right to induce another to contract with him on the supposition that his words mean one thing, while he hopes the court will adopt a construction by which they would mean another thing more to his advantage.

These views, in effect, dispose of every question argued. The judgment below will be affirmed, with costs.

MAUD E. SPAWN, RESPONDENT, v. ALBERT GOLDBERG ET AL., APPELLANTS.

Submitted March 17, 1920-Decided May 20, 1920.

1. It is a general rule that drivers of automobiles and other vehicles when using streets and highways are bound to exercise reasonable care towards other travelers-in other words, they must use that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances--and this rule is applicable to such travelers when approaching one another or meeting at street or highway intersections, and each is bound to exercise reasonable care not to collide with the other. 2. It was open to a jury to find that both drivers were negligent when each drove towards the junction point of two city streets at a speed of fifteen miles an hour and neither of them slackened speed nor changed direction until the instant of collision, although each had full view of the other for seventy-five feet from the point of collision.

3. It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to use reasonable care to avoid injury to others, and it is a breach of that duty to fail to stop the machine or slacken its speed when that is the only way in which injury to others can be avoided.

4. The provision of the Traffic act (Pamph. L. 1915, p. 285, chap. 156) that "every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his right," is not intended to provide an exclusively hard and fast rule, applicable to all hazards and in all situations, regardless of actual conditions, and thus liberate from responsibility one who adheres to the regulation, and is otherwise reckless and indifferent to the situation of others; and so the fact that the driver of the jitney bus in which the plaintiff was riding failed to accord to the defendant the right of way as directed by the Traffic act, is not in

itself a sufficient reason for the direction of a verdict for the defendant, when such fact is but one factor in the situation which, considered as a whole, presents a jury question as to the defendant's negligence under all the circumstances.

On appeal from the District Court of the city of Orange.

Before Justices TRENCHARD, BERGEN and KALISCH.

For the appellant Liberty Trucking Company, Kalisch & Kalisch.

For the respondent, Edward R. McGlynn.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

TRENCHARD, J. This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff and against the Liberty Trucking Company and Albert Goldberg, by reason of injuries sustained by the plaintiff (a young woman) as the result of a collision between a jitney motor bus owned by Goldberg, in which she was a passenger, and a motor truck of the Liberty Trucking Company, the collision occurring at the junction of Clinton avenue and La Grange Place, in Newark, on September 4th, 1919, at nine o'clock in the morning.

We are of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal of the Liberty Trucking Company (which alone appeals).

We think that the motion for a direction of a verdict in its favor was rightly denied.

The motion was based upon the notion, and the contention here is, that the facts and circumstances of the collision, as disclosed by the evidence, did not justify a finding of negligence on the part of the company.

But that is not so. It is a general rule that drivers of automobiles and other vehicles when using streets and highways are bound to exercise reasonable care towards other travelers; in other words, they must use that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same.

circumstances, and this rule is applicable to such travelers when approaching one another or meeting at street or highway intersections, and each is bound to exercise reasonable care not to collide with the other.

Now, the collision in question occurred at the junction of two city streets, the defendant's motor truck coming out of La Grange Place, and the jitney bus, in which the plaintiff was riding, traveling on Clinton avenue, both proceeding towards the junction point of the two streets.

We think that it was open to the jury to find, as they did, that both drivers failed to observe reasonable care in the circumstances. The evidence tended to show that each drove straight toward the junction point at a speed of fifteen miles an hour, and neither slackened speed nor changed direction until the instant of collision, although each had full view of the other for seventy-five feet from the point of collision.

We have pointed out that it was the duty of the driver of the defendant company's motor-truck to use reasonable care to avoid injuring others, and it was a breach of that duty to fail to stop the machine or slacken its speed when that was the only way in which injury to others could be avoided.

