terfering therewith, and appointing a receiver of said property. This action was brought to set aside an assignment for the benefit of creditors, made by one K., and dated January 17, 1884. The assignment was apparently acknowledged by K. on said day, but the certificate of his acknowledgement was irregular, inasmuch as, after stating that K. was known to the notary public to be one of the individuals who executed the assignment, it concluded with the statement, "who severally acknowledged that they executed the same." De fendant, as the assignee of K., acknowledged the execution of the assignment on the 18th of January, but the certificate was defective, for while stating that defendant came before the notary, it contained no statement that he acknowledged the execution of the instrument. Notwithstanding these defects, the assignment was filed and defendant took possession of the property as assignee. On the 22d of February following K. died, and, on March 7, certificates in due form, as to the assignor and assignee, were made by the notary public, and the assignment was again recorded. In June plaintiff was appointed the temporary administrator of K., and in July following commenced this action and procured the order appealed from. It was claimed in behalf of respondent that the defects in the certificates of acknowledgements could not be cured after the death of the assignor, and that the assignment, not having been duly acknowledged, could not be recorded, and being neither ac knowledged nor recorded it was absolutely void, and Smith v. Boyd, Daily Register, February 7, 1884, was relied upon as supporting this claim. John E. Parsons, for applt. A. H. Ammidown, for respt. Held, That it was conceded in the case of Smith v. Boyd, supra, that, if no rights intervened, the assignee might obtain a proper certificate and have the assignment recorded, his title vesting from the time of such record. That it was not pretended that the acknowledgments were not made as required by statute, but that the evidence of it was defective. That after the form of the acknowledgment was made to correspond with the fact and to conform to the statute, the assignment became valid, and, from the time of its record, conferred upon the assignee all the power which such an instrument grants. That plaintiff acquired whatever rights he might possess in reference to the personal estate of K. after the proper record of the assignment, and, consequently, no right of his intervened prior thereto, and, according to the case of Smith v. Boyd, supra, this would be regular. That the decision in that case was adopted only so far as it suggested the feasibility of making corrections in the acknowledgment and then recording the assignment to which the acknowledgment relates. Order reversed, and motion denied. Opinion by Brady, J.; Davis, P. J., and Daniels, J., concur. INSURANCE. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. FIRST DEPT. The People v. The Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. In re application of Carrie L. Young, applt. Decided Jan. 9, 1885. When the person insured by a policy of life insurance in an insolvent company dies during the process of the winding up of the affairs of said company, and within a very short time after the filing of such policy with the receiver for valuation, and before the actuary engaged in calculating the valuations of the policies issued by said company has made his report, and proofs of such death are furnished to the receiver before the making of said report, the policy should be valued as a death claim against the assets of the company and not as an existing and continuing insurance. Upon an application for a re-valuation of a policy, it is in the discretion of the court to make such order as may seem just and equitable. Appeal by Carrie L. Young from an order denying an application made by her for the re-valuation of a policy of life insurance issued by the Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. upon the life of her husband. The Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. was dissolved by an interlocutory judgment in this action, and a receiver of its property and effects appointed, and the policy issued for the benefit of appellant upon the life of her husband was filed with such receiver for valuation. Proceedings were taken to value such policies as were filed Vol. 20.-No. 21. with the receiver, and this was included in them; but before they were completed, or the report of the actuary confirmed, appellant's husband died, and shortly afterward the proofs required by the policy were filed with the receiver and afterwards retained by him. The report of the actuary was subsequently confirmed without notice to appellant, and as the valuation was made upon the policy as an existing and continuing insurance, and not upon the basis of the decease of the insured, appellant applied for an order directing a re-valuation to be made. It appeared by stipulation entered into between the attorneys for the parties. that no embarrassment or confusion could arise in the payment of the dividend previously directed to be paid to other policy holders from the re-valuation of this policy as a death claim against the receiver. John B. Green, for applt. John C. Keeler, for rec'r, respt. Held, That as the person whose life was insured died while the actuary was proceeding with his valuations, and knowledge of that fact was brought to the receiver himself, it seems to have been no more than just and equitable that the re-valuation asked for should have been directed. That by the valuation made appellant became entitled to very much less than the amount she would be entitled to receive upon the policy after the decease of her husband, and that this decease followed so nearly upon the time when the policy was filed with the receiver as to exonerate her from the charge of laches or unreasonable delay in obtaining another insurance upon his life. That it was committed to the discretion of the court to make such order as might appear to be just and equitable in the disposition of this application, 23 Hun, 601; 78 N. Y., 172; 88 id., 77, and that it should have been granted. Order reversed, and order entered directing re-valuation of the policy as a death loss. Opinion by Daniels, J.; Davis, P. J., and Brady, J., concur. INTERPLEADER. