concluding treaties of commerce, raising armies, and equipping fleets, was therefore granted to the Union. The necessity of a national government was less imperiously felt in the conduct of the internal affairs of society; but there are certain cerral interests which can only be attended to with a GISLAge by a generd authority. a generd authority. The Union was invested with the power of controlling the monetary system, carrying the mails, and opening the great roads which were to unite the different parts of the country.* The independence of the government of each State in its sphere was recognized; yet the Federal government was authorized to interfere in the internal affairs of the States † in a few predetermined cases, in which an indiscreet use of their independence might compromise the safety of the whole Union. Thus, whilst the power of modifying and changing their legislation at pleasure was preserved to each of the confederate republics, they are forbidden to enact ex-post-facto laws, or to grant any titles of nobility. Lastly, as it was necessary that the Federal government should be able to fulfil its engagements, it has an unlimited power of levying taxes. In examining the division of powers, as established by - the bill, which has since become the Constitution of the United States, was before the people, and the discussions were still pending, three men, who had already acquired a portion of that celebrity which they have since enjoyed, -John Jay, Hamilton, Madison, — undertook together to explain to the nation the advantages of the measure which was proposed. With this view, they published in a journal a series of articles, which now form a complete treatise. They entitled their journal «The Federalist," a name which has been retained in the work. The Federalist is an excellent book, which ought to be familiar to the statesmen of all countries, though it specially concerns America. * Several other powers of the same kind exist, such as that of legislating on bankruptcy, and granting patents. The necessity of confiding such matters to the Federal government is obvious enough. † Even in these cases, its interference is indirect. by means of the tribunals, as will be hereafter shown. The Union interferes the Federal Constitution, remarking on the one hand the portion of sovereignty which has been reserved to the several States, and on the other, the share of power which has been given to the Union, it is evident that the Federal legislators entertained very clear and accuras respecting the centralization of government. to m Jnite States form not only a republic, but a confederation; yet the national authority is more centralized there than it was in several of the absolute monarchies of Europe. I will cite only two examples. 1 Thirteen supreme courts of justice existed in France, which, generally speaking, had the right of interpreting the law without appeal; and those provinces which were styled pays d'Etat were authorized to refuse their assent to an impost which had been levied by the sovereign, who represented the nation. In the Union, there is but one tribunal to interpret, as there is one legislature to make, the laws; and an impost voted by the representatives of the nation is binding upon all the citizens. In these two essential points, therefore, the Union is more centralized than the French monarchy, although the Union is only an assemblage of confederate republics. In Spain, certain provinces had the right of establishing a system of custom-house duties peculiar to themselves, although that privilege belongs, by its very nature, to the national sovereignty. In America, Congress alone has the right of regulating the commercial relations of the States with each other. The government of the confederation is therefore more centralized in this respect than the kingdom of Spain. It is true, that the power of the crown in France or Spain was always able to obtain by force whatever the constitution of the country denied, and that the ultimate result was consequently the same; but I am here discussing the theory of the constitution. After having settled the limits within which the Federal government was to act, the next point was to determine how it should be put in action. LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. Division of the Legislative Body into Two Branches. - Difference in the Manner of forming the Two Houses. The Principle of the Independence of the States predominates in the Formation of the Senate.That of the Sovereignty of the Nation in the. Composition of the House of Representatives. · Singular Effect of the Fact that a Constitution can be Logical only when the Nation is Young. THE plan which had been laid down beforehand in the constitutions of the several States was followed, in many respects, in the organization of the powers of the Union. The Federal legislature of the Union was composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. A spirit of compromise caused these two assemblies to be constituted on different principles. I have already shown that two interests were opposed to each other in the establishment of the Federal Constitution. These two interests had given rise to two opinions. It was the wish of one party to convert the Union into a league of independent States, or a sort of congress, at which the representatives of the several nations would meet to discuss certain points of common interest. The other party desired to unite the inhabitants of the American Colonies into one and the same people, and to establish a government, which should act as the sole representative of the nation, although in a limited sphere. The practical consequences of these two theories were very different. If the object was, that a league should be established instead of a national government, then the majority of the States, instead of the majority of the inhabitants of the Union, would make the laws: for every State, great or small, would then remain in full independence, and enter the Union upon a footing of perfect equality. If, however, the inhabitants of the United States were to be considered as belonging to one and the same nation, it would be natural that the majority of the citizens of the Union should make the law. Of course, the lesser States could not subscribe to the application of this doctrine without, in fact, abdicating their existence in respect to the sovereignty of the Confederation; since they would cease to be a co-equal and co-authoritative power, and become an insignificant fraction of a great people. The former system would have invested them with excessive authority, the latter would have destroyed their influence altogether. Under these circumstances, the result was, that the rules of logic were broken, as is usually the case when interests are opposed to arguments. A middle course was hit upon by the legislators, which brought together by force two systems theoretically irreconcilable. The principle of the independence of the States triumphed in the formation of the Senate, and that of the sovereignty of the nation in the composition of the House of Representatives. Each State was to send two Senators to Congress, and a number of Representatives proportioned to its population.* It results from this arrangement that * Every ten years, Congress fixes anew the number of Representatives which each State is to furnish. The total number was 69 in 1789, and 240 n 1833. The Constitution decided that there should not be more than one Representative for every 30,000 persons; but no minimum was fixed on. Congress has not thought fit to augment the number of Representatives in proportion to the increase of population. The first Act which was passed on the subject (14th of April, 1792) decided that there should be one Representative for every 33,000 inhabitants. The Act which was passed in 1852 fixes the proportion at one for 93,423, and made the House consist of 234 members. The population represented is composed of all the freemen, and of three fifths of the slaves. the State of New York has at the present day thirty-three Representatives, and only two Senators; the State of Delaware has two Senators, and only one Representative; the State of Delaware is therefore equal to the State of New York in the Senate, whilst the latter has thirty-three times the influence of the former in the House of Representatives. Thus, the minority of the nation in the Senate may paralyze the decisions of the majority represented in the other House, which is contrary to the spirit of constitutional government. These facts show how rare and difficult it is rationally and logically to coinbine all the several parts of legislation. The course of time always gives birth to different interests, and sanctions different principles, among the same people; and when a general constitution is to be established, these interests and principles are so many natural obstacles to the rigorous application of any political system with all its consequences. The early stages of national existence are the only periods at which it is possible to make legislation trictly logical; and when we perceive a nation in the enjoyment of this advantage, we should not hastily conclude that it is wise, but only remember that it is young. When the Federal Constitution was formed, the interest of independence for the separate States, and the interest of union for the whole people, were the only two conflicting interests which existed amongst the Anglo-Americans; and a compromise was necessarily made between them. It is, however, just to acknowledge, that this part of the Constitution has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been feared. All the States are young and contiguous; their customs, their ideas, and their wants are not dissimilar; and the differences which result from their size are not enough to set their interests much at variance. The small States have consequently never leagued themselves together in the Senate to oppose the designs of the |