This definition, which is acted upon every day, identifies "the legal relation" and the slave system with the domestic slave-trade, and its constant and violent disruption of the most sacred and tender ties of consanguinity and affection. If the "legal relation" does not produce this effect in respect to each slave, it does, in each instance, uphold and sanction the principle of chattelhood upon which alone the traffic in slaves rests. It recognizes the rightfulness of the traffic by recognizing the rightfulness of slave ownership, which includes the right of purchase and sale. This is what Mr. Clay affirmed, and, thus far, he spoke truthfully. The moment the right of property in man is admitted, (and here lies the core of the "relation,") that moment the right of purchase and sale is virtually conceded likewise. It was a triumph of human sympathy over legal congruity and logical consistency, that enacted the Code Noir.

The exposition of Mr. Clay reduces slaves to a level with poultry and swine; it denies to them personality and the attributes of human beings. It does this not merely in theory, but on a point of the most pressing practical importance. It certifies us that the chattel principle is neither a dead letter nor an unmeaning abstraction. It exhibits the practical statesmanship, not of Henry Clay only, but of all

State courts sustained them, and thus they obtained the greater part of the importation without payment!

The restriction in the Federal District prevents dealers from bringing in supplies from the States, for sale and shipment abroad, but does not prevent purchases and sales among the citizens.

who admit the validity of the so-called "legal relation."

A similar exposition we have from Rev. James Smylie, of the Amite Presbytery, Mississippi, in a pamphlet written in defense of slaveholding. Alluding to the charges of abolitionists, he admits the facts adduced by them, but denies their criminality. And he says:

"If slavery be a sin, and advertising and apprehending slaves with a view to restore them to their masters, is a direct violation of the divine law, and if the BUYING, SELLING, and holding a slave, FOR THE SAKE OF GAIN, is a heinous sin and scandal, then verily, THREE FOURTHS of all the Episcopalians, Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians, in eleven States of this Union, are of the devil. They hold, if they do not buy and sell slaves, and (with few exceptions) they hesitate not to apprehend and restore runaway slaves, when in their power."

It will be noticed that the holding, the buying, and the selling of a slave are here put together, as being essentially of the same character. And common sense as well as "the law" of the peculiar "relation," as expounded by Henry Clay, attests the same thing.

A large portion of "Wheeler's Law of Slavery" is occupied with legal decisions connected, directly or indirectly, with cases growing out of the transfer of slaves. One division, or chapter of the work, treats "Of the Increase of Slaves-to whom the increase belongs of the grant or devise of the increase." Another topic is, "Of the Title to Slaves;" another, "Of War

ranty;" another, "Of Hiring of Slaves;" another, "Of Mortgage of Slaves;" another, "Of Dower of Slaves;" another, "Of the Division of Slaves;" another, "Of the Remainder in Slaves." Upwards of one hundred and fifty pages of the book (nearly one third of the entire work) are occupied with these topics. From the extent and variety of litigation coming before the courts and demanding these complicated legal rules and decisions, it would seem that a very large part of the business transactions of the people must consist in the reception or transfer, in some form, of this species of property. And, at every step, it appears that transfers of slave property are made upon the same principles that govern the transfer of other property, that it is held and conveyed under the same tenure, and with as little sense of the impropriety of the transaction; thus placing, in practice, a human being upon a level with a mere thing. Thus, when the judge, the lawyer, or the law compiler or author would lay down the legal rule by which the decision should be made in a litigated case, in a matter of sale, delivery, possession, warranty, &c., he looks up the precedents and rules originally occurring or laid down in respect to "a mare" or "a colt," and then, with the utmost coolness and gravity, applies it, as valid law, to the sale, delivery, or warranty of "a girl!" An instance of this occurs in "Wheeler's Law of Slavery," pp. 119, 120, in a note on the case of Smith vs. Rowzee, Spring Term 1821; a case in which “the girl" purchased was unable to travel home with her new master, eight miles distant, and

soon died. A lawsuit followed, and the law con. cerning other live stock determined the case!

In one instance (p. 68) we find "a negro woman slave named Peg," sold for $300, with leave to return her in three weeks, if the purchaser did not like her. With her new master she became frost-bitten, which rendered her "of little value." Hence a suit between the parties, judgment given, an appeal taken, judgment reversed-just as in the case of a horse or an ox.

On page 79 we learn that "five years' peaceable possession gives a title to a slave, and which, if lost, may be regained." We infer that if possession, as between contending claimants of slave property, be thus potent, it would be at least equally powerful, as between the possessor and the slave's legal right to freedom.

Of the extent of the slave traffic between the slavegrowing and planting States (of which we shall speak presently) some tolerably reliable approximation towards the true statistics may be gathered. But of the extent of local and neighborhood transfers, with which Wheeler's reported cases seem mostly occupied, very little can be accurately known. We can only say that a perusal of "Wheeler's Law of Slavery" has very greatly swelled our own estimate or apprehension of that extent. It can hardly be supposed that more than a tithe of such transfers would occasion lawsuits. But we seem to see the courts crowded with them, and a compilation of the reported cases swelling a law volume. It must be folly to pretend that the slave traffic occupies only

the vulgar portion of Southern society, when it figures so largely in the courts.

"Slaves may be sold and transferred from one to another, without any statutory restriction or limitation, as to the separation of parents and children, &c., except in Louisiana." (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 41.)

It can hardly be necessary to cite witnesses to prove that this feature of the Slave Code, which licenses the slave-trade and the separation of families, is not a dead letter. But it might be useful to impress upon the reader some idea of the magnitude and the atrocity of this traffic. This would open a wide field. We mig't refer the inquirer to Weld's "Slavery as it is," to Jay's "Inquiry," and to Goodell's "History of Slavery and Anti-Slavery," for collections of facts and testimonies on this subject, upon which we cannot enlarge here.

The extent of the slave-trade in America may be conceived, from the testimony of the Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky, that "these scenes" (i. e. cofflegangs) are "daily occurring in the midst of us;" that "there is not a neighborhood where these heart-rending scenes are not displayed;" that "there is not a village or road that does not behold the sad procession of manacled outcasts, whose chains and mournful countenances tell that they are exiled by force from all that their hearts hold dear."

Its general prosecution may be seen by the numerous advertisements of both purchasers and venders, in the most respectable newspapers in the slave States, as, for example, the following: