. W. 769.

42. Easements-Irrevocable License.-General parol license by owner of dominant tenement to

obstruct easement when executed by owner of servient tenement upon his own land becomes irrevocable.-Town of Brookline v. Loring, Mass., 118 N. E. 981.

43. Electricity-Public Service Company.Corporation furnishing electricity to consumers for lights, etc., may enforce reasonable regulations, but cannot compel customers to release it from obligation when it may elect, but must, according to their needs and its facilities, equally serve those submitting to its rules.-Chambers v. Spruce Lighting Co., W. Va., 95 S. E. 192.

44. Eminent Domain-De Facto Officer.-Condemnation by a board of muncipal park commissioners created under an unconstitutional statute cannot, when questioned in ejectment, be upheld on the ground that they were de facto officers, whose acts were not subject to collateral attack. Nichols v. City of Cleveland, U. S. C. C. A., 247 Fed. 731.

45. Procedure.-Without adjudication and judgment of necessity to condemn, no subsequent proceeding can be had in condemnation proceedings, and judgment of necessity is final, subject only to review as provided by law.State v. Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, Wash., 171 Pac. 238.

46. Estoppel-Change of Decision.- City held not entitled to base estoppel on expenditures made or action taken, based on rule of decision subsequently changed, where city took possession of land under invalid condemnation statute. Nichols v. City of Cleveland, U. S. C. C. A., 247 Fed. 731.

47. Exchange of Property-Rescission. If defendant or his agent, exchanging land for plaintiff's factory, took advantage of fact land was covered with snow when plaintiff inspected to mislead him, fact that had plaintiff been more diligent he would have discovered deception and saved himself from loss is no defense to defendant, sued for rescission.-Thuesen v. Johnson, Iowa, 166 N. W. 747.

48. Executors and Administrators-Breach of Contract. Contract whereby son, in consideration of his parents' conveyance to him, bound "himself, his executors, and administrators and heirs" to support parents during their lives, was not breached by son's death, so as to allow parents to establish the present value of such support, based on mortality tables, as a claim against the son's estate under Rev. St. 1909. § 210, providing that when the demand is not due the court may adjust the same, etc.-Wilbur v. Wilbur, Mo., 201 S. W. 387.

administrator is

49. Injunction.-Where seeking to sell property as a part of estate of his intestate, adverse holders of land may maintain a suit for injunction; there being other facts alleged to show grounds of equitable jurisdiction.-Pickron v. Pickron, Ga., 95 S. E. 238.

50. Fixtures Removability. Smokehouse built by lessor for tenant with money furnished by tenant as incidental to tenant's packing house business, held a "trade fixture," removable as such.-Armour & Co. v. Block, Ga., 95 S. E. 228.

51. Fraud-Expression of Opinion.-If party expressing opinion possesses superior knowledge, his statement is actionable if he knows that he does not honestly entertain opinion because it is contrary to facts.-Como Orchard Land Co. v. Markham, Mont., 171 Pac. 274.

52. Homestead-Constitutional Law.-Under Const. Ark. 1868, art. 12, § 2, a sale under a deed of trust of land including the homestead conveyed no right in the homestead, either present or in remainder.-Hill v. Hill, U. S. C. C. A., 247 Fed. 778.

53. Husband and Wife-Entirety.-Where a judgment is entered against both husband and wife who hold land by entirety the property is subject to execution, but where the lien and judgment against the husband's interest becomes void because of his bankruptcy, levy on the property cannot be made during his life.-Ade v. Caplan, Mo., 103 Atl. 94.

54. Joint Accounts.-Where a husband acted as agent for investment and management of property for a period of years, and he and his wife maintained joint accounts, wife received