We will now travel further south, and look into the courts for information. As our guide we will take "Wheeler's Law of Slavery," a regular lawbook, made for the use of slaveholders.* Slave property, like other property, is the subject of frequent litigation between the different owners or claimants of it, or with their neighbors. From these suits chiefly, and for use in future suits, the volume of Mr. Wheeler is compiled. The incidental testimony of such a work to the nature and incidents of slavery is the strongest and the most unobjectionable that can be conceived. We shall refer to it frequently in this volume. On the property tenure and chattelhood by which slaves are held, its testimo ny is clear and explicit. The idea is involved and implied throughout the entire volume. A few di

rect statements of the doctrine will be sufficient. Let it; be understood that our quotations are the decisions of Courts, stated in the language of the Judges.

Slaves, from their nature, are CHATTELS, and were put in the hands of executors, before the act of 1792

* "A Practical Treatise of the Law of Slavery, being a Compila tion of all the Decisions made on that subject, in the several Courts of the United States, and State Courts; with copious notes and references to the Statutes and other authorities, systematically arranged. By Jacob D. Wheeler, Esq., Counsellor at Law. NewYork: Allan Pollock, Jr. New Orleans: Benjamin Levy. 1837." 476 pages, octavo. This work is recommended by Hon. Judge H. Hichcock, of Alabama, and by the New-York Mercantile Advertiser. and New-York Star.

declaring them to be personal estate." (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 2.)

"The phrase 'personal estate,' in wills and contracts, should be understood as embracing slaves." (Ib.)

"Slaves were declared by law to be real estate, and descend to the heir at law. They are considered real estate in case of descents." (Ib.)

"Although for some purposes slaves are declared by statute to be real estate, they are nevertheless, intrinsically personal, and are therefore to be considered as included in every statute or contract in relation to chattels which does not, in terms, exclude them. They are liable, as chattels, to the payment of debts," &c. (Ib. p. 37.)

In the case of Harris vs. Clarissa and others, March Term, 1834, (6 Yerger's Tenn. Rep., 227; Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 319-26,) the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court, found occasion (p. 325) to say:

"In Maryland, the issue" (i. e., of female slaves) "is considered not an accessory, but as a part of the use, like that of other female animals. (1 Har. & McHen. Rep., 160, 352; 1 Har. & John's Rep., 526; 1 Hayw. Rep., 335.) Suppose a brood mare be hired for five years, the foals belong to him who has a part of the use of the dam. (2 Black. Com., 290; 1 Hayw. Rep., 335.) The slave, in Maryland, in this respect, is placed on no higher or different ground."

Mr. Gholson, of the Virginia Legislature, by the use of similar language, (as will hereafter be quoted,) offended the delicacy of some, who supposed him to

be peculiarly brutish and gross; but we here find it to be in accordance with the ordinary language of the courts of law!

About forty-five pages of "Wheeler's Law of Slavery" are occupied with judicial decisions concerning the "warranty of slaves" sold, in respect to their soundness, health, "freedom from all redhibitory vices, diseases," &c. It is impossible to look over the revolting details, and to notice the coldhearted insensibility with which the rules and decisions of the Courts are laid down and recorded, without being deeply impressed with the unhuman izing effects of the process, particularly in the systematic forgetfulness that the slave is any thing more than a brute animal. The section concerning "the warranty of moral qualities" may be claimed as an exception, and is certainly one of the most remarkable pieces of law literature extant:

"The 2500th article of the Code of Louisiana divides the defects of slaves into two classes: vices of body, and vices of character." "But with regard to those of character, the next article expressly declares that they are confined to cases where the slave has committed a capital crime, where he is convicted of theft, and where he is in the habit of running away." (p. 133.)

"Drunkenness is a mental, not a physical defect, and is not ground of redhibition." (Ib.) "But a fraudulent concealment of it will be a ground for rescinding the contract." (Ib., p. 134.)

"In South Carolina there is no implied warranty

of the moral qualities of the slave;" "as where a slave was sold who had committed burglary, the fact being unknown to both the seller and purchaser." (Ib., p. 136.)

These quotations are made to prove the bona fide, matter-of-fact chattelhood of the slave, or his being degraded to the condition of mere property, either real or personal. And they show that the condition adheres not merely to the body, but to the soul; to the moral qualities that distinguish a man from a brute! It is an honest servant that the vender sells. If the article is proved to have been dishonest, the sale is vitiated. The honesty of the man, then, is a commodity in the market!

"Craziness or idiocy is an absolute vice; and, where not apparent, will annul the sale." (Ib., p. 139.)

The God-like intellect of the human chattel is, therefore, the commodity sold and warranted! On the same page, a case is cited-"Icar vs. Suars, Jan. Term, 1835. 7 Louisiana Reports, 517”—in which Judge Bullard, after stating the law and the facts, gave judgment for the plaintiff, saying, "We are satisfied that the slave in question was wholly, and perhaps worse than useless."

In the case of the State vs. Mann, the defendant was indicted for an assault and battery on a hired slave, named Lydia. Judgment was rendered for the State; but, on an appeal, the judgment was reversed. In giving his decision, Judge Ruffin thus disposes of the plea that the relation of master and slave resembles other domestic relations:

"This has indeed been assimilated, at the bar, to the other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles which confer and restrain the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the apprentice, have been pressed upon us. The Court does not recognize their application. There is no likeness between the cases. They are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf between them. The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery, and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor on whom the duty devolves of training the youth to usefulness, in a station which he is afterwards to assume among freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and intellectual instruction seem the natural means; and, for the most part, they are found to suffice. added, to make the others effectual. If that fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a private person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security, and the public safety. The subject is doomed, in his own person and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that others may reap the fruits," &c.

Moderate force is super

From such premises the Judge infers the necessity of absolute power in the master over the slave, and