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL The New England Mutual Life Decided Jan. 9, 1885. When a person commences an action to recover a sum of money claimed to be due from the defendant, and two other persons also claim the same sum adversely to the plaintiff and to each other, and one of them claims only a portion of such sum, the remedy of the defendant, who makes no claim to the money, is by an action in the nature of an interpleader, and not by a motion under § 820, Code Civ. Pro., to substitute the two other claimants as defendants in the action brought against him. Section 820 of the Code is not applicable to a Appeal from order of Special Term, granting injunction pendente lite restraining defendants from bringing and prosecuting actions against plaintiff. In April, 1881, plaintiff issued a policy of life insurance of $5,000 to K., payable to him at the end of eleven years from its date, or, if he should die before that time, to his executors or administrators. The policy was declared, in case of his prior decease, to be for the benefit of his wife, P. K., if she should survive him. K. died in 1884, having kept up the payment of the premiums on the policy, and leaving his widow, the defendant, Philipena Keller, surviving him. Subsequently the defendant Camp was appointed temporary administrator of the estate of K., and duly qualified. Prior to his death K. made a general assignment, for the benefit of his creditors, to the defendant Buxton. In May, 1884, Mrs. Keller, the widow, brought an action in the Superior Court of the city of New York against the plaintiff, upon such policy, claiming to be entitled to the whole amount thereof. The defendant Camp, as temporary administrator, claimed to be entitled to receive the whole of the sum payable on such policy, and the defendant Buxton claimed to be entitled to receive $2,500 of such sum, as as case in which there are two claimants be- signee of K., on the ground that sides the plaintiff whose claims are not alike, and where there is not only a contest between the plaintiff and the two other claimants, but also one between the claim ants themselves which must also be liti gated before the rights of all the parties can be fully determined. the amount of premiums paid by K. exceeded the limitation imposed by statute, and that the excess belonged to his creditors. This action was therefore commenced for the purpose of bringing these sev of all the parties could be fully determined, and that that contest could not be carried under § 820, and therefore the rights of all the parties in respect of the money could not, in a contingency which might arise, be disposed of in the action brought by the defendant Keller. Order affirmed. eral parties into court to contest | also be litigated before the rights their respective rights, the plaintiff being ready and willing to pay over the amount due on the policy to whomsoever should be adjudged entitled to it and bringing the same into court for that purpose in this action. A motion was made by plaintiff for an injunction pendente lite, restraining the defendant Keller from prosecuting the action commenced by her, and restraining the other defendants from bringing actions, etc. This motion was opposed by the defendant K. upon the ground that this action was unnecessary, as unnecessary, as plaintiff had an adequate remedy by motion, under § 820 of the Code, in the action brought by her to have the other claimants substituted as defendants in that action. Merritt E. Sawyer, for applt. Held, That the case seems to be a proper one for an interpleader, That the case was not covered by the strict letter of § 820, Code Civ. Pro., because the assignee of the deceased policy holder did not claim or assert a demand for the same debt for which the action was brought. That even if that section would bear a construction that would admit the bringing in of both these claimants as defendants in that action, nevertheless the facts in the case presented a different contest than that contemplated by the section. That there was not only a contest between the plaintiff, the widow, and these two claimants, but one between the claimants themselves which must Opinion by Davis, P. J.; Brady and Daniels, JJ., concur. RAILROADS. ASSAULT. N. Y. COMMON PLEAS. GENERAL Paul Graville, respt., v. The Manhattan R. Co., applt. Decided Jan. 16, 1885. The regulation of an elevated railway company forbidding passengers to stand upon the platform is a reasonable and proper one, and if there is room inside the cars which can conveniently be reached, and a passenger refuses a request to leave the platform, the servants of the company may properly and lawfully eject him at the nearest station. But where, on refusal, the conductor undertakes to compel the passenger by physical force to obey the regulation and to go into the car, there being no exigency which requires immediate action, the company is liable for his unjustifiable assault; this irrespective of the question whether there are seats in the car or not. Appeal by defendant from judg ment. The plaintiff was a passenger on one of the cars of defendant company on the 9th of October, 1881. The cars of the train were crowded with passengers, and the plaintiff, with others, stood upon the plat The jury rendered a verdict for the N. Y. COMMON PLEAS. GENERAL plaintiff. Exceptions were taken by defendant to the judge's charge, raising the questions here decided. Deyo, Duer & Bauersdorf, for applt. Max Altmayer, for respt. Held, That the regulation of the defendant forbidding passengers standing upon the platform of the cars is a reasonable and proper one. If there is room inside the cars which can be conveniently reached, and the conductor requests a passenger to go inside, the request is a reasonable one. If the passenger refuses to comply with it the servants of the company may properly and lawfully eject him from the train at any regular station. Such refusal, however, does not give them authority to take hold of a passenger for the purpose of coercing him to go inside the car. Obedience to the regulations of a railway company cannot be compelled by TERM. Boecher, respt., v. Lutz, applt. Decided, Jan. 16, 1885. The defense of a human being justifies the killing of a dog. The owner of an animal may lawfully kill a dog, if such killing be necessary to save the animal from death or from serious injury. If two dogs are fighting, and cannot other wise be separated, the dog that made the attack may lawfully be killed. If it be proved that a dog is accustomed to bite mankind, and that it was upon the highway unmuzzled, and in a condition to do injury to human beings, the killing of it is lawful; and there is no rule of law limiting proof of acts of ferocity to those committed within a year prior to the trial. Appeal by defendant from judg ment. This action was for damages for killing a dog. Judgment was given for plaintiff. There was a conflict of evidence as to whether the dog was killed while attacking the wife of defendant; but it clearly appeared that there were at the time hostilities between plaintiff's dog |