35. Similar Public Use.-Property already appropriated to one public use cannot thereafter be condemned for inconsistent public use unless such taking is authorized expressly or by clear implication, and this rule applies to property about to be lawfully appropriated to a public use, though appropriation is not complete.-East Hartford Fire Dist. v. Glastonbury Power Co., Conn., 102 Atl. 592.

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36. Equity-Foreign Corporation.-Where one purchases stock and enters into a contract with cannot a foreign corporation which make valid contract because of failure to comply with state laws, and he repudiates the transactions, and there is no showing of fraud or concealment or insolvency, there is an adequate remedy at law and equity has no jurisdiction.-Flint v. Le Heup, Mich., 165 N. W. 626.

37.- Escrows.-Under husband's written contract to convey homestead, occupied by himself and wife, the wife having been coerced to sign the contract, the person holding a deed for premises in escrow has no authority to deliver it to purchaser.-Ambler v. Jones, Neb., 165 N. W. 886.

39. Duress.-Where complainant, ignorant negro, was acting under duress when, defendant sued out distress warrant and subjected crops raised on land sold complainant under parol contract to alleged claim for rent, defendant cannot set up, as estoppel barring specific performance, proceedings under distress warrant.Hicks v. Fordham, U. S. C. C. A., 246 Fed. 236. 40. Husband and Wife.-Where plaintiff's husband in 1909, executed and delivered warranty deed, apparently, though not actually, executed and acknowledged by wife, and where she, with knowledge, acquiesced and accepted! and retained benefits, and did not bring action for partition, etc., until 1915, she was equitably estopped from maintaining action.-Fuller Johnson, Minn., 165 N. W. 874.

V.

41. Fraud - Misrepresentation. Where defendant, selling motion picture theater to plaintiff, misrepresented it was doing profitable business, matter peculiarly within his knowledge, he could not deny liability for fraud on ground plaintiff should have made further investigations and that doctrine of caveat emptor applied. Johnson v. Campbell, Mich., 165 N. W. 823.

42. Frauds, Statute of-Contract.-A verbal contract by an execution creditor extending the time for redemption is not within the statute of frauds.-Pellston Planing Mill & Lumber Co. v. Van Wormer, Mich., 165 N. W. 724.

44. Fraudulent Conveyances Consideration. -Where a man owed his sister nearly $500, and had owed it for seven years, satisfaction thereof was not sufficient consideration as against creditors, to sustain his deed of all property bringing in a net income of over $900 a year, though the sister further agreed to support him for life. Wilmer v. Placide, Md., 102 Atl. 541.

45. -Intent.-Where plaintiff sued his debtor, who, with intent to defraud, conveyed to another, and later, to cover a defalcation of the debtor, a trust agreement was made in favor of defendant by which defendant advanced the money to care for the defalcation in return for a mortgage on the lots, defendant, having had no previous notice of the fraudulent intent, acquired good title in view of L. O. L., § 7401.People's Bank v. Rostad, Ore., 169 Pac. 347.

46. Gas-Deposit by Consumer.-Where consumer contracted separately for electric current and for gas with same company, depositing $20 on electric current contract, company was not required to apply deposit to arrears on gas bill before shutting off supply.-Annapolis Utilities Co. v. Martin, Md., 102 Atl. 465.

Public

of

49.

Highways-Husband and Wife.-The wife one obstructing a highway need not be joined in action to enjoin the obstruction, merely because she is a co-owner with him of the adjoining premises.-Sherwood v. Ahart, Cal., 169 Pac. 240.

50. Husband and Wife-Divorce.-Where wife holding title to property conveyed by husband, gave him power of attorney to sell or transfer, power did not authorize him to convey to himself through intermediary just before he sued for divorce for desertion.-English v. English, Mass., 118 N. E. 178.

51. Tenancy in Common.-Where husband and wife agreed to convey their farm, held as tenants in common, to nephew in return for his support, wife's refusal to join in conveyance and perform did not terminate contract.-Lavoie v. Dube, Mass., 118 N. E. 179.

52. Injunction-Covenant.-Where a landlord covenanted not to rent another part of his building to any business selling candy, ice cream, light lunches, soda water, or other things sold in the business of general confectioners, injunction will not be granted to enjoin the installing of a restaurant where the "light lunch" feature was not relied on for the injunction.Shean v. Weeks, Cal., 169 Pac. 231. 53.

Insurance-Breach of Condition.-Insurance contract conditioned to become void on breach of condition present or subsequent, does not mean that upon breach contract is a nullity,

but only that upon insured's breach of covenants insurer shall not be bound by his covenants.Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants' Ass'n Mut. Fire Ins. Co., N. D., 165 N. W. 545.

