A debt which has been fraudulently contracted, the debtor having obtained credit upon false representations of solvency, becomes due immediately upon the discovery of such fraud, and an action may be commenced to recover it and an attachment issued, notwithstanding the fact that the credit given has not expired at the time of the commencement of such action and issuance of the attachment. Appeal from order vacating attachment. The attachment in this case was issued upon the charge that the defendant had removed and dis posed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors. It appeared by the papers that the debt was fraudulently contracted, the defendant having obtained credit upon representations of solvency that turned out to be untrue. The attachment was order of the defendant V. for certain merchandise, "he, said H., guaranteeing or promising payment therefor." Held, On a motion for that purpose, that the complaint should be made more definite and certain by requiring plaintiff to elect to sue the defendant H. either as a promissor or as a guarantor. Appeal from order denying motion to make complaint more definite and certain. This was an action to recover compensation for goods sold and delivered to the defendant V. The complaint alleged that the defendant V. had applied to plaintiff's assignor for the purpose of purchasing certain merchandise signor had refused to sell the same from him, but that plaintiff's as to H. because he did not deem him to be of sufficient pecuniary responsibility, and that subsequentvacated, however, upon the groundly defendant H. had requested that a part of the claim involved was not due at the time of the commencement of the action. Blumenstiel & Hirsch, for applt. Kurzman & Yeaman, for respt. Held, That when it appeared that the debt was fraudulently contracted the whole of it became due by operation of law. Order reversed. PLEADING. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. FIRST DEPT. plaintiff's assignor to fill all orders given by V., "he, said H., guartherefor." Defendant moved that anteeing or promising payment the complaint be made more definite and certain, and the motion was denied, Charles H. Tweed and Sherman Evarts, for applt. John Cummins, for respt. Held, That the effect of the allegations of the complaint was that the defendant H. either promised to pay or guaranteed the payment of the demand; that the rules of law governing these two forms of Charles Partridge, respt., v. John obligations are entirely different; J. Haley, impld., applt. Decided Oct. 31, 1884. The complaint alleged that the defendant H. requested the plaintiff's assignor to fill an and for that reason the defendant should be advised whether he is sued as a promissor or a guarantor; that the obligation rested upon the plaintiff to make the election. Order reversed and motion delivered by the plaintiff soon Where a judgment has been recovered in an action the attorney has no authority to compromise, satisfy or vacate it without actual satisfaction. When, after a judgment has been rendered setting aside a conveyance of land by a ward shortly after coming of age to her late guardian, the consideration of which was a check given by the latter, the attor ney for the plaintiff, without authority from her, procures the certification of the check, such act on the part of the attorney will not bind the plaintiff, and she cannot be held thereby to have made the check her own and have affirmed the transactions which the action was brought to vacate and rescind, and the endorsement of the certified check by the plaintiff for the purpose of returning it to the drawer is not a ratification of the act of her attorney in causing it to be certified. It seems that the certification of a check will not operate as an appropriation of the funds by the person procuring such certification, when, by so doing, he does not intend to make the check his property, but only to place funds upon which it is drawn in such a condition that they would be subordinate to the result of a pending action. Appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment in this action and for a further trial of the same and for leave to file a supplemental answer. This action was brought to vacate and annul a release and deeds of premises executed and Vol. 20.- No. 14a. after the attainment of her majority to the defendant, who had been her guardian, and an interlocutory obtained which judgment was granted such relief. In the transaction the plaintiff received from the defendant, as the consideration of the conveyance to him, his check for $500, and, after the judgment in the case had been rendered the plaintiff's attorney, in whose possession the check then was, procured its certification by the bank on which it was drawn, without authority from plaintiff, for the purpose of preventing the defendant from withdrawing his funds until the final determination of the action. Subsequently the check in question was endorsed by the plaintiff and tendered to the defendant, who refused to receive it, but made a motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to serve a supplemental answer which proceeded upon the ground that by causing the check to be certified the plaintiff had practically made it her own, and thereby had affirmed the transactions which the action was brought to vacate and rescind. Anthony R. Dyett, for applt. legal proceedings, and therefore had accepted the check when it not within the authority confided to the attorneys by means of their retainer, and the plaintiff therefore was not bound by such act. That where a judgment has been recovered the attorney has no authority either to compromise, or satisfy, or vacate it without actual satisfaction, and the act relied upon in support of the motion was sufficiently of that description to be included within the operation of this rule. 68 N. Y., 528, 540; 36 How., 378, 381; 45 N. Y., 628, 635; 15 How., 539. That it was not intended by procuring the certification of the check to make it the property of the plaintiff, but to place the funds of the defendant in such a condition that they would be subordinate to the final result of the action. That in this respect the case very materially differs from those where the certification of a check has been held to be an appropriation of the amount for which it may have been drawn to the holder as so much money in effect received by him, for they all arose under circumstances where that could very well be held to be the legal result of the certification. That the endorsement of the check by the plaintiff was not a ratification of the act of her attorneys in obtaining the certificate, but, on the other hand, it was an act on her part tending to the restoration of the check to the condition in which it was held before the certificate was obtained, and the endorsement was made with that view, and if the defendant was tendered to him all his rights would immediately have been restored to the control of the funds represented by the check in the bank. That if the judgment had been opened and these additional facts brought before the court they would have produced no different result in the disposition of the action. Order affirmed. Opinion by Daniels, J.; Davis, P. J., and Brady, J., concur. