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of the record I think that no definite, uniform, and general commercial designation of the article is established. And even if such trade name had been satisfactorily established, it does not seem to me that that signifies that it is commercially known as a "cord." In the case of United States v. Walter (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 95; T. D. 33371) the court held that an article which was commercially known as "ladder tapes" was not proven to be commercially known as "tapes"; so here, if it had been established that the article is commercially known as "coronation cord," it is not conclusive that it is commercially known as "cord." In the case cited, Judge Barber, speaking for the court, said:

To bring these articles within the commercial designation of tapes we think it must be shown that they are commercially known as such; but it is not so shown. On the contrary, the evidence plainly shows that instead of being commercially known as "tapes" they are known commercially as "ladder tapes," which is not the same thing.

In United States v. China Co. (71 Fed., 864), giant paper umbrellas used for decorative purposes only were held not to be "umbrellas" in the tariff sense. In Downing v. United States (141 Fed., 490), paper novelties in the shape of fans, and so known and invoiced but not susceptible of use as fans, were held not classifiable as "fans of all kinds." The same ruling was made with respect to fans bearing paintings of quality in Tiffany v. United States (66 Fed., 736). In Newman v. United States (159 Fed., 123) and Newman-Andrew Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 4; T. D. 31570), so-called drawplates were held not to be "plates" on the ground that misnomer alone can not bring an article within a tariff provision, for, as the court said, "they are not known as 'plates,"" though they "may be called but not described by the name 'drawplates.'" In Sheldon v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 109; T. D. 31657), hair clippers, which are descriptively shears and are sometimes known as clipping shears, have been held not to be dutiable as "shears." And in Smith Co. v. United States (149 Fed., 1022), rubber sponges commercially known as "Kleanwell sponges" were held not to be dutiable as sponges." It seems to me that the weight of authorities sustains. the proposition that an article proved to be commercially known as "coronation cord" is not proved to be known as a "cord," and I believe this reasoning is strengthened by the fact that identical merchandise has been held not to be a cord in fact.

It is my opinion that the importation should be classified according to the common and usual meaning of the relative terms. In Ulmann v. United States, supra, the court held that this merchandise is not a cord within the common meaning and, upon the authority of said decision, I believe the protest claim of 45 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 332 should be sustained.

27778-VOL 26-14- -5

(T. D. 34090.)

Abstracts of decisions of the Board of General Appraisers.

Board 1-McClelland, Sullivan, and Brown. Board 2-Fischer, Howell, and Cooper. Board 3-Waite, Somerville, and Hay.


No. 34520.-HORSEHAIR AIGRETTES-GLASS AIGRETTES-MILLINERY ORNAMENTS.— Protests 687032, etc., of Judkins & McCormick Co. (New York). Opinion by McClelland, G. A.

Artificial aigrettes made of horsehair, and spun glass aigrettes used as substitutes for genuine feather aigrettes as a trimming or ornament, classified under paragraph 438; tariff act of 1909, were claimed dutiable under paragraphs 135 and 109, respectively. Protests overruled. Abstract 34067 (T. D. 33872) noted.

No. 34521.-GLASS TOPS FOR HATPINS-PREVIOUS RECORD.-Protest 608463 of National Hat Pin Co. (New York).

SULLIVAN, General Appraiser: The importer has submitted this protest on the appraiser's report, which is to the effect that

Merchandise consists of hatpin heads composed of glass returned as manufactures of glass at rate of 45 per cent, paragraph 109, act August 5, 1909. Note G. A. 7267 (T. D. 31844).

The collector in his letter transmitting the protest to the board states:

In view of said report the protest appears partly valid, and this office stands ready to reliquidate accordingly, if authorized by your board.

It will be observed the appraiser's report was that the merchandise consists of hatpin heads composed of glass. The appraiser did not report that the merchandise in this protest was similar to and of the same character and class as that referred to in the authority cited, and no effort was made by the importer to connect the merchandise in question with the merchandise referred to therein, nor did he move the record in G. A. 7267 (T. D. 31844) into the record of the case at bar.

In United States v. Lun Chong & Co. (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 468; T. D. 33041) the court held that unless a previous record is moved into the case on trial it can not be taken for granted that the merchandise is similar, although the collector may in his report so state.

It was there said:

It is not contended in this court by counsel for the importer that standing alone the mere submission of a case by reference to a former case imports into the present record the testimony in the former case. But it is said that as the record shows that the collector in his letters transmitting the protests reports that the merchandise in the instant case is like that in the case cited, the former case should be held stare decisis. This is carrying the rule of stare decisis further than the law justifies. When the present issue came on for trial, the presumption that the collector's action was correct obtained. It was incumbent on the importer, therefore, to overcome this presumption. The citation of a former case did not challenge the attention of the Government to the claim that the testimony in that case was to be made the basis of a decision in the present.

