death, to his foreman, proper person to receive it, satisfied Employers' Liability Act of 1913, pt. 2, § 4a (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5246ppp), requiring notice "as soon as practicable."-Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mummey, Tex., 200 S. W. 251.

77. -Safe Place to Work. Where it was the duty of the master or his agent to remove any oil spilled on the top of the tank or tender of an engine, a servant could presume this had been done, and until he has been notified or acquired knowledge to the contrary, he does not assume the risk of slipping and falling from such cause.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Hazelbusch, Tex., 200 S. W. 268.

78.- -Safety Appliance.-Under Employers' Liability Act and Safety Appliance Act, assumption of risk held not a defense if failure to have power brake of engine in working order contributed in whole or in part to the employe's death.-Union Pac. R. Co. v. Huxoll, U. S. S. C., 38 Sup. Ct. 187.

Act.-Under

79. Workmen's Compensation Workmen's Compensation Act, § 3, subd. 11. and § 16, and Domestic Relations Law. § 114, adopted child of employe's daughter held not entitled to compensation for his death.-Winkler v. New York Car Wheel Co., N. Y., 168 N. Y. S. 826.

80. Mechanic's Liens-Statutory Authority.— To authorize mechanic's lien, material must be furnished to one who has contract with owner of building or his agent, and it is not enough that material be furnished for or acfually go into the building.-De Ranko v. Lee, Mo., 200 S. W. 79.

81. Mortgages-Junior Mortgage. Where mortgagee took quit-claim deed from mortgagor's grantee in lieu of mortgage, and canceled mortgagor's note, but debt was not satisfied or mortgage released, position of junior mortgagee under mortgage from grantor in quit-claim deed was not bettered by cancellation of note.-James v. Williams, Kan., 169 Pac. 1163.

82.- -Payment.-Where mortgagor conveyed one-third of his interest to his wife, free from mortgage, and mortgagee thereafter accepted deed from mortgagor by terms of which he was required to apply consideration to payment of mortgage, mortgage was discharged, and wife's interest not subject to satisfaction thereof.Leary v. Clayton, Md., 102 Atl. 765.

83. Municipal Corporations-Automobile. Where defendant in driving an automobile violated ordinances by turning to the left to enter an intersecting street before passing beyond its center, and though he saw plaintiff coming from the opposite direction when he had 34 feet in which to stop and could have stopped in 10, he failed to stop it within 44 feet and until after the collision, he was negligent.-Heryford v. Spitcaufsky, Mo.. 200 S. W. 123.

84. Streets and Highways.-Streets and highways are for use of all law-abiding people, and members of labor unions and strikers have no authority to intimidate or prevent persons from using them.-Niles-Bement-Pond Co. Iron Molders' Union, Local No. 68, U. S. D. C., 246 Fed. 850.

V.

85. Negligence-Evidence.-Proof that judgment had been obtained against plaintiff city for defective street conditions which defendant contractor was improving does not constitute circumstantial evidence that contractor's negligence caused accident.-City of Seattle v. Erickson, Wash., 169 Pac. 985.

86. Principal and Agent-Attorney and Client. -Power of attorney, authorizing attorney to bail bond for third person in any execute a sum required to be given, held to authorize execution of bond in any amount the court might see fit to fix the bail.-Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 200 S. W. 9.

87. Railroads-Proximate Cause.-Where approach to train was rendered dangerous solely by negligence of another railroad in operating train on track passenger had to cross, first railroad was not liable for injury, second railroad being owner of depot and tracks.-Scott v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., Ky., 200 S. W. 6. 88. Trespasser.-Where, due to stopping of a freight on a side track, so as to block a crossing for an unreasonable length of time, one

walked down the right of way to get around the train, he was a trespasser.-Sweat's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co., Ky., 200 S. W. 14. 89. Street Railroads-Negligence.-Failure of motorman to reduce speed of car approaching a crossing and to have it under control so as to avoid collision with auto truck in plain view at apparently safe distance, is negligence.-Peterson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., La., 77 So. 647.