54. Evidence.-That local agent issued all policies of fire insurance on building is of considerable probative force that building was worth more than it was insured for, where other competent evidence is lacking.-Fite v. North River Ins. Co., Mich., 165 N. W. 705.

55. Indemnity.-Under policy indemnifying employer against loss by injury to employes, but expressly excluding "demolition or wrecking of any structure," injury during removal of partition wall in course of remodeling and repairing adjoining buildings was not within exception.Pilgrim v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., N. J., 102 Atl. 445.

56. Special Agent.-Under a special agent's contract to solicit life insurance, etc., providing that "during the continuance of the agreement" without any violation of its terms he should be paid certain commissions on renewal premiums, he was not entitled thereto after termination of contract.-Bowles v. Sawyer, Me., 102 Atl. 562. 57. Sunstroke.-Sunstroke of traffic policeman while performing his duties in usual way, held within policy insuring against bodily injuries sustained solely through accidental means. Higgins v. Midland Casualty Co., Ill., 118 N. E. 11.

58. Fatal Disability.-Under health policy requiring payment for illness wholly preventing assured from performing any duty, during which he shall be necessarily confined to the house, assured could not recover for an illness which practically incapacitated him, but during which he visited his office for a few minutes each day, and also called upon a doctor each day.-Pirscher v. Casualty Co. of America, Md., 102 Atl. 546.

59. Intoxicating Liquors-Intent.-The fact that a druggist stored five quarts of whisky in his home is not sufficient evidence, standing alone, to show intent to dispose of it unlawfully, nor to show any violation of Rem. Code 1915. $$ 6262-1-6262-33.-State v. Snell, Wash., 169 Pac. 320.

60. Landlord and Tenant-Lease.-In action for damages for refusal to permit plaintiff to go into possession of premises, which he claimed had been leased by defendant, charge that agreement was a lease, unless made subject to collateral conditions, and unless there was to be a formal lease to be delivered thereafter, was taking from erroneous, jury question whether parties made lease or agreement to make a lease.-Garber v. Goldstein, Conn., 102 Atl. 605.

61.-Repairs.-Where there was no competent evidence, at time tenant paid rent and went into possession, of an agreement on such day to repair a walk, any subsequent agreement to repair would be without consideration and unenforceable.-Brown v. Gray, Mich., 165 N. W.

624.

62. Waiver.-The tender of a bill for the rent reserved under a lease and the acceptance of payments thereunder was a waiver of any defaults by the lessee existing prior to that date.-Commercial Trust Co. V. L. Wertheim

Coal & Coke Co., N. J., 102 Atl. 448.

63. Life Estate Receivership.-Life tenant must keep premises in such repair as to preserve property from decay, to extent at least of its rental value, and, on his neglect to do so, receiver will be appointed to collect rents sufficient to pay taxes and for repairs.-Woolston v. Pullen, N. J., 102 Atl. 461.

64. Master and Servant-Accident.-Railroad car inspector injured while taking short cut to report to railroad with which his employer exchanged services of employes under certain conditions, held hurt by accident arising out of his employment within Workmen's Compensation Act. In re Maroney, Ind., 118 N. E. 134. 65. Accident.-In a proceeding for compensation under Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act for death of a janitor by an electric shock while cleaning a room wherein he had been

forbidden to enter and against which he had been warned, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.-Northern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Pietzvak, Ind., 118 N. E. 132.

66. Assumption of Risk.-One employed to operate a drilling machine in a mine, held not as a matter of law to assume risk of injury from falling rock at place other than his immediate place of work, though he was required to inspect his place of work.-Ulrich v. Utah Apex Mining Co., Utah, 169 Fac. 263.

67.--Burden of Proof.-It was not incumbent on claimant for compensation for death under Workmen's Compensation Act to show it was for best interests both of her and of employer to have compensation commuted to lump sum.-Schwarm v. George Thomson & Sons Co., Ill., 118 N. E. 95.

68. Contributory Negligence. Employe's failure to place blue flag in front of railroad car under which he was working, as required by a rule, held not contributory negligence, unless he had been instructed to do this.-Campbell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., Conn., 102 Atl. 597.

69.Course of Employment.-Under Workmen's Compensation Act (Rev. St. 1913, § 3651) providing compensation for injury to an employe "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment," compensation is not recoverable for a disease unless it is traceable to "accident" as defined by § 3693.-Blair v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage Co., Neb., 165 N. W. 893.

an

70. -Course of Employment. A bridge builder having finished work for the day, when struck by lightning while sitting in the boarding tent furnished by the employer, did not receive an injury arising out of his employment. -Griffith v. Cole Bros., Ia., 165 N. W. 577.

