active financial managers of the revolution, with headquarters in New York.

Many stories have been printed and direct charges made that revolutionary capital to the amount of millions was furnished by American corporations to aid Madero. The stories were fables and the charges unfounded. There was logic behind them but no facts. This was not due to Gustavo's unwillingness to receive such help or his failure to solicit it, since for many weeks he besought bankers and corporation men in vain. Not one of them would take the risk of being charged later on with having contributed to this cause. Perhaps a more potent reason for their declination was the apparent hopelessness of the Madero movement.

To the Standard Oil Company, Gustavo offered five millions of repudiated bonds which had been issued nearly half a century ago by General Carbajal, who served under Benito Juarez. The general was held to have exceeded his authority, and the issue became worthless. The bonds were to be recognized at face value by the Mexican government if Madero won. All the junta at Washington were to sign the agreement to this effect. One million dollars, or one-fifth of the par value, was the sum Gustavo asked of the Standard Oil Company. The same offer he made to the Waters Pierce Oil Company in St. Louis, and to various other corporations and bankers with present or prospective interests in Mexico. Not one of them would rise to the bait. Not a dollar of American money, or any other money, except that belonging to the railway did Gustavo secure.

The committee of the United States Senate appointed to investigate this matter searched for two years in vain for evidence to fasten financial assistance to Madero upon persons or firms or corporations of the United States." The committee learned something of the railway fund, but

the amount seemed utterly inadequate. The thing which had been accomplished by the Madero revolution had cost millions, the committee argued. Such a sweeping overturn must have involved an immense outlay for arms alone. If the gentlemen of the committee had known the inner history of the fall of Diaz, the affair would not have appeared in so mysterious a light.

A Canadian lumber company admitted to a representative of the committee that it had contributed $30,000 to Pino Suarez for certain rights to mahogany in Yucatan, but it could not be established that even this sum was used in the interests of the Madero cause. It is certain that none of it passed through Gustavo's hands.

Gustavo paid $55,000 for arms and $50,000 to Sherbourne G. Hopkins of Washington as counsel for the revolution. The arms were sent forward in three shipments, the largest of which did not arrive till after peace had been established. The two smaller shipments were all that were received from sources outside of Mexico itself. Hopkins accomplished nothing of importance in return for his fee.

Organization expenses in Mexico, junta expenses in San Antonio and Washington, publicity costs in the United States, and the thousand and one incidentals of the enterprise used up Gustavo's little fund. As has been stated the balance in hand was only $1,500 at the time when the meeting with Limantour took place, and it had dwindled to $1,200 at the end.

The repayment of the funds abstracted from the railway treasury by Gustavo was included in the peace agreement signed by the delegates of Diaz and Madero at El Paso on May 21, 1911, but the source from which Gustavo had secured the money was not named. Giving this item such importance seemed to stamp the Maderos as greedy men; it could not be openly set forth that warrants were out for

Gustavo in the United States in connection with these funds, and that no time must be lost in repayment of them.

An appropriation to refund 700,000 pesos to Gustavo Madero for advances he had made was passed by the Mexican Congress among its first acts after de la Barra succeeded to the presidency. This evoked comment from one end of Mexico to the other and was the foundation upon which Gustavo's reputation as a grafter was built. Among the injudicious acts of the Maderos this hasty and obvious reimbursing of Gustavo takes high rank. The family owed this brother of Francisco Madero a debt of gratitude. It would have been easy for them to arrange a loan at the moment of their victory to shield Gustavo's character from attack. Later on an adjustment of the matter could have been made. Much adverse peon sentiment was based upon this badly managed affair, which was never allowed to disappear from view while Madero ruled.

I'

CHAPTER VI

N describing the overthrow of Diaz I have dealt very lightly with the influences exerted by and through the

State Department at Washington. There is no doubt that the framers of policy, both official and unofficial, had lost in a few months their good will toward the Mexican dictator, and had come to desire that he should be deposed and that a man more amenable to control should take his place; but de la Barra was their candidate, not Madero. De la Barra had given satisfactory assurances on the Japanese question, and was acceptable to business interests. He was not the man to involve his country in trouble with the United States, but there was no longer any confidence to be reposed in Diaz. The latter might force intervention which many desired, but which no one in authority dared undertake.

Francisco Madero, the younger, was undesirable for many reasons, in regard to some of which the views of Washington statesmen and their advisers were contradictory. It was said that Madero was a reformer of the type peculiarly obnoxious to the Taft administration and to Americans having large investments in Mexico. On the other hand it was asserted that he and his family - especially the latter were seeking to control the government from purely selfish motives, and would inaugurate an era of graft. There were those who even went so far as to view the prospect of Madero's ascendency with complacence, because of their belief that he and the men who would serve him could be bought.

But what Washington hoped for was that de la Barra might retain the presidential seat for a considerable time, and that the Madero upheaval might subside, so that when an election" should finally be held, a safe and sane man would be counted in. It is alleged that there was an understanding between Diaz and de la Barra, with the approval of the Taft administration, prior to March 7, 1911, but so far as Diaz is concerned this is an error. De la Barra knew that he would have the approval of the United States, if he should succeed to the Mexican presidency as provisional incumbent, but Diaz was not a party to the bargain. He meant to remain in office, and if the proper measures had been taken in his behalf he might have held the place against anything except armed intervention by the United States.

I have described his government as undermined, and as falling with every evidence of its inherent weakness; and I have elsewhere spoken of it as solvent and as powerful beyond comparison with the rebellion that assailed it. There is no real contradiction in this. The Diaz autocracy was doomed, in default of vigorous and radical action in its defense. Fraud and incompetency had weakened the military arm. But money can recruit soldiers, buy munitions, and even hire competent officers, and Limantour could have secured all the funds that Mexico needed for these purposes. Beyond question the Madero revolt might have been conquered in the field, if the central government could have been protected from external foes. And if de la Barra could give pledges satisfactory to the Taft administration, Limantour could have given them equally well, and could have forced their acceptance upon Diaz. Washington would then have been left with no cause for aggression except that which has since proved to be so embarrassing resentment toward an individual. It is