GENERAL

WE suppose that no Federal, whether a native of the North or an obsequious advocate of Northern interests in this country, can find any particular gratification in contemplating the group of men who have come to the surface by the revolutions of Time's whirligig in America. The popular idols have been manufactured generally of the very coarsest and commonest clay; and even when permitted to remain on their pedestals, they are objects at least as much of ridicule as of admiration. We observe, indeed, that some English journals preserve, through all vicissitudes, their fealty towards Mr Abraham Lincoln; but we imagine that the admiration they profess is not so much for the individual as for some principle or other, certainly not democratic, which he is supposed to embody. To the eye of Europe in general he presents a rather melancholy spectacle, with nothing, except the honesty of purpose generally ascribed to him, to distin guish him from the swarm of politicians and generals that have been engendered by the corruption of the defunct Union. But there is one man who stands out in honourable distinction from the other public men of the North, remarkable alike for his consistency, his moderation, his singleness of purpose, his eminently respectable personal character, and his abstinence from the practice of those low arts to which men so commonly resort when they wish to gain the suffrages of a democracy: that man is General McClellan. Whether, in addition to his high character as a man, he is also, as his admirers assert, great as a general, is a subject on which, until lately, it was difficult to form an opinion. If success were the test of merit he must be pronounced a failure. But we have now before us, in his Report lately published, the means of knowing whether his plans were well adapted for the

MCCLELLAN.

attainment of their ends, and how far their failure was due to the Federal Government. After being called upon at a desperate crisis to resume the command-in-chief of the Federal armies, he was again deprived of it, his conduct arraigned before a commission of inquiry, and himself consigned to an inaction which, if deserved, would have been dishonouring, and during which he has occupied himself in putting into form, and connecting by a thread of narrative, the official documents and correspondence which he has deemed it necessary for his own justification to publish.

The steps by which men destined to sudden eminence attain the point from whence in great emergencies they at once stride into power, are frequently obscure and unnoticed by the world. McClellan's claims lay, not in his position or rank, for he was only a captain in 1861, but in the character he had established. He was distinguished in the academical course at West Point, and as an officer of known intelligence he was one of the commissioners selected to proceed on the part of the Federal Government to the Crimea, and to report on the different armies in the field before Sebastopol. So little prospect appeared, after his return, of promotion in the United States army, that he almost entirely relinquished the service, and became manager of a public company. There had been nothing in his career to show the world that he was likely to achieve anything beyond an honourable mediocrity. But he had established a reputation among those who knew him as a man of great intelligence and of superior endowments-an opinion shared, it is said, and proclaimed, by men whose names now stand higher than his own, and on less doubtful foundations - such men as Jefferson Davis and General Lee.

In the spring of 1861 he was

selected to direct the operations in a department including Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Western Virginia. In the affairs of Philippi, Rich Mountain, and Carrick's Ford, he had acquired a reputation for skill and conduct which caused the distracted Federal Government, at its wit's end for a general after the disaster of Bull's Run, to grasp at him as the hope of the Union. He was invited, in August 1861, to submit to the President his views of the military and political situation of affairs, and as the document in which he conveyed them is interesting, both in itself and as a key to the mind of the writer, we give it almost at length :

"On the 4th August 1861 I addressed to the President the following memorandum at his request:

"MEMORANDUM.

"The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are usually engaged, mainly in this: That the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous terms. In this contest it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organised forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been spared the labour and expense of a great effort; now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class; now it is with a people. Our military success can alone restore the former issue.

"Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the military action of the Government should be prompt and irresistible.

"The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus directing our main efforts, it is necessary to diminish the resistance there offered us by movements on other points, both by land and

water.

"Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong movement be made on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri.

"As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement through that state into Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the east.

"The possession of these roads by us in connection with the movement on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the mean time all the passes into Western Virginia from the east should be securely guarded; but I would advise no movement from that quarter towards Richmond, tucky renders it impossible, or inexunless the political condition of Kenpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee through that State. Every effort should, however, be made to organise, equip, and arm as Virginia, in order to render the Ohio many troops as possible in Western and Indiana regiments available for practicable, it would be well to protect other operations. At as early a day as and re-open the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

"Baltimore and Fort Monroe should

be occupied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our possession. The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac, in the direction of Leesburg, will be very materially diminished so soon as our force in this vicinity becomes organised, strong, and efficient,. because no capable general will cross the river north of this city when we have a strong army here ready to cut off his retreat.

"For the main army of operations I urge the following composition :250 regiments of infantry, say, 225.000 100 field batteries, 60 guns, 28 regiments cavalry, 5 do. engineer troops,

15,000 25,500 7,500

273,000.

"The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for everything save tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of, from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force to protect the movements of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's seacoast, thus either creating diversions, and rendering it necessary to detach largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favourable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also co-operate with the main army in its efforts to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels.

"It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations. It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such other as the particular case may require. We must endeavour to seize places on the railways, in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Confederate army.

"The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce important results in this connection. That advance, and the progress of the main army at the east, will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to be encountered by each.

[Some political suggestions here.]

The force I have recommended is large, the expense is great. It is possible that a sinaller force might accomplish the object in view; but I understand it to be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish the power of its Government, and to restore peace to its citizens in the shortest possible time. The question to be decided is simply

this, Shall we crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign; or shall we leave it as a legacy to our descendants?

