MUIR v. JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF DETROIT.

surety, as required by the act; and thereupon an order was entered in the cause in the circuit court accepting said security. The bond was in the usual form, except in the condition, and contained the names of the relators as principals and that of their surety as surety, and recited the proceedings for a transfer of the cause, and concluded as follows: "Now the condition of this obligation is such that if the said shall cause to be filed and entered

in the said superior court, on the first day of next term, copies of all papers filed and proceedings had in said cause in the said circuit, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect." In compliance with the condition of the bond, copies of all the papers filed in the cause were filed in the superior court; and the cause was duly noticed for hearing in the latter court and placed upon the docket. Thereupon, on motion of defendants' attorneys, the respondent dismissed the cause from that court for want of jurisdiction by reason of the incompleteness of the bond in not naming the obligors in the condition thereof. The relators then filed a certified copy of this order of dismissal in the circuit court and noticed the cause for trial in that court; but when the cause was reached on the docket the circuit judge declined to proceed with the trial, holding that by the law the cause was removed to the superior court. The relators then moved in the circuit for an order vacating the former order accepting the security offered upon the petition for removal, and the circuit judge refused to hear the motion, holding that by the law all proceedings in the cause in that court were stayed, and that he had no authority to proceed further therein.

The relators now apply for mandamus to compel the respondent to vacate and set aside the order dismissing the cause from the superior court of Detroit.

A demurrer to this application was interposed on behalf of the respondent.

MUIR V.

JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF DETROIT.

L. S. Trowbridge, for the relators.

Moore & Griffin, for the respondent.

THE COURT held that the bond was sufficient, as there could be no mistake from the whole instrument as to who were the parties that were obligated to perform the conditions and cause the papers, etc., to be filed in the superior court; and that after the papers were filed and the conditions of the bond fully performed the bond became functus officio, and any such irregularities in it would not thereafter warrant a dismissal of the cause.

Writ granted.

The People on the relation of Thomas W. Hamilton and others v. The Judge of the Calhoun Circuit Court.

Criminal cases: Bill of exceptions: Motion to quash. A bill of exceptions in a criminal case should embrace every ruling raising a question of law, whether on the trial or in the proceedings preliminary thereto, by which the defendant claims that his rights were in any way prejudiced; and the proceedings upon a motion to quash the information are always proper to be incorporated into the bill of exceptions if required by the defendant.

Heard and decided October 28.

Application for mandamus.

The relators were convicted, in the Calhoun circuit, of arson, and sentenced. They thereupon sued out a writ of error to bring said cause up for review, and tendered to the respondent a bill of exceptions for settlement, and the latter declined to incorporate into the bill certain proceedings and motions in the cause, on the ground that they were no proper or legal part of a bill of exceptions. The

HAMILTON v. JUDGE OF CALHOUN CIRCUIT.

proceedings sought to be introduced into the bill were those had upon a motion to strike from the files a rejoinder to a replication to a plea to the jurisdiction, and to default the defendant for want of rejoinder, a motion for leave to file a second rejoinder, and a motion to quash the information.

Mandamus is now sought to compel the respondent to incorporate such proceedings into the bill.

Brown & Patterson, for the relators.

James A. Miner, Prosecuting Attorney, for the respondent.

THE COURT held that a bill of exceptions in a criminal. case should contain every ruling raising a question of law, whether on the trial or in the proceedings preliminary thereto, by which the defendants claim that their rights were in any way prejudiced; and the proceedings upon a motion to quash the information are always proper to be incorporated into the bill of exceptions, if required by the defendants.

Mandamus granted.

John L. Perkins v. Loftus N. Keating and others.

Appeals in chancery : Final order. An order sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint in a chancery suit, granted by virtue of a stipulation entered into for the purpose of bringing the cause to this court on appeal, without any further decree dismissing the bill, or otherwise disposing of the cause finally, is not such a final order or decree as is appealable under our statute.

Heard and decided October 29.

Appeal in Chancery from Lenawee Circuit.

PERKINS v. KEATING.

This was an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint. This order was granted by virtue of a stipulation entered into for the purpose of taking the cause to the supreme court for a decision upon a question involved in the case. No further decree dismissing the bill, or otherwise disposing of the cause finally, was ever made.

George L. Bachman, for complainant.

L. N. Keating and C. A. Stacy, for defendants.

THE COURT held that the order appealed from is not such a final order or decree as is appealable under the statute.

Appeal dismissed.

Isaac Fewlass v. O. B. Abbott.

Names: Initials: Presumptions. A suit brought and judgment rendered in the name of the plaintiff by initials only for his given name, is not open to objection on that ground, in the absence of any showing that he had any other name; it will not be presumed for the sake of invalidating such judgment that the plaintiff has any other Christian name than the initials used in bringing the suit.

Principal: Surety: Errors that do not prejudice. The discharge of a surety upon certiorari from the circuit to a justice's court, whether erroneous or not, is not open to objection by the principal; it is a matter that does not concern him.

Heard and decided October 29.

Error to Lenawee Circuit.

Defendant in error brought suit in the name of O. B. Abbott, against plaintiff in error, before a justice of the peace, upon a promissory note made by Fewlass, payable to

FEWLASS v. ABBOTT.

O. B. Abbott or bearer. Objection was taken by the defendant that the plaintiff was not named, or properly named, in the process and proceedings, but was overruled, and judgment rendered for plaintiff. The defendant carried the cause by certiorari to the circuit, where the judgment of the justice was affirmed, and judgment rendered against the defendant and his surety. Subsequently, on plaintiff's motion, the judgment was amended so as to release the surety and to hold the defendant alone. To this the defendant excepted. The defendant brought error raising the question of the validity of this amendment, and also the same question mooted by his objection taken before the justice.

George L. Bachman, for plaintiff in error.

C. E. Weaver and A. L. Millard, for defendant in error, were stopped by the court.

THE COURT held that the objection to the name in which the suit was brought by the plaintiff is not well taken; that it will not be presumed for the purpose of invalidating the judgment in his favor, and in the absence of any showing upon the subject, that the plaintiff has any other name than the one used; and that the release of the surety, whether erroneous or not, could in no wise prejudice the defendant or affect his liability as principal, and he will not, therefore, be heard to complain of it.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.