CHAPTER I.

OF THE GROUND AND NATURE OF THE SLAVE'S CIVIL

CONDITION

The Civil Condition of the Slave grows out of his relation to his Master as 'property," and is determined and defined by it

IF slaves were "deemed, reputed, and adjudged in law" to be "sentient beings," and not "things," then their relation to society and to civil govern ment would be the relation of HUMAN BEINGS. But this is directly the opposite of the fact. "Slaves" are "deemed, sold, taken, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal, in the hands of their owners and possessors, their administrators and assigns, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever." Their relation to society and to civil government is, accordingly, the relation of BRUTES.

The only real exception to this, or modification of it, is where the interests of the "owner," the wants of society, or the exigences of the Government require an anomalous departure from the principle of slave chattelhood, by the temporary and partial recognition of their humanity. Such exceptions and

modifications are never made for the benefit of the slave. They enable the Government to punish, as a human being, the poor creature whom, in no other respect, it recognizes as such! The slave is subjected to the control of the Government, but is not considered entitled to its protection.

The slave cannot be considered by the Government as entitled to its protection while he is not regarded by it as having any rights to be protected. And the Government that recognizes and protects slave chattelhood has already, in that very act, denied to the slave the possession of any rights by denying to him the right of self-ownership, which is the foundation and parent stock of all other rights, and without which they cannot exist.

Having no right to himself, to his bones, muscles, and intellect, (being all of them the property of his "owner,") he has no right to his own industry, to its wages or its products; no right to property or capability of possessing it, as already shown. Of course he has no rights of property to be protected by the Government, and none of the rights that grow out of them.

Having no recognized right of making any contract, he has no contracts with others to be enforced by the Government, and no one has any legal pecuniary claims upon him to be enforced. He can neither sue nor be sued. This is no arbitrary rule. It is the inevitable result of his chattelhood.

Unable to contract marriage, as already seen, he can bring no action at law against the violator of his

bed.

Having no marital or parental rights, he has none for the Government to protect.

Not being accounted a person, but a thing, he can have no personal rights to be protected-no rights of reputation or character-no right to education-no rights of conscience-no rights of personal security-no social rights-no political capabilities or rights—not even the right of petition, as the Federal Congress (very consistently with its recognition of legal human chattelhood) have affirmed. It would be an anomaly to receive the testimony of such an one in a Court of law!

It is futile, it is absurd, it is self-contradictory, it is short-sighted and foolish (to say nothing more severe) for any persons to find fault with any of these things while they recognize as innocent and valid "the legal relation of master and slave," the relation of slave ownership, which includes, implies, and necessitates it all. Such persons should ask themselves seriously what they would have?

Would they have the Government stultify itself, and add mockery to injustice by pretending to attempt known impossibilities in the enactment of contradictions? by making a show of civil protection where none is intended, or where they have rendered it impossible? What protection can they bestow so long as, by sustaining or even permitting or tolerating human chattelhood, or failing to suppress it as a crime, they leave not the slave the possession of one single right of humanity to be protected?

Or, suppose the Government to be honest and

successful in its attempts to confer upon the slave civil rights, to recognize and treat him as a member and component element of civil society. Suppose it to protect, instead of denying these rights-rights of conscience--rights of security--rights of reputation-right to education-free speech-parental rightsmarital rights right of testimony-right to sue and be sued right to make contracts-rights of property-right to his earnings and products. What would become of the right of slave ownership, "the legal relation of master and slave?" Would it not vanish and disappear? Assuredly it would.

These thoughts open a wide field for reflection and remark, if we could spare room.

The Hebrew servitude, so often cited as a precedent for modern slavery, was wanting in its essential element, human chattelhood. Its abundant recognition and guaranty of the civil rights of servants affords demonstrative proof of this.

In the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and even the (recent) British West India types of slavery, we see the principle of human chattelhood less perfectly developed than in our own, less consistently enforced. They exhibit faint recognitions of civil rights in the enslaved. They are less inveterate, and hence (under the same appliances) less difficult to be overthrown. In our country, where so much is said and known of human rights, the slave power has been compelled to fortify and entrench itself in the most unlimited and unmitigated system of despotism ever known or conceived.

In dealing with such a type of slavery, it is especially important to remember that nothing is to be accomplished without striking directly at the root. Attempts at ameliorations, restrictions, limitations, and gradual removal, are signally out of place here. Such a despotism, under such a form of government, and in such a state of society as ours, and at such a crisis as that which is now reached, must be overwhelmed and uprooted speedily, or it will overwhelm and uproot all that does not harmonize with and uphold it. But we must not enlarge.

The statements made in this chapter, like those made in the first chapter of the former series, will be found to contain the key to the chapters that follow. And the present series is the sequel to the former one.

The single idea of human chattelhood, or of slave ownership, carried out in all possible directions, gives us the details of the entire code of slavery. Take away that, and they all vanish. Retain it, and they all stand firmly. The Courts in the slave States understand this.

"A slave is in absolute bondage. He has no civil rights." So said Judge Crenshaw, in Brandon et al. vs. Planters' and Merchants' Bank of Huntsville, Jan. T., 1838; 1 Stewart's Ala. Rep., 320. Same principle in Bynum vs. Bostwick, 4 Desauss., 266. Wheeler, p. 6.

"Slaves are deprived of all civil rights." "Emanci pation gives to the slave his civil rights." (Judge Matthews, in Girod vs. Lewis, May T., 1819; 6