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his administrator, and the notes were transferred by him to plaintiffs to secure them for their liability as sureties on the bond given by J., as administrator of S., and for a judgment or claim for $3,200, which had been obtained against the estate of S. and which had been paid by plaintiffs. Defendant was the son of S. All but two of the notes were non-negotiable.

B. T. Wright, for applt.

M. M. Waters, for respts. Held, That plaintiffs must be deemed to have known that the

Held, That defendant was not discharged from his liability on the notes in suit by this deed, and his sale of his interest in the personal estate, "including his distributive share," implied that he must pay his own debt as going in part to make up that share.

Judgment of General Term, affirming judgment for plaintiffs, affirmed.

Opinion by Finch, J. All con

cur.

COMMON CARRIERS.

notes were assets of the estate and N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL

to have taken them at their peril if the transfer to them was in any respect a misapplication. 7 Johns. Ch., 160. A debtor defending solely in that character could not raise the question as to misapplication. 79 N. Y., 631.

The transfer of the notes to plaintiffs in no manner worked a devastavit.

It appeared that defendant transferred by deed his interest to J., the administrator. The property conveyed was described as "all my right, title and interest of every name and kind in the estate or property of Dann C. Squires, deceased, including all my right, title and interest in the hereinafter mentioned several pieces and parcels of real estate; also all my right and interest in the personal property of said Dann C. Squires, including my distributive share in said personal property."

This transfer contained no assumption by J. of the payment of the notes.

TERM. FIFTH DEPT. Christoph Schwinger, respt., v. Alonzo Raymond et al., applts. Decided Jan., 1885.

Where the owner of a canal boat agreed to

carry barrels of beans on deck, but told the shipper that he did not want to be responsible for their proper covering, as he could not be personally present at the time and place of loading, but would furnish the lumber for that purpose, and the shippers promised that they would attend to the cov ering, but they failed to do so after a reasonable opportunity afforded, Held, That the owner having furnished the lumber, was not responsible for damage to the beans resulting from an imperfect or defective covering, made by the captain, whereby they became wet, etc.

Appeal from judgment entered upon verdict and from order denying motion for a new trial made upon a case and exceptions.

Action to recover the amount of freight due for transporting barrels of beans by canal from Albion to New York. Counterclaim for damages occasioned through plaintiff's negligence in not properly

covering the beans, whereby they | portunity, plaintiff waived perbecame wet and moldy. The proof formance by defendants in that showed that they were to be trans- respect, and was bound to care ported in barrels upon the deck of for their goods as though no spethe boat; that they were to be cial contract had been made. The covered with boards so as to keep court answered that it was unnethem from getting wet; and that cessary, as it was covered by the plaintiff was to furnish the lumber charge made. Exception taken. for such covering. Plaintiff testi- The court had already stated to fied that it was further understood the jury, that if the captain furand agreed that defendants would nished the lumber and defendants see to the covering of the beans omitted to use it and cover the after they were delivered upon the beans when they had the opporboat; that plaintiff said he did not tunity, they could not recover. want to be responsible for the cov- No evidence was given tending to ering of the beans, as he could not show that they were deprived of be there (Albion) in person when this opportunity, but it appeared the beans were loaded. Defend that they left before the loading ants admitted that plaintiff wanted was completed, and neither were them to see the captain and to see present when the boat finally dethat he covered the beans proper- parted. The jury found for plainly, and they promised to do so, tiff and against the counter-claim. but could not for want of lumber Adelbert Moot, for respt. on board. There was a conflict of D. C. Hyde, for applts. testimony as to whether there was any lumber on board. Defendants requested the court to charge, that assuming they agreed to perform or to help perform the labor of covering the beans, and that plaintiff should not be responsible for the manner in which such labor should be done, nor for the protection of the goods by such cover from the elements, and did furnish the lumber, yet defendants were entitled to a reasonable opportunity for performance after the production of the lumber and the proper arrangement of the goods on deck to receive the cover, and if the captain departed without a proper cover, or defendants' consent that they might go uncovered and without giving them such op

Held, That the exception was not well taken; that the verdict was sustained by the evidence, and that defendants were not entitled in law to recover upon the facts adduced. If the lumber was not on the boat, then plaintiff was guilty of a breach of the contract on his part, as he had expressly agreed to furnish it; but if the lumber was upon the boat, then defendants were guilty of a breach of contract in not seeing that the beans were properly covered, and if they suffered damage by reason of their own neglect they have not ground of complaint. The position of defendants, that their neglect to assist in covering the beans did not exonerate plaintiff from his duty as a common carrier to

properly cover them, cannot be maintained; for they knew that plaintiff could not be present at Albion, and that he did not wish to entrust the covering of the beans to the captain, and they expressly promised him that they would look after it and see that the beans were properly covered, and they failed to do so.

Judgment and order affirmed. Opinion by Haight, J.; Bradley and Rumsey, JJ., concur.

PROMISSORY NOTES.

N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. THIRD DEPT. George A. Farnham et al., respts., v. James A. Connors, applt.

Decided Dec., 1884.

Defendant, sued upon his note, set up a lack of consideration. He testified that he hired certain premises for a certain sum, a further sum to be paid if he made any money during his occupation. That he made no money. That, at the end of the term, defendant threatened to injure his credit with a friend unless he gave a note for the further amount; that under these circumstances the note was given. Held, that the note was not given in settlement of a disputed claim, and that the question of consideration should have been submitted to the jury.