The defendant company, however, insists that its driver was not negligent because he had the right of way by virtue. of the Traffic act (Pamph. L. 1915, p. 285), which enacts that "every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his right." But, as to that contention, it is a sufficient answer to say that such provision was not intended to provide an exclusively hard and fast rule, applicable to all hazards and in all situations, regardless of actual conditions, and thus liberate from responsibility one who adheres to the regulation, and is otherwise reckless and indifferent to the situation of others; and so the fact that the driver of the jitney bus in which the plaintiff was riding failed to accord to the defendant the right of way as directed by the Traffic act, is not in itself a sufficient reason for a direction of a verdict for the defendant, when, as here, such fact is but one factor in the situation which, VOL. XCIV.

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considered as a whole, presents a jury question as to the defendant's negligence under all the circumstances. Paulsen v. Klinge, 92 N. J. L. 99; Winch v. Johnson, Id. 219.

The motion for a nonsuit also was rightly denied, for the

same reason.

Since these are the only points argued, the judgment will be affirmed, with costs.

HAROLD A. DAVISON, RELATOR, v. ARTHUR A. PATTERSON ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Submitted March 29, 1920-Decided June 5, 1920.

1. The act of 1919, chapter 125 (Pamph. L., p. 290), amending the Soldiers' and Sailors' act of 1897 (Pamph. L., p. 142; Comp. Stat., p. 4871), is unconstitutional, so far as relates to the extension of the purview of the act of 1897 to honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines who have served in any other war than the civil war; such extension as the object of the act of 1919 not being expressed in its title.

2. Where the title of an amendatory act in undertaking to express the object of such act goes no further than to indicate an intention to amend the original act, such title is not constitutionally adequate as an expression of intention to enlarge materially the scope of the former act by the inclusion of classes of persons not originally covered thereby.

3. The act of 1919 (Pamph. L., p. 290) provides that honorably discharged soldiers, &c., shall be preferred for appointment, employment and promotion provided they possess the business capacity necessary to discharge the duties of the position involved. Held, that where the power of appointment was vested in the mayor, subject to confirmation by the council, it was the duty of the mayor to investigate and determine as a matter of fact whether or not a candidate possessed the business capacity necessary to discharge the duties of the position involved, and where he had after due investigation decided this question adversely to the candidate, and therefore refused to nominate him, his action in the matter would not be reviewed by a mandamus to require him to nominate and the council to confirm such candidate. 4. Whether the act of 1919 (Pamph. L., p. 290) relates to appointments to and removals from public office as distinct from a position or employment, quære.

On rule to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue.

Before Justices SWAYZE and PARKER.

For the relator, Warren Smock.

For the respondents, John S. Applegate.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PARKER, J. The relator as an honorably discharged soldier of the United States, having served as such in the war with Germany, claims the preferential right to appointment as borough clerk of the borough of Red Bank, under the statute of 1919. Pamph. L., p. 290. There is little or no question about the regularity of his candidacy and application for the office. The mayor, whose duty it is to nominate to the office, under the Borough act, refused to nominate the relator on the ground that he did not consider him properly qualified to perform its duties. The relator applied to a justice of this court for, and obtained the present rule, which calls upon the mayor and councilmen to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding and enjoining them to "nominate, ratify and confirm the relator as sole soldier applicant for the office of borough clerk, as borough clerk of the borough of Red Bank," &c.

The act on which the relator's claim is based is an amendment of the body, and intended as an amendment of the title, of the so-called "Veteran act" of 1897. Pamph. L., p. 142; Comp. Stat., p. 4871. That act applied solely to "honorably discharged Union soldiers," i. e., veterans of the civil war who had served on the Union side. It has been passed upon in several decisions, the principal effect of which has been to restrict its operation to the "public service of the State of New Jersey" as expressed in its title. We cite the cases for convenience of reference. Hardy v. Orange, 61 N. J. L. 620; Sutherland v. Jersey City, Id. 436; Conklin v. Freeholders, 62 Id. 168; Kreigh v. Freeholders, Id. 178.