71.-Course of Employment. Although when night switchman was injured, he had completed his hours of active service for night, and was proceeding to entrance of plant to register out, which was a further duty of his employment, his injury was suffered in the course of the employment.-Inland Steel Co. v. Lambert, Ind., 118 N. E. 162.

72.- -Dependency. On issue of dependency, son's contribution of $27 to his father, though given for purchase of articles of household furniture, could have been adjudged a "contribution to support" of the father within Workmen's Compensation Act.-In re McMahon, Mass., 118 N. E. 189.

73. Hours of Service Act.-If sudden sickness of a railroad telegraph operator was emergency, within Hours of Service Act, § 2, held, that carrier could not escape liability where operator then on duty, before being relieved, was kept on duty for more than hours, though there was another operator__near by who might have been called.-United States v. Delano, U. S. C. C. A., 246 Fed. 107.

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74. -Safe Place.-The rule of safe place, as generally understood, cannot apply where employe of owner of building in course of construction was injured by fall of scaffolding which he was engaged in constructing and working on.-Porth v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., Mich., 165 N. W. 698.

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75.--Workmen's Compensation Act.-Where fence builder for a railroad reported each morning at a station for instructions and was paid from the time he left the station, but one morning on account of rain he did not go to the station and the foreman came and asked him to work and he went down the track, direct for the work and was killed on the way, the relation of master and servant existed, within Workmen's Compensation Act.-Porritt v. Detroit United Ry., Mich., 165 N. W. 674.

76.- Workmen's Compensation Act.-Where fire insurance agent slipped on icy sidewalk while proceeding from his train to hotel in town to which his employer had sent him, injury arose out of his employment within Workmen's Compensation Act. In re Harraden, Ind., 118 N. E 142.

78. Municipal Corporations Under Gen. Code, § 10129, empowering municipality to grant franchise subject to "regulations and restrictions," etc., its officers have large latitude, and unless expressly limited, may exercise such power in any reasonable way compatible with best service and greatest advantage to it.-Federal Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 118 N. E. 103.

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79. Intoxication. Under supplement 1913, to Disorderly Persons Act (P. L. 1913, p. 103), making it an offense to drive an automobile upon a public street "while under the influence of intoxicating liquors," covers the usual conditions of intoxication, though one need not be SO intoxicated that he cannot safely drive a car.-State v. Rodgers, N. J., 102 Atl. 433.

80.- -Licensee.-Pedestrian injured by fall of awning while waiting for street car did not forfeit her rights as licensee on public streets by lingering in front of shop window.Leighton v. Dean, Me., 102 Atl. 565.

81. Nuisance.-Offense of driving an automobile upon a public street while under influence of intoxicating liquor, prohibited by supplement of 1913 to Disorderly Persons Act (P. L. 1913, p. 103), is complete when thing prohibited is done, as distinguished from a public or common nuisance which is not committed unless and until there is inconvenience or annoyance to public.-State v. Rodgers, N. J., 102 Atl. 433.

Vehicles.-The

82. Registration of Motor word "owner," in Motor Vehicle Law, §§ 2, 19, providing that no suit could be had for injuries to a car unless the owner registered it, refers to any person having an interest in the property even under a special title.-Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., Conn., 102 Atl. 573.

83. Sidewalks.-In an action against a city on account of a defective walk, where the question was whether the walk would have washed out if properly constructed, it was error to admit evidence of the defendant that the walk was put in again properly and that it washed out, where the amount of rainfall in the first instance was much less than in the second instance.-Kethledge v. City of Petoskey, Mich., 165 N. W. 788.

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ratifying

84.- -Street Grading. - · Resolution erection of retaining wall necessitated by grading of street, where committee acted in response to informal direction of common council, is as valid as if work had not been done until after passage of resolution.-Hackett v. Hussels, N. J., 102 Atl. 527.

85. Partition-Action for.-One who had parted with all his right, title and interest in vein of coal under lands in which he retains interest could not maintain proceeding to partition entire tract, including coal.-In re Young's Estate, Pa., 102 Atl. 506.

86. Principal and Agent-Evidence. -The agency of the men with whom plaintiff dealt in purchasing lots is sufficiently shown by defendants' acceptance of the notes given by him and by their execution and delivery of land contracts.-Billig v. Goodrich, Mich., 165 N. W. 647.

