! human body, but includes any organ or organic substance-plants, animals, and human beings. The items on the invoice under protest, as read and explained by the witness, are as follows: Echinoccus of the hergrus; verfekung der aorta; echinoccus der n'ere of the kidneys; miltztiberkel, tuberculosis of the spleen; muskeltrichine, trichina in the muscles; cancer of the liver; echinoccus of the liver. The witness further stated that these all consisted of portions of the human or animal bodies; that the third item, showing echinoccus of the kidney, was very probably from a pig; also the last item, echinoccus of the liver; that the others are from a human being. The dictionary meaning of the word "anatomical" is "of or relating to anatomy or dissection." "Anatomy" is defined as * * * The The art of dissecting or artificially separating the different parts of any organized body, to discover their situation, structure, and economy; dissection. science which treats of the structure of organic bodies. From the testimony and the dictionary definitions we conclude that the articles in question are anatomical preparations, and therefore hold the same free of duty under paragraph 675. The expression in paragraph 2 reading "animal or mineral objects * * * immersed or placed in Moreover, a provision of the free list evidently designed to promote an educational purpose in connection with the study of medicine should, in our opinion, be given a liberal construction in interpreting the congressional intent. See Abstract 33717 (T. D. 33778), Abstract 9259 (T. D. 26890), Abstract 7325 (T. D. 26594), and Abstract 8100 (T. D. 26708). Protest sustained. (T. D. 34089- G. A. 7527.) Coronation cord. Articles having a core or center composed of strands of cotton around which mercerized cotton threads are spun in such manner that the completed article resembles a string or cord upon which there are at regular intervals small, oval lumps about one-half inch in length, the articles being known commercially as "coronation cord," are properly dutiable under the provision for cotton cords in paragraph 349, tariff act of 1909. United States General Appraisers, New York, January 22, 1914. of customs at the port of New York. Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and COOPER, General Appraisers; COOPER, G. A., dissenting). HOWELL, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question, invoiced as "coronation," consists of an article having a core or center composed of strands of cotton around which mercerized cotton threads are spun in such manner that the completed article resembles a string or cord upon which there are at regular intervals small oval lumps about one-half inch in length. The merchandise was classified as "cotton cord" under paragraph 349 of the act of 1909, and duty was collected thereon at the rate of 60 per cent ad valorem. Protestants rely upon the claim that said merchandise is dutiable at 45 per cent ad valorem as "manufactures of cotton" under paragraph 332 of said act. This issue was decided by the United States Court of Customs Appeals in the case of Ulmann v. United States (4) Ct. Cust. Appls., 77; T. D. 33363), wherein the court held that such merchandise was not a cord within the common understanding or meaning of the term. The Government, however, relying upon statements (quoted below) in the decision of the court, has made up a new case and has introduced new evidence with a view of establishing (1) the administrative practice relative to the classification of this kind of goods, and (2) the commercial designation of the article. The above-mentioned statements of the court are as follows: There is no proof in the case at bar as to the administrative practice in the assessment of duty upon merchandise like that here, nor does it satisfactorily appear that the articles before this court are identical with the merchandise which was before the board in each of the two cases referred to. The board in the case at bar does not state that the coronation cord is like that involved in the other two cases, nor does it cite the same as authorities for its decision here. * * * To sustain the judgment below the Government relies upon the proposition that, as coronation cords were by the cited decisions held to be cotton cords under paragraphs therein invoked, it must be presumed, because Congress thereafter employed the word "cords" without any change of phraseology relating thereto in the acts of 1897 and 1909, that it adopted the construction put by the board upon that word in the respective paragraphs referred to in the acts of 1894 and 1897, and therefore that it describes the merchandise here. There would be force in this contention if it affirmatively appeared here that the coronation cords under consideration in those two decisions were substantially identical with these before us, and this claim would be reenforced if it were shown that the uniform administrative practice had been since those two board decisions to assess as cords articles that in form, size, and construction were like those involved in this case. Neither of these conditions is, however, shown to exist. For aught we know the coronation cords involved in those two board decisions may have been in their external physical appearances unlike these before us or may have been of different construction. Again, if the board in the cited cases had considered the common meaning of the word "cord" and thereupon reached its conclusion, we might incline to give greater weight thereto as precedents, but it did not, as far as the published decisions in the two cases show, do this, and therefore those cases are authority, if at all, only so far as relates to merchandise substantially identical with that there passed upon. The cases referred to in the court's decision-G. A. 3736 (T. D. 17750); G. A. 4113 (T. D. 19156), as shown by the sample in G. A. 4113 introduced in evidence in this case (Exhibit 4)---cover merchan: dise which is similar in style and manufacture to the merchandise here under consideration, and the Government has introduced evidence which conclusively establishes that it has been the practice of the customs officials since March 25, 1898, the date of the publication of the last decision (G. A. 4113), to classify this merchandise as a "cord." It would appear, therefore, that the uniform administrative practice, extending over a period of 15 years under the tariff acts of 1894, 1897, and 1909, has been to classify this article as a "cotton cord." Furthermore, we think it appears from the testimony of the witnesses examined in this case that this article was commercially known in the wholesale trade of the United States at and prior to August 5, 1909, as "coronation cord," and that this was the only general commercial name under which the article was known in that trade. It is true that some of the witnesses say they have known the article as "coronation"; others say they have known it as "torpedoes"; and still others as "rice thread"; but as the evidence conclusively shows that there never has been a time when the trade did not understand the term "coronation cord" to be applicable to this article and to no other