90. Telegraphs and Telephones-Delivery of Message. In damage action against telegraph company for failing to deliver message offering plaintiff a personal service contract, plaintiff's testimony that he would have accepted offer if message had been delivered is admissible.Pfiester V. Western Union Telegraph Co., Ill., 118 N. E. 407.

91.- -Unrepeated Message. Stipulation on back of telegram that liability for error in sending unrepeated message was limited to amount paid for transmission will not relieve company from liability for losses occasioned by its negligence.-Warren-Godwin Lumber Co. v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., Miss., 77 So. 601.

92. Theaters and Shows-Administrative Tribunal.-Under Laws 1917, c. 308. Kansas board of review has full power to determine whether films offered for its examination and decision are proper for exhibition, and its determination is not open to review unless its action is fraudulent or beyond its jurisdiction.-Mid-West Photo-Play Corp. v. Miller, Kan., 169 Pac. 1154. 93. Time-Computation.-In computing two-year period with which action to recover usurious interest paid must be brought under United States Usury Statutes, the first day of the period is excluded and the last day included. -First Nat. Bank v. Drew, Okla., 169 Pac. 1092.

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the

94. Trover and Conversion Evidence. Where a cashier of a bank in his personal capacity negotiated an exchange of stock of the bank for another person holding stock of such bank, the bank was not a party thereto, and is not liable for conversion for issuing stock to an assignee of plaintiff's certificate of stock.-Harvey v. Bank of Marrowbone, Ky., 200 S. W. 28.

95. Usury-Evasion.-An agreement by the borrower to insure his property mortgaged to secure the loan does not constitute usury, unless the policy is taken out as a cloak or device to evade the statutes.-Matthews v. Georgia State Sav. Ass'n, Ark., 200 S. W. 130.

96. Vendor and Purchaser-Tender of Deed. -On tender of quit-claim deed on condition that it be accepted in satisfaction of bond to quiet title, which condition had no proper place in tender, yet as deed quieted title to all land which plaintiff could rightfully claim, it did not make tender void. Snodgrass V. Snodgrass, Kan., 169 Pac. 1147.

97. Waters and Water Courses-Franchise.A franchise contract, requiring water company to furnish water upon streets where its pipes were laid, and in such localities off same as citizens might conduct water to, does not require company to pay for piping between its mains and private property lines.-City of Indianapolis v. College Park Land Co., Ind., 118 N. E. 356. 98. Pollution.-In action for damages to freehold from pollution of stream, exclusion of evidence of president of defendant company that, since construction and operation of fertilizer plant, the market value of plaintiff's land was enhanced, held not error.-Pelham Phosphate Co. v. Daniels, Ga., 94 S. E. 846. 99. Wills-Codicil. instrument, duly signed and attested, reciting the making of a previous will disposing of all of an estate, and which had never been revoked, is a codicil, and sufficiently describes the will, provided the one executing it had previously made only one will. -Gulland v. Gulland, W. Va., 94 S. E. 943.

An

100. Voluntary Transfer. Son, stricken from father's will by codicil, to whom brothers and sisters gave share in father's estate, held not entitled, for fraud and inadequacy of consideration, to reconveyance of land conveyed by him to sister in trust for him, and by her, with him, conveyed to brother on same trust in settlement of his suit against sister.-Lewis v. Lewis, Ill., 118 N. E. 452.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 5, 1918.

TAKING CARE OF THE BUSINESS OF THE LAWYER WHO HAS GONE TO WAR.

Local bar associations are doing commendable work in urging lawyers who stay at home to take care of the business of lawyers who go to the front.

Reports from different sections of the country indicate that this idea is more than a patriotic sentiment. It has taken definite shape in many places. One bar association has written every member of the bar asking their consent to handle certain parts of the practice of enlisted and commissioned practitioners that may be assigned to them and to forward the entire fee to the

client's former attorney and also pledging themselves not to accept any business from any such client after the return of his former attorney to regular practice.

This is idealism put into practice and is worthy of the greatest profession on earth. It reflects credit on the practice of the law and has confirmed the definite increase in the prestige of lawyers which followed upon the unselfish services rendered by the entire bar of the country to the young men eligible to draft in preparing their questionnaires.