87. Proof of Agency.-Where bank cashier withdrew a certain amount from a depositor's account, that he deposited with bank's papers a receipt signed by himself for depositor, did not establish his agency to withdraw amount, or justify the submission of question of agency to jury.-Gonder v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Somerset, Pa., 102 Atl. 510.

88. Scope of Agency.-Selling agent, apparently authorized to do automobile company's business, could convey good title to bona fide purchaser of automobile belonging to company, although in making the sale he failed to disclose that he was acting as agent.-Lister, Smith & Walsh Co. v. Smith, R. I., 102 Atl. 514.

89. Railroads-Crossings.-In suit by rail

way against landowners to enjoin interference

93.

be

conversation Sunday Contract.-A tween the tenant and the landlord's janitor on Sunday, by which the janitor agreed that a walk should be repaired, does not constitute a valid contract with the landlord.-Brown V. Gray, Mich., 165 N. W. 694.

94. Vendor and Purchaser Estoppel. Where married men contracted to sell land, title to which was held by their wives, although evidence indicated they were not the owners, purchaser, not having been injured and deed from wives having been tendered. cannot defeat contract on ground that it was induced by fraudulent representations.-Crump V. Schneider, U. S. C. C. A., 246 Fed. 225.

95. Waters and Water Courses-Abandonment. Where defendant mutual irrigation company executed contract with government, limiting its appropriation of water, and government proceeded with reclamation project based on such contract, defendant cannot defeat contract on theory that it should not be construed as abandonment of rights of its stockholders.West Side Irr. Co. v. United States, U. S. C. C. A.. 246 Fed. 212.

96.

-Option.-A town under option to purchase waterworks, providing for pipes being laid with its approval, may not take such parts only as it approved; the subsequent resolution of council, vote of people, and prayer of bill being for system as in use.-Town of Boonton v. United Water Supply Co., N. J., 102 Atl. 454.

97. Wills-Intent.-It being probable that when testatrix used expression "my whole estate, real and personal," it was equivalent to saying "all my real estate and personal property," intent may be gathered from will in light of surrounding circumstances.-Moseley v. Bogy, Mo., 198 S. W. 847.

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Under

98. -Unincorporated Association. will devising property to "Allegheny County Children's Aid Society of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania," a then existing unincorporated body known as Children's Aid Society of Allegheny County, thereafter incorporated, was entitled to property as against an organization known as the Children's Aid Society of Western Pennsylvania, Allegheny County Auxiliary.In re Neel's Estate, Pa., 102 Atl. 503. 99. -Life Estate.-Devise "to J. his natural life, * and upon his death to his children, if any, and if he should die without leaving any living children or should die with children and they should die, thereupon or at their death to be equally divided between C., C., and S.," gave a life estate to J., with remainder in fee to his children, and, there being children, C., C., and S., would receive nothing unless both J. and his children should die the testatrix. Bibby v. Broome, Miss., 76 So. 835. 100. Wife's Life Estate.-Under will devising all testator's property to his wife in trust, for benefit of herself and her children, and giv ing her its entire use and management for life, with power of sale, etc., she took only a life estate in an undivided interest in the property. -Patterson v. Gaissert, Ga., 94 S. E. 563.

before

Conflicting laws of our different states regarding causes for divorce, along with questions regarding the obtaining of divorce upon service by publication and of the bona fides of residence bring the matrimonial residence within jurisdiction, have occasioned much discussion in American courts.

An inquiry by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court into legitimating statute of another state and its recognition in Massachusetts is cognate to what is above spoken of, at least in so far as innocent offspring are concerned. Green v. Kelley, 118 N. E. 235.

The facts in this case show that the father of two sets of children was first

legally married in the State of Michigan, and by that marriage one child was born. He deserted his Michigan wife and settled in Indiana. While this wife was still living and undivorced he went through a form of marriage in Indiana to a woman innocent of the fact that he had a living wife. By this union or living together two other children were born. It was provided by Indiana statute that if a void marriage was contracted with one having the reasonable belief that no disability by the other to contract marriage existed, the issue of such void marriage begotten before discovery by the innocent party of existence of disability "shall be deemed legitimate." In this case the two children by the void marriage claimed to be lineal descendants, along with the other child, of their father, who if living would have been entitled to an estate in remainder in Massachusetts.

The court, after stating that the status of a person as to legitimacy depends upon the law of his domicile," says: "Such status

is recognized according to the principles of international law in other countries and states unless contrary to the positive law or to public policy of the sovereign state where it is drawn in controversy or so repugnant to good morals as to be improper to recognize. *** Removal of the obstacles to the legitimation of innocent children, who have no responsibility for the circumstances of their birth and thus ameliorating some of the apparent harshness of the common law, has been the progressive policy of our law as illustrated by statutes and decisions. It is not contrary either to the statute law or the public policy of this commonwealth that the children of a marriage, bigamous on the part of one parent, but innocent on the part of the other, should be declared legitimate to some extent and under some circumstances."

