The Works of John Locke, Volumen1

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Thomas Tegg, 1823

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Página 78 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer, in one word, From experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Página 79 - First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.
Página 10 - This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done. 4. What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.
Página lxx - I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
Página 274 - God ; who will render to every man, according to his deeds : to them who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life : but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness ; indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil...
Página lxxi - If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
Página 90 - I suspect, a confused notion taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny.
Página 33 - That men should keep their compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality; but yet, if a Christian who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word ? he will give this as a reason: Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us.
Página 98 - The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding, being muchwhat the same as it is in the great world of visible things ; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being.
Página 235 - I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.

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