Such splendid self sacrifice on the part of the lawyers of the army makes us feel like holding our heads a little higher and congratulating ourselves on the fact that the finer instincts of the profession we love are still actuating members of the bar and that virus of commercialism has not destroyed the higher ideals of the profes

RIGHT OF LABOR UNION TO PRESCRIBE MINIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYES IN A BUSINESS OR ENTERPRISE.

In a Massachusetts case the question is propounded: "Is a combination between musicians a legal one by which a plaintiff is compelled to employ a number of musicians specified by the members of the combination, if he wishes to employ any member of the combination, even though it be the fact that in the plaintiff's opinion the employment of a single musician is the most advantageous way of conducting his business and that the employment of more than one musician will cause him pecuniary loss?" Haverhill Strand Theater v. Gillen, 118 N. E. 671, decided by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

The court in treating this question concedes that a labor union is a lawful combination and may resort to a strike to enforce lawful rules to accomplish its purposes. For example, the court had committed itself to the proposition that a labor union of masons had the right to strike to enforce its demands to secure the work of pointing mortar where members of the union had laid bricks for a building. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 7 Ann. Cas. 638.

That case is described as one where "the defendants combined for the purpose of getting work which the employer wanted done," while in the case before the court, the union was seeking to force an employer to employ men for work he had no desire to have done, and when paying therefor would work a pecuniary loss. It asks whether the latter demand "is a justifiable interference with the plaintiff's right to a free flow of labor?"

The distinction stated appears quite narrow, but its consequences are said to be "far reaching." It is said that: "If it is legal for musicians to adopt a minimum rule fixing the number of musicians who shall be employed in all the theaters in its

jurisdiction, it is hard to see why a minimum rule may not be adopted by the allied trade unions of masons, carpenters and plumbers, fixing the number of stories of which every store to be erected in the busines district is to consist, that is to say, masons, carpenters and plumbers may combine to refuse to work on any store less than ten stories in height even though the owner of land wishes to erect

advance its own interests, may be, it will be held to be the employment of means to an unlawful end. Police power protecting such a rule would seem quite one-sided in its application and the struggle for private advantage would become ruthless in its disregard of ordinary rights and privileges.

MUNICIPAL

The court concludes that a majority of the court are of opinion that the minimum rule sought to be enforced was an interference with the right of employers to a free flow of labor not justified by the purpose for which the rule was made. The court rejects a Minnesota case to the contrary which case went upon the theory that what a man may do singly any number of men may do jointly, which it declares not to be the law in Massachusetts.

We think criticism of the principle in the Minnesota case is just, as appears lately to have been held by U. S. Supreme Court. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 38 Sup. Ct. 65. There it was said: "The right of employees to strike would not give defendants the right to instigate a strike. The difference is fundamental."

Neither does the fact that carrying on a strike is peaceable make it, as matter of law, lawful, as the Mitchell case also holds.

It seems to be a question of a degree how far rules adopted by a lawful combination, as is a labor union, may be enforced. If they have the necessary effect to violate legal rights of others, as if their tendency is to create an unlawful monopoly, a combination, however lawful which may be in the protection of a labor union's right to

CORPORATIONS ORDINANCE FIXING RATES FOR PUBLIC UTILITY NOT CONTRACT FREE FROM IMPAIRMENT.-In Collingwood Sewerage Co. V. Borough of Collingswood, 102 Atl. 901, decided by Supreme Court of New Jersey, it was held that where an incorporating act for a public utility provided for a borough granting a consent ordinance fixing maximum and minimum rates for service, this ordinance and its acceptance did not create a contract for rates within those limits so as to be free from impairment of contract obligation, and therefore rate fixing for the utility came under the control of the state's Public Utility Commission.

The court said: "The ordinance was the legislative act of the municipality. As a legislative act, it was subject to the control of the legis lature itself, and that body could make changes as long as it did not infringe the rights of the sewerage company, arising under the ordinance. It makes little difference whether we say that the ordinance created by way of legislative grant a property right called a franchise, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, or a contract protected by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution and under our state constitution. In either case, the question is whether a municipal corporation, an agency of the state, is protected by either the Fourteenth Amendment or the contract clause. It is well settled that such protection does not extend to the rights of the municipal corporation against it own creator."