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. INTEREST. N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS. The Mechanics & Traders Natl. Bk., applt., v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y., respt. Decided Dec. 16, 1884. In an action against a municipal corporation on a contract against which several parties had filed claims judgment was rendered for a certain sum, with interest. On appeal the judgment was modified as to the interest included therein. Held, That defendant was chargeable with interest on the principal sum from the date of the judgment and not from the modification thereof. See S. C. Ante, 247. This was a motion to amend a remittitur sent down on a judgment of this court in the above entitled action, entitled action, November 25, 1884. It appeared that judgment was entered in this action, which was brought to recover from the city an amount claimed to be due on a contract against which several parties, who were made defendants, had filed claims May 19, Held, No error; that the court had undoubted discretion to make such order and no injustice was done thereby. Motion denied. Per curiam opinion. All con cur. BLACKMAIL. N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS. 1880, against the city for divers | plaintiff to pay costs directly to sums of money, amounting in the the city. aggregate to $12, 179.78, with $1,614 interest thereon. The city appealed from so much of the judgment as directed the recovery of interest. The judgment appealed from was affirmed by the General Term, and on appeal to this court was modified by striking therefrom all the interest on the various sums ordered to be paid. The remittitur herein simply directs the judgment as entered to be modified by striking therefrom the interest included therein and, as so modified, to be affirmed. The respondents claim that as the judgment is affirmed in respect to the principal sum interest thereon follows as a matter of right from the date of the entry of said judgment. The city claims that it should not be charged with interest prior to the modification of the judgment by this court and seeks to to have the remittitur amended in this respect. The People, respts., v. Thomp. son, applt. Decided Nov. 25, 1884. Defendant wrote a letter to the father of one E. Henry Lacombe, for motion. L. Laflin Kellogg, opposed. Held, That the motion should be denied; that when the judgment at Special Term was entered the time had arrived when the city should have paid the principal To make out the crime specified in § 558, sum, about which there was no longer any dispute, into court, and then the claimants could have obtained it, or compelled plaintiff to give such security upon the appeal as would have secured to them the interest. Instead of ordering plaintiff to pay costs to the claimants, and they to the city, this court ordered Penal Code, it is not necessary to show that the threat was against the person to whom the letter was sent, or that the writer was the one threatening to do the wrongful act. Defendant was indicted under Section 558 of the Penal Code, and convicted of the crime of blackmailing. It appeared that one J. in September, 1878, was arrested for a Also held, That the fact that J. had been discharged on an examination before a justice was not material, as that discharge was no bar to a subsequent indictment and conviction of the crime charged. Nor does it matter that no person in fact threatened or was proceeding to indict J. Certain conversations between defendant and J.'s father, prior to the sending of the letter, in which he made statements similar to those contained in it, and requested money to stop proceedings which he claimed were imminent to indict the son, were received in evidence under objection and exception and were submitted to the jury. criminal offence, upon a warrant | the jury to determine its meaning issued by a justice of the peace, and effect was proper. and after an examination, upon which defendant appeared as attorney for complainant, was discharged. In May, 1883, defendant wrote a letter to the father of J., which purported to come from the office of the District Attorney, and in which he represented that he was a deputy district attorney and that J. was in great danger of being indicted; that defendant had conversed with the District Attorney in relation to the matter, and had so far "killed" it; that it was in his power to stop any such movement; that he desired to make the District Attorney a present, and that if J.'s father would send him $75, or a note for that amount payable in three months, defendant said it would be very acceptable, and added: "At all events, this will save you and your folks some trouble and expense as well as the stink, and show that a friend in the right place is worth something sometimes." At that time there was no complaint against J., and the District Attorney knew nothing about the matter. James A. Lynes, for applt. Clarence L. Barber, Dist. Atty., for respt. Held, That defendant's letter was fairly susceptible of the construction that either he or some one else would proceed to procure an indictment against J., and thus accuse him of crime and expose him and his relatives to disgrace, and a submission of the letter to Held, No error; that these conversations were material and proper, as bearing upon the criminal intent of defendant in writing the letter. To make out the crime specified in § 558 of the Penal Code it is not needful for the prosecution to show that the threat was against the person to whom the letter was sent or addressed, or that the writer or sender of the letter was the one threatening to do the wrongful act. The crime may be committed by one who sends a letter conveying a threat of some other person to do the forbidden acts, provided he sends the letter for the unlawful purpose mentioned in the act; nor is it needful to constitute the crime that the threat should inspire fear or be cal culated to produce terror. No precise words are needed to convey the |