merchandise, we conclude that the other names are subordinate to this general trade name and should not be given an "undue importance" for the purpose of changing the tariff classification of the goods. In re H. B. Claflin & Co. (52 Fed., 121). Philip J. Krackehl, assistant manager of one of the departments of Mills & Gibb, of New York, importers and jobbers, testified that he has been selling this article for 40 years to customers from all over the country as "coronation cord" or "coronation braid," and that most of the orders received are under the name of "coronation cord." Mortimer Hyman, of the firm of Strauss Bros. & Co., importers, located in New York, testified that he has dealt in the article for 25 years, selling it to customers from all over the country, and has never sold it under any other name than "coronation cord." John A. Kraemer, a manufacturer of dress trimmings and novelties, testified that he has bought this article since 1897 or 1898 under the name of "torpedoes." Upon cross-examination he testified that there has never been a time in his experience when the trade would not know this article under the designation of "coronation cord." Charles A. Jacobson, of the firm of Campbell, Metzger & Jacobson, importers of fancy goods, testified that he has been jobbing this article for 17 years and that purchasers usually have asked for "coronation." Upon cross-examination he admitted that he had heard it called "coronation cord," and says this is the article he would show if people came into his store and asked for "coronation cord," and that this has always been true. It appears from the record that the goods were invoiced to him as recently as May 15, 1913, by the parties from whom they were obtained in Barmen, Germany, under the designation of "coronation cord." Nicholas Volckmann, of the firm of Van Blankensteyn & Hennings, importers of embroidery materials, testified that the article is called "coronation" or "coronation cord," and that he has heard it called "coronation cord" for 15 years. It has been suggested by counsel for the importers that even if it be admitted that the article is commercially known as "coronation cord," this is not conclusive that it is commercially known as a "cord." This argument, we think, gives undue importance to the subsidiary name. In the case of United States v. Baruch (223 Fed., 191; T. D. 32300) the United States Supreme Court held that articles which were commercially known as "featherstitch braids," and which it had been the practice of the Government to classify as "braids" prior to the passage of the tariff act of 1897, were dutiable under that act as "braids." The court said: That the tariff act of 1897 was drafted and was adopted by Congress in the light of the then fixed practice of the Government to assess such articles as "braids," irrespective of the subsidiary names which may have been applied by some who used the articles or without regard to some of the special uses of which they were susceptible of being put, is not open to reasonable contention. Applying the principle of that decision to the case at bar, we hold that the article here in question, which was commercially known as "coronation cord" at and prior to the passage of the tariff act of 1909, and had been assessed for duty as a cord for over 15 years under prior tariff acts, is dutiable under the provision for cotton cords in paragraph 349, tariff act of 1909. The protests are accordingly overruled and the decision of the collector is affirmed in each case. DISSENTING OPINION. COOPER, General Appraiser: I find myself unable to assent to the conclusion reached by the majority of the board. The Court of Customs Appeals has held that merchandise identical with that now before us is not a cord, and consequently not dutiable under the paragraph 349, as it is here classified. Ulmann v. United States (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 77; T. D. 33363). Moreover, I do not think that the long customs practice of classifying this class of merchandise as cotton cord is controlling. In G. A. 3736 (T. D. 17750) the board held on the evidence that the merchandise was "a cotton cord, used in appliqué work, and that it is known commercially as coronation cord or braid," and the merchandise was held dutiable as a "cord or braid" at 45 per cent ad valorem, and not as "manufactures of cotton" at 35 per cent ad valorem under the act of 1894. From an examination of the record in that case, however, which is made a part of the record herein (illustrative Exhibit B), it appears that the evidence was not sufficient to establish commercial designation. The protest was correctly overruled, however, as there was no evidence tending to overcome the presumption of correctness of the collector's classification. In G. A. 4113 (T. D. 19156), the board held that the merchandise was dutiable as a "cord" and not as a "braid." It appears from the record in that case, however, which is a part of the record herein (illustrative Exhibit A), that there was no appearance on the part of the importer, and the board found that the merchandise was a cord from an inspection of the sample alone. The merchandise in that case was imported under the act of 1897, wherein the same rate of duty was levied on "cotton cord" and "manufactures of cotton," and an importer would have no reason for objecting to the board's ruling or the collector's decision in classifying the merchandise as "cotton cord" and claiming that it should be returned as "manufactures of cotton," as duty would have been collected at the rate of 45 per cent ad valorem in either instance. Under these conditions I am of opinion that the collector's practice in classifying the merchandise as "cotton cord" under the act of 1897 is not determinative that Congress adopted this construction and intended that this kind of merchandise should be included within the classification of cotton cords in the act of 1909. Furthermore, there is no doubt as to the meaning of the statute here, and I do not think this is a case where customs practice is controlling. In the case of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 389; T. D. 32162) the court held that it is only in a case where there is a doubt as to the meaning of the statute itself that the usage of customs may be held to determine the construction of that statute. Judge DeVries, speaking for the court, said: We do not think this is a case where the principle of long-established customs usage is determinative. The application of that principle of judicial interpretation confines its exercise to cases wherein there is a doubtful meaning of a statute. In such cases of doubt long-established customs usage may be invoked as determinative of one contention or the other. There is no dubious statute here. The board further holds that the merchandise is commercially known as "coronation cord," but I am unable to reach that conclusion from the record before us. Some of the witnesses testified that the article is known in trade as "coronation cord," some that it is known as "coronation," some as "torpedoes," and some as "rice thread." In view of this confusing and unsatisfactory state |