Martin's Lou. Rep., 559. Wheeler, p. 199.) If this be true in Louisiana, with its relics of the Code Noir, we may be well assured that it is true of the codes of the other States.

CHAPTER II.

NO ACCESS OF SLAVES TO THE JUDICIARY, AND NO HONEST PROVISION FOR TESTING THE CLAIMS OF

THE ENSLAVED TO FREEDOM.

"A Slave cannot be a party to a civil suit." (Stroud's Sketch, p. 76.)

"A SLAVE cannot be a party to a suit, except in the single case where a negro is held as a slave and he claims to be free." [We omit the references to authorities here cited.] "It would be an idle form and ceremony to make a slave a party to a suit, by the instrumentality of which he could recover nothing; or, if a recovery could be had, the instant it was recovered, would belong to the master. A slave can possess nothing. He can hold nothing. He is therefore not a competent party to a suit. And the same rule prevails wherever slavery is tolerated, whether there be legislative enactments upon the subject or not." (Note to p. 197, in Wheeler's Law of Slavery. Case of Berard vs. Berard, before cited.) We proceed to examine the condition of the slave in reference to suits for freedom.

"In all cases where the slave alleges to be free, he

is of course a party. He may have a habeas corpus, and if there be a false return, may sue upon it. Or he may bring a trespass for assault and battery, and false imprisonment, in which action, the defendant, to justify himself, must plead that he is his slave. In many States he may proceed by petitions for freedom." (Note in Wheeler, p. 197.)

In inquiring after "the origin of the relation and its subjects," (Chapter XXIII. of the former series,) it was ascertained that colored persons who cannot prove their freedom may be enslaved; that colored persons, whether negroes or mulattoes, whether bond or free, cannot be admitted as witnesses to prove their freedom, (a free colored mother not being permitted to come into Court to identify, under oath, her own kidnapped free child, torn from her arms the day previous, nor give testimony to the fact, nor identify the kidnapper!) it was ascertained, further, that color was held to be presumptive evidence of the condition of slavery. The bearing of all this upon law-suits for the recovery of freedom will be readily appreciated. (Hudgins vs. Wrights, 1 Hen. and Munf. Va. Rep., 134.) Judge Roane said: "In the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is incumbent on him to make out his right to freedom; but in the case of a person visibly appearing to be a white man, or an Indian, the presumption is that he is free, and it is necessary for his adversary to show that he is a slave." (Wheeler, p. 394.)

The same principle appears in other cases, and seems to be the general rule.

South Carolina.-The act of 1740 provides that "if any negro, Indian, mulatto, or mestizo, claim his or her freedom, it shall be lawful" for such person "to apply to the Judges," &c., who are empowered to appoint for the applicant a guardian, to prosecute in his or her behalf, &c., &c. "And if judgment shall be given for the plaintiff, a special entry shall be made, declaring that the ward of the plaintiff is free, and the jury shall assess damages, with full costs of suit;-but in case judgment shall be given for the defendant, the said Court is hereby fully empowered to inflict SUCH CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, NOT EXTENDING TO LIFE OR LIMB, on the ward of the plaintiff, as they, in their discretion, shall think fit. Provided that, in any action or suit to be brought in pursuance of the direction in this Act, THE BURTHEN OF THE PROOF SHALL LAY ON THE WARD OF THE PLAINTIFF, and it shall always be PRESUMED that every negro, Indian, mulatto and mestizo is a slave, unless the contrary be made to appear; (the Indians in amity with the Government excepted, in which case the burthen of proof shall be on the defendant.)" (2 Brevard's Digest, 229-30.)

In Georgia, the Act of May 10, 1770, is almost literally a copy of the preceding. (Prince's Digest, 446.)

The slave, it seems, must first find a white friend willing to incur the expense and trouble of conducting the suit, liable, in case of failure, to lose the costs.

Then he must find white witnesses to prove his freedom, instead of demanding that the pretended "owner" (as in the case of other property) prove his right to ownership. And then, for the crime of losing his case in Court, (the fault, perhaps, of Judge and jury, even by their own laws,) he may be subjected, by the same Court, to corporal punishment, resulting perhaps, in "death by moderate correction !!!" But this is not all.

In South Carolina, by Act of 1802, (by way of progress in sixty-two years!) "the guardian" (in a trial for freedom) "of a slave" (who may have been illegally imported into the State, and is, on that account, by the same law, declared to be free) "claiming his freedom shall be liable to double costs of suit, if his action shall be adjudged groundless; and shall be liable to pay to the bona fide owner of such slave, all such damages as shall be assessed by a jury, and adjudged by any Court of Common Pleas." (2 Brevard's Digest, 260.)

In Maryland, the attorney, in a trial for freedom, must pay all the costs, unless the Court shall be of opinion that there was probable cause for supposing that the petitioner had a right to freedom." (Act of 1796, chap. 67, sect. 25.) And on such a trial, the master (the defendant) is allowed twelve peremptory challenges as to the jurors. (Ib., sect. 24.)

In Virginia, "for aiding and abetting a slave, in a trial for freedom, if the claimant fail in his suit, a fine of one hundred dollars is imposed." is by the "REVISED Code" (of 1819), 482.

And this