We would be willing to go further and subscribe to the principle, that even in meretricious union by two guilty parents, holding themselves out to the world as man recognized everywhere as legitimate, especand wife and so recognized, ought to be ially if a statute of the domicile so considers them. If they are innocent victims, it is no reason why their innocence should be penalized in another state, because both parents, instead of one only, are acting in bad faith.

How particularly, at all events, should public policy be offended, in recognizing claimants born elsewhere, on moral grounds, if the claimants had no sort of responsibility in the matter? It involves in no way the moral law of a state extending comity, that one participating in no way in infraction of moral principles shall not be held for the sins of his progenitors. There is no doctrine of original sin in statutory enactment, that puts a stain on birth, as some spiritual doctrine maintains is done. If to bastardize children puts a stain on offspring, such doctrine deserves confinement to plain words, with no implication in its favor. Society visits enough punish

ment on an innocent, without law adding thereto. Questions of this kind arise in a variety of ways. Very often a situation is created where the parents in a union recognized in a foreign state are innocent of wrong. It is only incidental that questions. of property rights in the children arise. Public policy in another state ought not to cut out rights of innocent children. In many cases the faith and credit clause may not control the matter. But humanity ought, so as to extend comity.

however, shows that the Postmaster General nevertheless, is merely to be the judge of nonmailable matter under the act, but all that is required is for him to administer the law according to congressional intent. Cartoons, as well as printed matter, were held to come under the rule of exclusion, as well as literary language.

It would seem quite a claim for one having views, that might be deemed opposed to the policy of our government in the prosecution of the war, to claim that the government must aid him in their dessemination.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

POST OFFICE-NON-MAILABLE MATTER UNDER ESPIONAGE ACT.-The purpose of the Espionage Act is declared as not intended to repress legitimate criticism of Congress or the officers of government, but merely to prevent the dissemination and distribution through the mails of publications intended to embarrass and defeat the government in the successful prosecution of the war. To ac complish this purpose the judgment and discretion of the Postmaster General is relied on, and his decisions are conclusive unless clearly wrong. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, decided by Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

As to whether this involves or was intended to involve any question of free speech, it was said that matter of a certain character shall not be carried in the United States mails. This is held to say that the government may refuse facilities for the distribution of matter injurious to public morals or public policy.

That the Postmaster General could act in this sort of matter without a judicial hearing is held not opposed to regulation vesting :ninisterial functions in officers or even of private parties, where this has been recognized at the common law.

It is pointed out also, that not since the Sedition Law of 1798, has any such legislation been on our statute books until adoption of the Espionage Act, and the Sedition Law expired by its own limitation in 1801. In the Espionage Act it is pointed out that the original draft provided that every publication "containing any matter of a seditious, anarchistic or treasonable character" shall be non-mailable, stricken out because this was too indefinite, and left too much room for construction. This,

was

INSURANCE TORPEDO BY SUBMARINE CAUSING INJURED TO DROWN WHEN ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE.-In Woods v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 166 N. W. 20, decided by Wisconsin Supreme Court, it was held, that under the provision of accident policy, excepting from liability loss under any cir cumstances from fire arms or from explosives, "or where injury is inflicted upon insured by any other person," the torpedoing of a vessel by a submarine was not the direct cause of death of insured, where the facts tended to show that death arose from drowning.

** * *

The court said: "The fair inference from the evidence is that after the Arabic was struck Mr. Woods adjusted upon himself a life preserver, got into a lifeboat and by some accident thereafter was drowned. There is no evidence that he was injured by contact with an explosive or any object displaced or put in motion by the explosive. It may well be said that had no explosion occurred which resulted in the sinking of the Arabic, Mr. Woods would not have lost his life, but it cannot be said under the circumstances of the case that the explosion was the direct cause of his death within the meaning of the exception in the policy. In order to escape liability under the policy, it must appear that the explosion was the direct cause of the injury to the insured."

No doubt had it appeared that Mr. Woods was actually struck by the torpedo, or standing on some part of the ship where he would have been blown into sea and immediately drowned, his death would have been held the direct result of the explosion. How then, may his death from drowning after attempting to escape be held any different? He was precipitated into the ocean and the fact that he adjusted a life belt upon himself only mitigated but did not take away danger of losing his life, or that he was in a lifeboat. The element, into which he