spirit. It can be no time to recount a man's faults when he lies stretched in dangerous illness; but it may be very right earnestly to inquire what has brought him to that condition-what causes, predisposing to disease, must be eradicated before he can be thoroughly restored, and more especially, how far any course we may take would delay or promote recovery to really sound health.

Another reason for silence has been assigned by those who remind us that we are of the same kith and kin. This, like all sentiment, may be pushed to an undue excess. Relationship is mutual, and its obligations are mutual. We cannot discover where this has been acknowledged by American citizens, save in their eloquence in after-dinner Anglo-Saxon speeches. Such words are valuable in the degree in which facts confirm them. We have received for many years one certain and unvarying treatment-our manufactures have just been virtually prohibited—the largest branch of our commerce is now paralyzed by a deliberate act we are addressed in terms, and visited with threats, which bespeak no manner of affection. The relationship appears to bring to one side considerable indignity and scant justice; must it return to the other nothing but tenderness and love? There has perhaps been enough of this fastidious delicacy, and matters grow too serious for more of it. It may possibly have created a willingness to rely upon it, and to abuse it. We take it to be now our plain duty neither to be

dismayed at the present power of America, nor at that which has already threatened us as a prospect of the future,-nor yet to be disturbed by any virulence of the press, with which that country is afflicted,-nor, furthermore, to be restrained by sentiments which, though responded to in phrases, are denied in facts. We have been invited, nay, vehemently urged, to support the Union, or to sympathize with those who are struggling to restore it. Under these circumstances shall we take its merits upon trust, and continue to believe in them on hearsay; or may we not attempt to form an opinion of our own, whether or not it be for the real welfare of any portion of the United States that the Union should be restored?

We cannot, indeed, dispute the eloquence of the terms in which its advantages have been portrayed. The marvellous progress of the United States seems to confirm these glowing descriptions. We have heard, too, indignant denunciations of rebels and traitors, and our own loyalty has predisposed us to join in the censure, though in the milder spirit of the looker-on. We have heard of the Free, as opposed to the Slave States, and our repugnance to slavery has impelled us towards the voice that was said to be the voice of freedom. We hear the praises of the Constitution, sounding and resounding so loudly, that we fall into a kind of deferential acquiescence, and yield ourselves to be swept along by so irresistible a torrent of applause.

And yet, after all, it may be that the maintenance of a Constitution, which was framed by slave-owners, will afford slender hope of advantage to the slave; and, indeed, it seems possible that the chances of his escape might be better in breaking the walls of his prison, than in rebuilding them. It may prove that the Southern rebels and pirates may be simply following, and for similar reasons, the example of those who have been extolled for the very conduct so reprobated, in others, now. Indeed, we may possibly find that the prosperity of the United States, so dazzling to the eye-their rapid progress and sudden wealth -may arise from local or peculiar causes, and that the Union may have been silently working out effects in the highest degree prejudicial, whilst the vigorous energy of the race, and the glare of apparent success, may have confused our judgment, and diverted attention from the real facts.

In endeavouring to form an opinion of the true value of the Union, one of the first questions that arises in the mind is whether this form of government-that of a Federal Republic-be really permanent in its nature. Were the Union in its former condition, there would be little interest in this inquiry; but severed as it now is, and when so costly an effort is being made to restore it, we naturally ask whether durability may be expected in the future. All experience seems to teach that this form of government can never permanently

endure, except on a very small scale, and under rare and peculiar circumstances. There have been already two Federal Republics in the United States, or, rather, the Union has existed under two Constitutions that bearing the title of " Articles of Confederation," under which the revolutionary war was terminated, and that which followed it, and now exists. The history of Greece affords an example of two Federations, somewhat similar in their principles to the two Constitutions of the Union.

Under the Amphictyonic Council the States of Greece were loosely united in a league, similar to that of the American States under the old Congress. The Grecian republics also retained their individual sovereignty-had equal votes-and the Council was invested with power to declare war and make peace-to decide controversies between the States-to admit new ones into the league, and to promote its general welfare-in short, with all the chief attributes of the Congress in the first Confederation. This was followed in another portion of Greece by the Achæan league, the type of the present Federal Republic. Its members retained their local power and jurisdiction under a Senate, or Federal government, to which were allotted the rights of war and peace, the duty of receiving and sending ambassadors, of making treaties, and of appointing a prætor or president, who administered the federal affairs under the advice of the Senate. The same laws, customs,

measures, and coin were ordained; strangers were admitted to citizenship on equal terms; and the effective nature of the Union may be seen in the fact, that when Sparta joined it she had to alter the laws of Lycurgus for the purpose. In spite of all this, both these Federations failed to endure; and it may be held that they proved of serious injury to Greece, by sustaining the small States in a separate yet ineffective existence; whilst but for this they might have been incorporated with the larger, and so have prevented the civil wars that proved so fatal to the country.

If it be held that the mercurial character of the Greek rendered his government unstable, we have another instance in modern times amongst a people, of all in Europe, the least open to that charge. The united provinces of Holland formed a Federal Republic, under a president, bearing the title of Stadtholder. The confederation had an assembly or congress for general affairs, each province or State having its own legislature for provincial purposes, and enjoying a theoretical sovereignty. The history of this Republic presents on some points a striking analogy to that of the United States. The Dutch not only made a similar commercial progress, but displayed an energy, both in commerce and war, without any parallel in modern history, if the small dimensions of the country, and its many disadvantages are considered. The same features are found in all these cases-great activity in the people, constant intestine commo