ited, that Lutzky had occupied an acre before the platting, and that when the deed was drawn up it was changed to prevent any difficulty as to boundary which the description by lots might create. As they were fully cautioned that whatever public road they found to have been referred to must govern, there was nothing in the instructions which was not, in our opinion, in absolute harmony with the deed.
As the boundary was made expressly by the public road, it indicates an intent to convey according to the rules governing boundaries on highways, and the court was therefore right in so holding, and in extending the ownership to the center.
The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
COOLEY J., and GRAVES, CH. J., concurred.
CHRISTIANCY, J., did not sit in this case.
INDEX TO CASES REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME.
See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 17-19.
The mere writing of the drawee's name across the face of an
order is a sufficient acceptance; and the fact that the words:
"Paid on this order forty dollars were written across the face
of the bill above the signature of the drawee, does not qualify
the acceptance or limit it to that sum.-Peterson v. Hubbard, 197.
See EVIDENCE, 22-24; GIFTS, 2, 4.
A certificate of acknowledgment which, after naming the grantor,
reads, "to me known to be the same person," etc., is not open
to the objection that it fails to show that the grantor was per-
sonally known to the officer.-Brown v. McCormick, 215.
A justice of the peace of one county has no authority to take an
acknowledgment in another county.-Ibid.
See CERTIFICATES, 1-3; DEEDS, 1, 5; REGISTRY, 1.
ACQUIESCENCE.
See MASONIC SOCIETIES, 5.
See PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 1-3.
See HIGHWAYS, 4, 5.
28 MICH.-69.
Whether under our statute (Comp. L. 1871, § 4562) forbidding ex-
ecutors, administrators or guardians, in making sales of land,
from directly or indirectly purchasing, or being interested in the
purchase, and declaring sales made contrary thereto to be void, a
sale to another with the understanding that he should hold for
the benefit of the administrator, to protect his interest as the
largest creditor of the estate, is such an "indirect purchase" by
the administrator as the statute is aimed at, and therefore void,
not only between the original parties, but also, at least where the
administrator's deed has never been recorded, as against a bona
fide purchaser from the nominal purchaser at such sale, as held
by CHRISTIANCY, CH. J., with whom COOLEY, J., concurred; or
whether, on the other hand, this statute is to be considered as a
mere adoption by the legislature of what the courts had thereto-
fore held to be the rule without any statute, and therefore to be
construed as subject to the same qualifications and exceptions in
favor of bona fide purchasers to which the doctrine as before de-
veloped by the courts was subjected, as held by Graves, J., with
whom CAMPBELL, J, concurred :-Quære?-Hoffman v. Harring-
lon, 90.
See EVIDENCE, 28-30; REPLEVIN, 10; TENder, 3.
1. In an action of ejectment, where the defense is long continued
adverse possession, the fact that the land was assessed to plaintiffs'
ancestor, from whom they derived title, at a time when he had
been dead for more than thirty years and when defendant's an-
cestor was paying the taxes, can have no bearing upon the char-
acter of the possession, in the absence of any showing that the
person in possession had any thing to do with having it so as-
sessed.-Dubois v. Campau, 304.
2. The questions to be separately submitted to the jury under the
statute (Comp. L. 1871, § 6026), are required to be "particular
questions of fact" and such as involve legal consequences and
have some controlling force in reaching a conclusion; and a ques-
tion so general as the inquiry, "By what acts did Joseph Cam-
pau claim to hold possession adversely to the plaintiff?" may
well be declined.-Ibid.
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