It would appear from this holding that the mere citation of an authority does not overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the action of the collector. That the cited authority may be used for the principle enunciated is correct; but as to the merchandise involved the presumption of similarity does not attach.

The protest is overruled.

No. 34522.-PROTEST WITHOUT MERIT.-Protest 575407 of Hensel, Bruckmann & Lorbacher (New York). Opinion by Sullivan, G. A.

Protest without grounds; dismissed.

No. 34523.-PROTESTS OVERRULED.-Protests 394300-30665, etc., of G. W. Sheldon & Co. (Chicago), protest 292526 of M. Gugenheim, and protest 138295 of Siegman & Weil (New York). Opinions by Sullivan, G. A.

Protests unsupported; overruled.

No. 34524.-PAPER MASKS.-Protests 684177-43743, etc., of Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Chicago). Opinion by Brown, G. A.

Merchandise classified as masks in chief value of wool under paragraph 378, tariff act of 1909, was found to be made of paper and held dutiable under paragraph 465, as claimed.

No. 34525.-FISH IN TINS.-Protest 664181 of Wm. A. Bird (Buffalo), protests 41810331967, etc., of Wakem & McLaughlin (Chicago), protest 584675 of L. E. Doudiet & Co. (Minneapolis), and protest 451772 of Getz Bros. & Co. (San Francisco). Opinions by Brown, G. A.

United States v. Smith (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 70; T. D. 33312) and United States v. Rosenstein (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 304; T. D. 31357) followed as to fish in tins.


No. 34526.-ELASTIC CORDS.-Protests 683639, etc., of Gross, Engel & Co. (New York). Opinion by Howell, G. A.

Elastic cords composed of silk and india rubber were held dutiable at 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 401, tariff act of 1909, as claimed.

No. 34527.-ELASTIC BELTS WITH METAL BUCKLES.-Protest 285506 of Wiener Bros. (New York). Opinion by Howell, G. A.

G. A. 7052 (T. D. 30730) followed as to elastic belts with metal buckles, classified under paragraph 390, tariff act of 1897, and held dutiable as manufactures in part of metal (par. 193).

No. 34528.-FLAX FABRICS-COUNT OF THREADS.-Protest 621397 of W. H. Horstmann Co. (Philadelphia). Opinion by Cooper, G. A.

Woven flax fabrics classified as counting between 120 and 180 threads per square inch were found to count between 60 and 120 threads and held dutiable accordingly under paragraph 357, tariff act of 1909, as claimed.

No. 34529.-MERCERIZED COTTONS.-Protest 703961 of Spielmann & Co. (New York). Opinion by Cooper, G. A.

Protest overruled as to cotton cloth held subject to additional duty for mercerization under paragraph 323, tariff act of 1909.

No. 34530.-COTTON GLOVES, KNITTED OR WOVEN.-Protests 671658, etc., of J. & D. Lehman Co. (New York).

COOPER, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question consists of men's cotton gloves. They were returned for duty at the rate of 50 cents per dozen pairs and 40 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 328 of the tariff act of 1909, and the importers claim

that they are properly dutiable at 45 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 332, at 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 324, or at 60 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 349 of said act.

The testimony shows that these gloves are made out of knitted cotton cloth, which was manufactured in flat pieces. Protestants claim that the only gloves dutiable under paragraph 328 are those which are shaped and fashioned wholly by knitting, and that as the gloves in question are cut to the proper shape from a plain fabric and sewed up and finished on an ordinary sewing machine, they are not "cotton gloves, knitted."

A similar question was passed upon by the court in the case of Spielmann & Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 368; T. D. 32962). The importers have here made up a new case, but the question seems to be the same as that decided in the previous case. The court, in stating the issue, said:

The contention of the appellants is that the phrase "cotton gloves, knitted or woven," includes only such as are shaped and finished, so far as may be done, by the knitting process, and can not be extended to include gloves of the character here in question.

The court held that "the phrase 'cotton gloves, knitted or woven,' was used in a comprehensive and inclusive sense and intended to embrace gloves manufactured from material either woven or knitted, although not shaped by the weaving process.” There seems to be no new question raised by the evidence in this case and, on the authority of the decision cited, we hold the goods dutiable under paragraph 328, as returned by the collector.

The protests are overruled.

No. 34531.—Boys' Corton GLOVES.-Protest 497448-37320 of Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. (Chicago). Opinion by Cooper, G. A.

