atonement, these present no difficulty. Both sets of passages are easily interpreted, for God is supposed to be reconciled to man as well as man reconciled to God. On the Socinian hypothesis, however, which supposes that only man is reconciled to God, it is not easy to see how the one class of texts is to be understood at all.

Betwixt the two, on the orthodox principle, there is no disagreement, but the most complete and delightful harmony; on the principle of its opponents, the inconsistency is glaring and palpable.

2. Still, it may be thought, this does not get rid of the difficulty; it merely shifts it from our own shoulders to those of the sacred penmen.

And are we to suppose, on the authority of scripture too, that the atonement does effect a change on the immutable God? Far be the thought. The doctrine is not charge. able with anything so blasphemous. What we have affirmed is, that the texts in question seemingly imply a change in God. We have not said that they really imply such a thing. What, then, do they imply? To speak of a change in the nature, or attributes, or will of God, is blasphemous and absurd, as we have just now said. But it is neither blasphemous nor absurd to speak of a change in the mode of the divine administration. Now the anger, wrath, and displeasure of God, are not passions or affections of the divine nature resembling those which receive the same names in man. They are terms denoting the necessary opposition of the divine rectitude to such as have violated the holy law of the righteous Lord who loveth righteousness. They mark the relation into which iniquity brings such as are chargeable with it, to the Lawgiver and Judge of the universe. It is the language of government, not of passion. And what the atonement effects is, not a change in God the Lawgiver, but a change in the administration of his government; a change in the relation subsisting between his creatures and himself. Those whom he formerly treated in a way which is fitly represented to us by anger, indignation, and wrath, he, in consequence of what Christ has done, treats in a way which is fitly represented by love and complacency. But the change is not in God, it is in the creature, and in the relation in which the crea ture stands towards God. God does not love at one time what he hated at another. He does not, in respect of

Christ's atonement, love what, irrespective of this atonement, he hated. No. He hates and loves the same things at all times. What does God hate? It is sin, and not the sinner; he cannot hate his creatures as such, but only as violators of his just and holy will. What does God love? Holiness, his moral image, which is reflected from men, not as mere creatures, but as moral creatures, as new creatures; not as sinners, but as saints. The change thus appears to be not in God. He is pleased and displeased with the same things at all times. He always hates sin -always loves holiness. The atonement does not make God love sin which he formerly hated, nor hate holiness which he formerly loved. The change which it effects is not in God who is the author of love, but in man who is the object of love. By means of Christ's death, man is brought out of a state of condemnation and depravity which God could not but regard with repugnance, into a state of reconciliation and purity which he cannot but look upon with complacency. The change, every one must perceive, is, in this case, not in God, but in man, or in the relation in which man stands to God. Whatever change the creature undergoes, God continues the same. The

sun, the glorious fountain of light and beauty, is always the same in its nature and properties, although the earth may reflect its rays at one time and not at another. But it were every whit as reasonable to ascribe the different appearances which the earth assumes by day and by night, to a change in the solar luminary, rather than to its own relative position with regard to that luminary, as to ascribe the state of man, in consequence of Christ's atonement, to a change in God rather than in man himself. Thus do we dispose of the objection founded on the divine immutability.

III. It is further objected to the doctrine of atonement, that it is incompatible with the gracious nature of pardon. The forgiveness of sin, say the objectors, is uniformly in scripture ascribed to grace. It is an act of free favour, of sovereign goodness. But, on the supposition of satisfaction being given for sin by Jesus Christ, the act can no longer be called an act of grace; it is an act of justice; and, instead of its being merciful in God to pardon sin, it would be unjust in him to withhold forgiveness. Such is the objection with which we have now to deal. It is more spe

cious, certainly, than some others, and, consequently, a great favourite with the enemies of atonement. But the following observations may serve, it is hoped, to show its groundlessness.

1. The objection supposes justice and grace to be opposed to one another, not only in their nature, but in their exercise, so that both cannot respect the same object.

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This supposition has already been refuted, and we must beg our readers to revert to what was before advanced in proof of the perfect harmony of these perfections of the divine nature.* In addition, we may here observe, that the inspired writers appear to have had no idea of any incongruity between justice and grace in the pardon of sin. On the contrary, they represent both as connected with forgiveness. What one apostle ascribes to grace, another refers to justice. Paul says, We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his GRACE:'t while John, writing under the direction of the same Spirit, tells us, that If we confess our sins, He is faithful and JUST to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.' It is worthy of remark, too, that in both these passages pardon is connected with atonement; in the former mention being made of redemption through the blood' of Christ, and in the context of the latter reference being made to the blood of Jesus Christ God's Son which cleanseth from all sin.' This is agreeable to other parts of scripture; as, for example, when Paul, writing to the Romans, in one verse ascribes for. giveness through the redemption of Christ to grace, and in the very next speaks of it as a manifestation of justice. 'Being justified freely by his GRACE, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his RIGHTEOUSNESS for the remission of sins.'§ Can anything more distinctly prove that the inspired writers had no notion whatever of an essential incompatibility between justice and grace, or between atonement and free favour?