This principle being settled, as said, the court spoke of such an ordinance as being "a grant upon condition rather than a contract. It creates public duties which can be enforced by mandamus." Being such there was held to be no reason "why the legislature may not clothe a public service commission," with the power it had formerly reposed in the municipality. For discussion of this subject see

Collier on Public Service Companies, 1918, §§ 91, 92.

The instant case was later confirmed by Supreme Court of New Jersey in Northampton, E. & W. T. Co. v. Board of P. U. Comrs., 102 Atl. 930, where consent of Public Utility Commission was sought by a street railway company to increase its fares and resistance was | interposed on the ground that there was an irrepealable contract in favor of the municipalities through which the railway ran. order of the commissioners refusing to entertain the application was set aside.

The

of individuals, speaking by its solemn agreement, provide for the same thing? Certainly one joining an order either before or after such a provision is made, accepts or enters into a contract as between individuals.

It does not seem precisely right to take away from a corporation all right to contract outside of certain limitations and then hold it as if it were clothed with a general right of contract.

BENEFIT SOCIETY-CLAUSE FOR COMPENSATION FOR INJURY ACCORDING TO SYSTEMATIC BENEVOLENCE OF SOCIETY. -In Miller v. Grand Lodge, Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen, 118 N. E. 713, decided by Supreme Court of Illinois, it is held that where one section of the constitution and by-laws of a fraternal association provided for recovery for enumerated injuries and for other injuries another section provided that application is to be addressed to the systematic benevolence of the association through its beneficiary board, but in no event shall claim therefor "be made the basis of any legal liability" of the association, this other section was held contrary to public policy, as giving to one party to a contract to be both "judge and arbitrator of its own case." Therefore a suit for other injuries was cognizable by the courts, and an award for compensation was affirmed.

The court concedes that the former section, if it stood alone, would have precluded any recovery, but it strongly inveighs against the other as providing for charity in satisfying a legal right. All through the contract of insurance is admitted to be governed, not solely by the policy or benefit certificate, but by the constitution and by-laws.

But what are a constitution and by-laws of a society of this sort? And what powers has a corporate organization governed by such constitution and by-laws? Plainly it seems to us it has no real contractual existence, so far as agreements with members are concerned. Members so understand when they put limitations on the corporation in its right to contract with them. If two individuals make a contract by which in a certain event one is to become liable to the other for specified injury, and for injury suffered otherwise, the latter may give him anything or nothing as he may out of sympathy see fit, why is not such a contract lawful? If it is, why may not an aggregation

CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF ONE ALSO STOCKHOLDER IN RIVAL CONCERN, TO INVESTIGATE BOOKS.-In Furst v. W. T. Raleigh Medical Co., 118 N. E. 763, decided by Supreme Court of Illinois, it is held that the fact that a stockholder is also a holder of stock in a competing corporation and displays a hostile attitude to it and by examination into its books may obtain information of benefit to the competing company, does not deprive him of his statutory right to examine its books.

It appears that the statutory right conferred is as to records and books of account kept at its principal office, but it was alleged by the corporation, that the exercise of the right granted by statute would enable the applicant to discover its customers and to obtain knowledge of its secret processes in compounding medicines. The examination sought by him was ordered by the Appellate Court so as to exempt from its operation salesmen's registers and formulas and secret processes, and this ruling on further appeal by the corporation was affirmed.

This restriction of the order for examination seems entirely just, but should it appear that the examination would lead to disclosure of "secret formulas and business matters," further hope is held out for application for relief.

While the court appears to have correctly ruled this case, it yet appears that there may be a serious handicap in the conduct of corporate business beyond what might exist as to a partnership or individually owned business. If stockholders in their entirety own a business, in ultimate aspect, they are entitled to know all about it, its list of customers, its methods of doing business, its formulas, secret or open, just as much as are its directors or managers. But is the fact, that stock may be sold on the open market or come into ownership of others by descent or distribution an implied limitation on their rights as ultimate owners?

It is well settled in law, that the owner of a business has rights in legitimate secrecy and