Boys' cotton gloves classified under paragraph 328, tariff act of 1909, were claimed dutiable as wearing apparel composed of cotton (par. 324). Protest overruled on the authority of Spielmann v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 368; T. D. 32962).


No. 34532.-CAPERS IN VINEGAR.-Protests 708209, etc., of Cresca Co. et al. (New York). Opinion by Waite, G. A.

Capers put up in vinegar and packed in bottles or barrels were held properly classified under paragraph 253, tariff act of 1909. Austin, Nichols & Co. v. United States (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 261; T. D. 33483) followed.

No. 34533.-ROTTEN FRUIT.-Protests 409496, etc., of N. C. Ives et al. (Philadelphia). Opinion by Somerville, G. A.

Protests overruled as to rotten fruit. Vandegrift v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 198; T. D. 32470) followed.

No. 34534.-SAMPLES-VALUE.-Protests 717884, etc., of R. F. Lang et al., and protests 720269, etc., of Schall & Co. et al. (New York). Opinions by Somerville, G. A.

On the authority of Badische v. United States (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 374; T. D. 33535) protests overruled claiming certain samples entitled to free entry as of no commercial value.

No. 34535.-INSULATORS.-Protests 702058, etc., of W. H. Allison Co. (Detroit). Opinion by Hay, G. A.

Insulators made of talc and iron wire, classified under paragraph 93, tariff act of 1909, were claimed dutiable under paragraphs 480 or 95. Protests overruled.

No. 34536.-CLERICAL ERROR.-Protest 703190 of Strobel & Wilken Co. (New York). Opinion by Hay, G. A.

On the report of the appraiser, protest sustained claiming clerical error.

No. 34537.-MEDALS IMPORTED BY A SOCIETY.-Protests 700333, etc., of American Express Co. (New York). Opinion by Hay, G. A.

Medals imported by the Germanistic Society of America to be awarded to certain professors at the Columbia University, classified as manufactures of metal under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, were claimed entitled to free entry under various paragraphs of the law. The regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury not having been complied with the protests were overruled.

No. 34538.-SCIENTIFIC APPARATUS-CALCULATING MACHINE.-Protests 675257, etc., of W. A. Morschauser (New York). Opinion by Hay, G. A.

"Millionaire calculating machines" imported for the use of universities, classified as manufactures of metal under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, were claimed entitled to free entry as scientific apparatus (par. 650). Protests sustained in those cases where the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury have been complied with.

No. 34539.-FITTED LEATHER CASES.-Protests 590431, etc., of Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne et al. (New York). Opinion by Hay, G. A.

United States v. Mark Cross Co. (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 274; T. D. 33489) followed as to fitted leather cases. Protests sustained in part.


No. 34540.-MEDICINAL PREPARATIONS-PARAACETPHENETIDIN-CHLORALHYDRAT— PHENYLASLICYLAT-PAPAIN.-Protest 562130 of Richard E. Jacobson (Buffalo). MCCLELLAND, General Appraiser: This protest is against the collector's assessments of duty on certain proprietary medicines known as paraacetphenetidin, chloralhydrat, phenylaslicylat, and papain. On the three articles first named duty was assessed at the rate of 55 cents per pound and on the last named duty was assessed at the rate of 25 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 65 of the tariff act of 1909. It is claimed that in the manufacture of paraacetphenetidin, chloralhydrat, and phenylaslicylat, alcohol was not used and that therefore, each being a medicinal preparation, they should have been assessed at the rate of 25 per cent ad valorem under the same paragraph. The papain it is claimed should have been assessed at the rate of 5 cents per pound under paragraph 248 as sugar of milk. The witness called on behalf of protestant was a qualified chemist who was familiar with the manufacture of each of the articles named. In fact he was shown to have had nine years' experience in the manufacture of each of these articles in the factory where they were made. In the manufacture of chloralhydrat he states that denatured alcohol is used and the process is the passing of chlorin through the alcohol. The resulting liquid, when it crystalizes, becomes chloralhydrat. The witness states that pure alcohol might be used instead of the denatured alcohol, but that, on account of its high value, it is commercially impracticable, and is therefore never used. In the manufacture of phenylaslicylat it appears that alcohol is not used at all, as it would serve no purpose.

The papain consists of one part of papain and 80 parts of sugar of milk. It is not made clear what the effect of the papain is upon the sugar of milk in the combination, but inasmuch as it serves to give it another name and fit it for use as a medicine for ailments of the stomach, we think the conclusion is warranted that its i lentity no longer exists.

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