Plaintiff sued upon a note. The defenses were infancy and no consideration. Defendant testified that he hired of plaintiffs a stand in a hotel upon this agreement: that he was to pay $100 for the season, and $100 more if he made any money. That he lost money; that, at the end of the season,

one of the plaintiffs asked him for this note of $100, saying that defendant had a friend who had helped him, and that if defendant did not give the note plaintiff would tell that friend that defendant did not pay his debts. That then plaintiff gave the note, saying that he would do so rather than have plaintiff do what he proposed. Plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that defendant had ratified the contract, and of fered in evidence a letter of defendant, asking an extension about the time the note became due, and refused to submit the question of after he became of age. The Court consideration to the jury, and ordered judgment for plaintiff.

E. T. Brackett, for applt.
W. J. Miner, for respts.

Held, Error. The evidence of defendant as to the terms of the agreement was not contradicted. It tended to show that he gave the note, not because he owed plaintiff, but because the latter threatened to ruin his credit with a friend. In this view the note was not given, as respondent claims, in compromise of a disputed claim. For there was no claim. 37 Barb., 152, 157. The asking an extension of time may have been inconsistent, but defendant's version may still have been true. This was for the jury.

Infancy was not made out. The contract was only voidable, and the letter written asking for an extension was a distinct recognition of the existing obligation of the note. The question of considera

tion still remained, and should have been submitted to the jury.

Judgment reversed.

Opinion by Landon, J.; Learned P. J., and Fish, J., concur.

APPEAL. PRACTICE.

where an appeal is taken from a final judgment rendered upon the verdict of a jury, the appeal may be taken upon questions of law. Section 1347 provides for an appeal from an order granting or refusing a new trial, or where it involves some part of the merits of the action, etc. Under this section,

N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL if the appellant desires the appel

TERM. FIFTH DEPT.

Lauren Olmstead, respt., Thomas Reed, sheriff, applt.

Decided Jan., 1885.

v.

If appellant desires the appellate court to review the evidence upon the merits, he is

required to make a motion for a new trial, either upon the minutes of the court, or upon a case and exceptions, and appeal from the order denying the motion. An appeal simply from the judgment brings up for review only questions of law.

Appeal from judgment entered upon verdict of a jury.

The action was instituted to recover the value of certain cattle

late court to review the evidence upon the merits, it becomes necessary for him to make a motion for a new trial, either upon the minutes, under § 999 of the Code, or upon a case and exceptions under § 1002, and appeal from the order denying the motion. 64 N. Y., 236; 14 Hun, 177-8; id., 559-560; affirmed 79 N. Y., 632.

Judgment affirmed.

Opinion by Haight, J.; Bradley and Childs, JJ., concur.

HIGHWAYS.

which defendant, as sheriff, had N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL

seized and sold upon an execution issued upon a judgment against a third party. The appellant contended, on this appeal, that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, but he failed to make any motion for a new trial, either upon the minutes of the court, or upon a case and exceptions at Special Term, but appealed from the judgment simply.

E. M. Walker, for applt. Hoag & Upson, for respt. Held, That the court could not, upon such appeal, review the evidence upon the merits, but could only consider questions of law. The Code, § 1346, provides that

TERM. THIRD DEPT.

In re rebuilding the bridge between Shawangunk and Crawford. Decided Nov., 1884.

A commissioner of highways can lay out a highway only in the manner prescribed by statute, i. e., by order. His acts or words encouraging individuals to construct it and his promise to recognize it officially when completed are not sufficient to estop his town.

Where there has been no official recognition of a highway as such, a user of twenty years is necessary to constitute it a highway which the town is bound to maintain.

Appeal from order directing the commissioner of highways of the town of Crawford to build one-half

A less user than twenty years might bar the owner of the land through which a highway passes, but where there has been no official recognition by the town a user of that length of time is necessary to complete the acceptance so as to constitute the road a highway and to compel its maintenance by the town. 6 N. Y., 257; 37 Barb., 50; 21 N. Y., 274; 51 Barb., 436. Order reversed.

the bridge over the creek fming | way, still the public user in this the boundary line between Craw- case is not of sufficient duration ford and Shawangunk. Laws of to constitute an acceptance by the 1857, ch. 639. The proceeding town. was resisted by Crawford upon the ground that there was no legal highway connected with the bridge. The road in question was opened and worked in 1877, and was a private enterprise at first. In 1881 the bridge built in 1877 was carried away by a freshet. The part of the road in Shawangunk was laid out eventually by an order under the statute made by its commissioner of highways, and this order was recorded. The latter town desires to take the benefit of this order. No order has been made at any time by the commissioner of Crawford. He promised to do so when the road and bridge were completed and by his acts and conversation encouraged the projectors. He died in office and his successor refused to recognize the road officially.

William Vanamee, for town of Crawford.

A, B. Parker, for town of Shawangunk.

Held, That the order was imThe commissioner of proper.

Crawford could only lay out the road by order under the statute. See 1 R. S., pt. 1, ch. 16, tit. 1, § 55. His promise to make the order is not enough. His acts do not amount to an estoppel to the

town.

Opinion by Landon, J.; Learned, P. J., and Bockes, J., concur.

PLEADING. MISTAKE.

N.Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL
TERM. THIRD DEPT.

Hollis Russell, respt., v. Catharine A. Brownell, applt.

Decided Nov., 1884.

Where a complaint states a reason for equitable relief upon the ground of mutual mistake and also upon the ground of fraud, and upon the trial no fraud is shown, the action may be maintained, provided the count for mistake is not dependent upon the allegation of fraud, is sufficient in itself and is supported by proof.

The action was tried by the Court. The complaint alleged and the Court found that defendant represented to plaintiff that she had a plot of land lying between the lines of two patents; that re

Assuming, but not deciding, that the road in the town of Craw-lying on this representation plainford was, by the owners of the land through which it passed, dedicated to the public as a high

tiff deeded a house and lot and received in exchange a deed of said. plot; that there was no such plot,

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