names of all the States at length. But on consideration, it was obvious that some might not ratify; indeed, this was expected. Hence, to avoid the inconvenience of reciting those who afterwards might not actually become parties to it, the title was abbreviated. Its true meaning is here plainly seen; and equally plain it is that a mere abbreviation could not alter the intention of the parties.

It has also been endeavoured to impart a peculiar force to this epithet by the deduction that it proved the popular action, and so gave the sanction of its being a direct manifestation of the people's will. The defect in this argument is that of being directly opposed to historical record. It is the fact that after the Constitution was framed by delegates of the States, approved by the Congress appointed by the States, and referred to the Legislatures of the States, it was finally ratified by a Convention called in each State for the purpose. This Convention was elected by such of the people of the State as were then electors, or rather by those of them who cared to vote; for in Pennsylvania, out of seventy thousand voters, it is stated that the majority who voted for ratification was elected by six thousand eight hundred only. The decision, whether to ratify or not, was left absolutely to these Conventions; they acted independently, on their own judgment. Their decision, therefore, was an act of the people, simply as a vote of the House of Commons may

be called an act of the people, and in no other sense. And not only is the argument founded on popular action apart from the fact, but directly opposed to it. Had the Constitution been referred to the popular will, to the general suffrage, as in France, it cannot be doubted that it would have been rejected by a large majority. It was framed by men in advance of their age, desirous to secure the welfare of the people by framing a code, they well knew to be opposed to the popular passions of the day. As we have seen, they sat with closed doors, with precautions to secure secrecy, and with such apprehensions of the difficulty of obtaining popular ratification, as to provide against one-third of the States absolutely refusing to ratify.

Of all the members of the Convention which framed the Constitution, the ablest was, unquestionably, Madison. It may be said it was his calm judgment and indomitable perseverance that eventually achieved success.18 Hamilton was, indeed, the master spirit, but Madison was the able workman. It so happens that we have on record his interpretation of this very phrase. In the ratifying Convention of the State of Virginia, Patrick Henry objected strongly to the words, "We, the people," on the ground that the very construction might be given to them which is attempted at the present day. But Madison at once showed such construction to be erroneous. He replied in these words: "The parties to it were to be the people, 18 See Notes in Appendix.

♦

but not the people as composing one great society, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties." Not contented with giving the true meaning of the phrase, he adduced an argument to prove it by adding: "If it were a purely consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient to establish it. But it was to be binding on the people of a State only by their own separate consent.' This argument seems conclusive; and as an interpreter of the meaning of the terms none will attempt to compare the authority of Mr. Motley, or of Webster, with that of Madison.

We have seen that the modern interpretation of the phrase is contradicted by the rest of the sentence; but a still plainer contradiction will be found at the close of the Constitution. Those who desire to discover who are the parties to an instrument usually refer to the signatures. On doing so, we find the Constitution thus attested : Art. 7. "The ratifications of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution, between the States so ratifying the same." "Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the States present." Here follow the names of each of the twelve States who were parties in the Convention, and under each name those of the delegates who represented and signed for it.

It will be observed that the former of these two sentences contains a remarkable expression; it not

only requires ratification by the States, as States, but describes the Constitution as established, not over the people, but "between the States." In the face of such evidence as this, in the most important part of the instrument, it appears strange that an epithet should be selected from the preamble, a part of the document merely introductory, and an interpretation given it does not bear, in order to disprove that the States are the parties to the compact, whose names, signed for each by its commissioners, appear at the foot of the instrument.

If we turn to the clauses of the Constitution, we find them directly opposed to this theory of a single people or State. Were it founded in fact, the first result, under a republican government, would be uniformity of suffrage. The Constitution leaves it to each State to ordain what suffrage it may please. One State may have the most aristocratic, and another the most democratic, of electoral constituencies, without the slightest power in the Federal Government to interfere with either.

Representatives are allotted in the ratio of population; at first, one to 33,000, now, one to 127,381. Were there but one single State, or people, the division would simply be made throughout, for the difficulties are obvious when the ratio is applied to each State as a separate and distinct population. There are now three States that have not the number required for a single

member; and by the last census, the fraction left over, unrepresented, in the State of Mississippi, is larger than the entire population of the State of Oregon. There is also remarkable evidence on this point. Washington exercised, once, his power to veto an act of Congress. The great inconvenience of the unrepresented fractions, when the divisor is applied to each State separately, led to an act of Congress under which it would have been applied to the population as a whole. This was objected to on the ground that it would tend to obliterate the distinct individuality of the States, and impair the federal character of the system; that, in fact, it was a measure of consolidation. This act was vetoed by Washington, on the express ground that it was opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.

On turning from the House of Representatives to the Senate, we find that each State returns two members to that branch of the legislature, without regard to other attribute, than its distinct individuality. A comparison has been made between this position of the Senate and the House of Lords. The House of Lords does not profess to be a representative institution, or an elected body; the Senate does. This was one of the compromises made in the Convention; the smaller States declined to accede on other terms. In this light, as an unavoidable result of a compact between the States, it is quite intelligible. But it appears incredible that any single community,