When the extent of the possible line

of operations is considered, the force asked for the main army under my command cannot be regarded as unduly large. Every mile we advance carries us farther from our base of operations, and renders detachments necessary to cover our communications, while the enemy will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. 1 propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and to occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's country, and crush out the rebellion in its very heart.

"By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the difficulties of transportation will be materially diminished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, in addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur. . .

The opening of this memorandum shows that he took a view which, uncommon at the time, was in consonance with reason and fact. It is impossible to read the paper without recognising the moderation, humanity, and good sense of the writer, displayed at a juncture when those qualities were especially rare and valuable. Accustomed as we are to the inflated nonsense of Mr Seward's state papers, and the bombastic reports of other Federal generals, which their deeds have often so little justified, we are the more ready to appreciate the temperate and honourable sentiments of McClellan.

In estimating the military saga. city displayed, we must remember that his are not the opinions of an irresponsible essayist, inconsiderately formed and hastily delivered, but the deliberate judgment of a rising general, called to the councils of the state. On such a paper, if it were submitted to a sagacious ruler, might rest the whole future fortunes of the writer. We may presume, then, that we have here the very ripest conclusions that McClellan could at that time form.

Events have long since proved one of his opinions to be unsound, namely, that the possession of the

roads of Tennessee, in connection with a movement on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining the evacuation of Virginia. The strongholds of the Mississippi have been captured; and not only the roads of Tennessee held, but an army supplied by those roads has moved deep into Georgia: yet the Confederates still defy in Virginia the main army of the Federals.

It might be inferred from his language that he considered it proper to make the first great struggle in Virginia, because the Confederates had chosen it for their battle-field. If so, the reason is quite inadequate, and is, in fact, no reason at all for choosing that line of invasion. To operate in a certain portion of the theatre of war merely because the enemy has already occupied it, is to abandon to him that great advantage in war known as "the initiative," which consists in selecting a line, and compelling the enemy to make his operations subordinate to those of the invader.

There is a vagueness in his sketch of the general plan which seems to show that his mind had failed to grasp as a whole the vast extent of the theatre of war from Washington to Memphis. His plan, too, of seizing and occupying points of the enemy's coast "at any favourable places that opportunity might offer" is essentially unsound; for even on the supposition that the Northern forces greatly outnumbered the enemy, the numerical superiority might be turned by an able general to much better account by concentrating than by dispersing them. But if by "threatening their seaboard cities," he means to employ a single force in making rapid descents on various points, so as to keep many defensive bodies of the enemy in doubt as to the real point of attack, he is indicating, though not with sufficient clearness, the right way of turning to account the great advantage of having the mastery at sea.

His remarks about the railways and the influence of the navigable

rivers on campaigns in the Southern territory, though just, are obvious, and familiar to all students of war; and are only justified in a document like the present by the fact that they were intended for the enlightenment of a President who could not be supposed to know anything of the subject. Regarding this memorandum then as the work of a scientific soldier who had bestowed long and patient thought on a military problem of the deepest interest to him, we must consider it to be deficient in definiteness, distinctness, and originality. But it pos sesses the merit, a very considerable one at that time, of rightly estimating the nature of the struggle and the magnitude of the preparations required for success. We must remember that at this time Mr Seward was designating the Southern Secessionists as "a weak and failing faction," and assigning "ninety days" as the period of their resistance; while the Northern press, recovered from its recent panic, was proclaiming its confidence in Federal prowess in the contemptuous tone (maintained, with a few intervals of frantic terror, down to the present time) with which Goliah of Gath advanced upon his puny foe.

In November 1861 McClellan was placed in chief and general command of the Federal armies, and issued instructions to his subordinates, Burnside, Halleck, Butler, and Buell. In the following February the President desired to commence concerted operations. McClellan proposed to operate in Virginia from the lower Potomac, Lincoln from Washington. McClel lan proceeds to discuss the two plans. The Confederate front at that time stretched from the position of Manassas on the left to below the point where the Occoquan meets the Rappahannock on the right, and it is unnecessary to remind the reader that the roads between Washington and Richmond, and Fredericksburg and Richmond, are intersected by several important rivers.

"Two bases of operations," says 'McClellan, 'seem to present themselves for the advance of the Army of the Potomac.

"1. That of Washington, its present position, involving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c.; or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions; or a combination of the two plans.

"The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks: an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of waggon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right and left.

"Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river and near his batteries, we could, perhaps, prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre (we might destroy the former); we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of waggon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway communication."

He goes on to detail the combinations for this operation; and assuming it to be successful, and the enemy forced to the intrenchments of Richmond, he says:

"The question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory-important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to fight us again out of range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges, and otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be, and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time, than were

we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate and perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared.

2. The second base of operations available for the Army of the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the east.

"The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.

"The country now alluded to is much more favourable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavourable) — much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can only be averted by entirely defeat. ing us in a battle in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels. Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks.

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Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water; our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play.

"After a successful battle our position would be ;-Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg, Buell in East Tennessee and North Alabama, Halleck at Nashville and Memphis.

"The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia, to push Buell either towards Montgomery or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Hal