CHAPTER XIX.

THE SLAVE CANNOT SUE HIS MASTER.

Slave Property cannot litigate with its Owner!

THE slave is a "chattel;" his master is his "owner." This "legal relation" precludes the idea of a suit at law between them, especially a suit in which the chattel should be plaintiff! As a horse or an ox cannot sue his owner, so neither can a slave; for "slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken, reputed and adjudged in law to be chattels personal, &c., &c., to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever." "A slave is one who is in the power of his master, to whom he belongs." These all-comprehensive definitions are not a dead letter, and they accordingly settle, at every step, every question that can be raised concerning the condition of the slave. This is "the legal relation," and the whole of it. If this be tolerated, all the rest of the system, in all its parts, and in all its legitimate and natural workings and results, may be tolerated likewise. The parts, severally, cannot be worse than the whole.

"A slave cannot be a party before a judicial tri

bunal, in any species of action against his master, no matter how atrocious may have been the injury which he has received from him." (Stroud's Sketch, p. 57.)

We cited this paragraph in our Chapter IX., in proof of the master's "unlimited power." In the chapters succeeding it has been shown that the laws ostensibly framed for the protection and redress of the slave are of no value to him. And no where have we found any provision for a suit at law by the slave against his master. If the master assaults his life, if he inflicts torture, if he takes away his wife by force, or ravishes her before his eyes, neither he nor his wife can bring him to trial, nor enter complaint or bear testimony against him. If any instance has occurred, amid the outrages of the last two hundred years, LET IT BE PRODUCED.

"The law is unquestionably as stated above, without any exception or limitation." (Stroud's Sketch, p. 57.) *

The proposition at the head of this chapter, that "a slave cannot sue his master," is involved, of necessity, in the still more comprehensive one (which will be established when we come to treat of "the civil condition of the slave") that a slave cannot be a party in any civil suit whatsoever. It would be absurd to suppose that he could maintain a suit

* The case of an alleged slave bringing a suit for his freedom (which will be considered in its place) is not an exception to the above proposition, because the question whether the plaintiff be a slave is still to be settled, and is not to be taken for granted.

against his owner, when he could maintain a suit against no body else. And it would be equally absurd to suppose that he who could possess nothing, if he should gain a suit, could have any power to bring a suit before the Courts for so idle a purpose. The testimony of Mr. Wheeler to this point, in his "Law of Slavery," p. 197, we reserve for its more appropriate place hereafter, but refer to it here, for the convenience of the inquiring reader.

The following cases, extracted from the same author, will, however, be as appropriately inserted here as elsewhere, though they prove more than the mere proposition now before us:

"Berard vs. Berard et al., Feb. Term, 1836; 9 Louisiana Rep., 156.

"Per Cur., Martin, J.: The plaintiff is a person, and SUES HER AUNT, Marie Louise Berard, for the purpose of establishing her and her children's claim to their freedom. The defendant disavowed any title to the plaintiff, but averred that she belonged to her late sister, Marie Jeane Berard, and that she descended to her sister's natural children and legal heirs, Celina and Antoine Garidel. These heirs intervened, and claimed the plaintiff and her children as their property, in the right of their deceased mother. The case was tried by a jury, who found a judgment for the intervening party, and the plaintiff appealed.

"The Court instructed the jury that the interveners were not bound to show their title. The plaintiff excepted.

"On a full consideration of the case, this Court is

of opinion that the instruction given to the jury by the District Judge was correct. A slave cannot stand in judgment for any other purpose than to assert his freedom. He is not even allowed to contest the title of the person holding him as a slave." (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, 197-8.)

This decision covers the entire ground of the incapacity of the slave to sue his master, or any other person. And it lifts the curtain from the scenery of society in a slaveholding community. It shows us a niece, suing her aunt for her freedom-the aunt claiming her niece as a slave, not for herself, but on behalf of two other nieces-those nieces coming forward to claim their cousin and her children as their slave-the Court and Jury sustaining the claim without calling upon the claimants to show their titlethe Supreme Court, "on a full consideration of the case," confirming the decision, and all as coolly as if the claim were for a horse! yet upon a principle by which no horse could be held, without showing a title! This is slavery in the concrete, as actually existing, sanctioned by the Courts, and not merely an abstraction.

The case that follows has been twice alluded to already, and may be referred to again. We give it in full here:

"Dorothee vs. Coquillon et al., Jan. T., 1829; 19 Martin's Louisiana Rep., 350.

"Appeal from the Parish Court of the parish and city of New-Orleans.

"Per Cur., Martin, J.: The plaintiff, a free woman

of color, complained that her child was directed to be emancipated at the age of twenty-one, by the will of her mistress, who bequeathed her services, in the meanwhile, to defendant's daughter, who is still a minor; that the will requires the child to be edu cated in such a manner as may enable her to earn her livelihood when free; that no care of her education is taken, and she is treated cruelly. The prayer of the petition is, that the child be declared free at twentyone, and in the meantime hired out by the sheriff. The answer denies the plaintiff's capacity to sue; that she has any cause of action; and the general issue is pleaded. The petition was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff cannot sue for her minor daughter, in a case in which the latter could not sue were she of age. The daughter is a statu liber, and as such, a slave till she reaches her twenty-first year. Clef des loix romaines verbi statu liber. As a slave, she can have no action except to claim or prove her liberty. (Civil Code, 177.) Her right to her freedom will not begin till she is twenty-one; if in the meantime the legatee fails to perform the conditions of the bequest, and the heirs of the testatrix have the legacy annulled therefor, the statu liber must continue a slave in the meanwhile, and her services enjoyed by her heir; so that the object of the suit, so far as concerns her, is relief from ill treatment, which a SLAVE cannot sue for. The plaintiff is without any right of action. Judgment affirmed, with costs." (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 198–9.)

And so the poor free colored woman loses her