The human intellect, in truth, may be considered in three distinct states, which frequently succeed one another.

A man believes firmly, because he adopts a proposition without inquiry. He doubts as soon as objections present themselves. But he frequently succeeds in satisfying these doubts, and then he begins again to believe. This time, he has not a dim and casual glimpse of the truth, but sees it clearly before him, and advances by the light it gives.*

When the liberty of the press acts upon men who are in the first of these three states, it does not immediately disturb their habit of believing implicitly without investigation, but it changes every day the objects of their unreflecting convictions. The human mind continues to discern but one point at a time upon the whole intellectual horizon, and that point is constantly changing. This is the period of sudden revolutions. Woe to the generations which first abruptly adopt the freedom of the press.

The circle of novel ideas, however, is soon travelled over. Experience comes to undeceive men, and plunges them into doubt and general mistrust. We may rest assured that the majority of mankind will always stop in one of these two states, will either believe they know not wherefore, or will not know what to believe. Few are those who can ever attain to that other state of rational and independent conviction, which true knowledge can produce out of the midst of doubt.

It has been remarked that, in times of great religious fervor, men sometimes change their religious opinions; whereas, in times of general scepticism, every one clings to his old persuasion. The same thing takes place in politics under the liberty of the press. In countries where all the theories of social science have been contested in their turn,

* It may, however, be doubted whether this rational and self-guiding con viction arouses as much fervor or enthusiastic devotedness in men, as their first dogmatical belief.

men who have adopted one of them stick to it, not so much because they are sure of its truth, as because they are not sure that there is any better to be had. In the present age, men are not very ready to die for their opinions, but they are rarely inclined to change them; there are few martyrs, as well as few apostates.

Another still more valid reason may be adduced: when no opinions are looked upon as certain, men cling to the mere instincts and material interests of their position, which are naturally more tangible, definite, and permanent than any opinions in the world.

It is a very difficult question to decide, whether an aristocracy or a democracy governs the best. But it is certain that democracy annoys one part of the community, and that aristocracy oppresses another. It is a truth which is self-established, and one which it is needless to discuss, that "you are rich and I am poor."

11

CHAPTER XII.

POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

Daily Use which the Anglo-Americans make of the Right of Association. Three Kinds of Political Associations. - How the Americans apply the Representative System to Associations.— Dangers resulting to the State. - Great Convention of 1831 relative to the Tariff.-Legislative Character of this Convention. - Why the unlimited Exercise of the Right of Association is less dangerous in the United States than elsewhere. — Why it may be looked upon as necessary. - Utility of Associations among a democratic People.

INon con more successfully used, or applied to a greater

N no country in the world has the principle of associa

multitude of objects, than in America. Besides the permanent associations, which are established by law, under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals.

The citizen of the United States is taught from infancy to rely upon his own exertions, in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he looks upon the social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety, and he claims its assistance only when he is unable to do without it. This habit may be traced even in the schools, where the children in their games are wont to submit to rules which they have themselves established, and to punish misdemeanors which they have themselves defined. The same spirit pervades every act of social life. If a stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare, and the circulation of vehicles is hindered, the neighbors immediately form themselves into a deliberative

body; and this extemporaneous assembly gives rise to an executive power, which remedies the inconvenience before anybody has thought of recurring to a pre-existing authority superior to that of the persons immediately concerned. If some public pleasure is concerned, an association is formed to give more splendor and regularity to the entertainment. Societies are formed to resist evils which are exclusively of a moral nature, as to diminish the vice of intemperance. In the United States, associations are established to promote the public safety, commerce, industry, morality, and religion. There is no end which the human will despairs of attaining through the combined power of individuals united into a society.

I shall have occasion hereafter to show the effects of association in civil life; I confine myself for the present to the political world. When once the right of association is recognized, the citizens may use it in different ways.

An association consists simply in the public assent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines; and in the engagement which they contract to promote in a certain manner the spread of those doctrines. The right of associating with such views is very analogous to the liberty of unlicensed printing; but societies thus formed possess more authority than the press. When an opinion is represented by a society, it necessarily assumes a more exact and explicit form. It numbers its partisans, and compromises them in its cause: they, on the other hand, become acquainted with each other, and their zeal is increased by their number. An association unites into one channel the efforts of diverging minds, and urges them vigorously towards the one end which it clearly points out.

The second degree in the exercise of the right of association is the power of meeting. When an association is allowed to establish centres of action at certain important points in the country, its activity is increased, and its in

fluence extended. Men have the opportunity of seeing each other; means of execution are combined; and opinions are maintained with a warmth and energy which written language can never attain.

Lastly, in the exercise of the right of political associa tion, there is a third degree: the partisans of an opinion may unite in electoral bodies, and choose delegates to represent them in a central assembly. This is, properly speaking, the application of the representative system to a party. Thus, in the first instance, a society is formed between individuals professing the same opinion, and the tie which keeps it together is of a purely intellectual nature. In the second case, small assemblies are formed, which represent only a fraction of the party. Lastly, in the third case, they constitute, as it were, a separate nation in the midst. of the nation, a government within the government. Their delegates, like the real delegates of the majority, represent the whole collective force of their party; and, like them, also, have an appearance of nationality and all the moral power which results from it. It is true that they have not the right, like the others, of making the laws; but they have the power of attacking those which are in force, and of drawing up beforehand those which ought to be enacted.

If, among a people who are imperfectly accustomed to the exercise of freedom, or are exposed to violent political passions, by the side of the majority who make the laws be placed a minority who only deliberate and get laws ready for adoption, I cannot but believe that public tranquillity would there incur very great risks. There is doubtless a wide difference between proving that one law is in itself better than another, and proving that the former ought to be substituted for the latter. But the imagination of the multitude is very apt to overlook this difference, which is so apparent to the minds of thinking men.