2. The objection overlooks the origin of Christ's satisfaction.

It did not originate with man, but with God. Man did not find a surety for himself; it was God that found out + Eph. i. 7. + 1 John i. 9. § Rom. iii. 24, 25.

* See p. 29.

the ransom. If another than God who pardons sin had provided the ground on which the pardon rests, there might have been room to deny the graciousness of the act. But as it is God that provides the Mediator, the work of the Surety, so far from interfering with the freeness of man's forgiveness, becomes the most illustrious proof and confirmation of divine grace. God manifests his grace in determining to pardon man; it is farther displayed in providing a legal ground on which pardon might proceed in consistency with justice; and it is again brought into view in accepting the satisfaction offered by the Surety, which he was not bound in absolute justice to do.

3. The objection also overlooks the circumstance, that although the satisfaction of Christ may be regarded as a legal purchase of pardon, the bestowment of pardon is altogether an act of grace as regards the persons on whom it is conferred.

It is free pardon at least to men. They have no claim; no satisfaction is made by them; they do nothing to procure for themselves forgiveness. If the pardon of sin is an act of justice at all, it is so only to Christ; to the sinner it is one of pure sovereign goodness. It flows through an equitable channel; it proceeds on a righteous foundation; the ground on which it rests is such as to meet every claim of divine justice: but, as regards the spring from which it issues and the objects on whom it terininates, it is wholly a display of superabounding mercy. Being justified through the redemption that is in Jesus' is thus no way inconsistent with being justified freely by God's grace.' Fancy to yourselves,' says Dr. Wardlaw, 'a band of traitors, apprehended, convicted, condemned, lying in irons under the sentence which their crimes have deserved. Suppose their prince, naturally benignant, desirous to extend mercy to them; but at the same time, wise and righteous, and mindful of the interests of the community, as well as benignant, solicitous to effect this in such a way as may at once secure the dignity and authority of his government, attach the hearts of the criminals to its administration and to himself, and impress all his subjects with the conviction that the remission of the penalty in the particular case implies no relaxation of the rigour of the law and the stability of its sanctions. Suppose that,

in such circumstances, he should contrive some method by which these ends might be effectually answered; and that, having completed his scheme, and publicly announced its purpose, he should give his clemency its desired indulgence: -would the pardon now be less a matter of free favour or grace to the delinquents? Clearly not. The scheme does not render them one whit more deserving of it. It does not lessen their guilt: it rather shows its magnitude, by declaring it such as could not be passed by without some precautionary means for securing the honour of the prince and the respect due to his government; nay, it aggravates instead of extenuating, by showing the charac ter of the prince, and government against which the rebels had risen up, not a ruthless tyrant and an oppressive despotism, but a paternal ruler and an administration of equity and love. The pardon is to them, therefore, as much an act of mercy as ever :-and the character of the prince stands forth to more prominent view and to more rapturous admiration, as adorned with the twofold excellence, of a gracious solicitude to show mercy, and at the same time a decided attachment to righteousness, and a determination, for the good of his subjects, that its claims shall not be trifled with, but shall be maintained inviolate. -In like manner, the divine Ruler's adopting a plan for maintaining the honour of his character and government in the dispensation of forgiveness, does not, in the least degree, render that forgiveness less a matter of pure grace to those who receive it.-And, while it is pure grace, it is also rich --rich indeed! that provided such an atone. ment!--and rich indeed! which, on the ground of the atonement so provided, blots out, to every sinner who par takes of it, so vast an amount of evil, and yet embraces among its favoured objects a multitude which no man can number, out of all kindreds, and peoples, and nations, and tongues!**

4. These remarks may be deemed a sufficient reply to the objection. But, in refutation of the Socinian's favourite position, we may perhaps go farther still.

It may fairly be questioned, whether there could have been seen to be grace at all in the pardon of sin, had it not been for the atonement of Christ. Had God pardoned sin

* Essays on Assurance and Pardon, pp. 199, 200,