Willis, adm'r, &c., v. Cadenhead. Aikin's Digest. The effect given to Aikin's Digest by the courts was not simply that of affording evidence of what the law was, but of law itself. It has been held by this court to have effected the repeal of pre-existing law. We do not think it could have been contemplated, in the adoption of the constitution, that every thing which becomes a law, as the result of the adoption of a bill, should be read on three several days in the legislature. It would exclude the power of making comprehensive enactments, which legis lative bodies have always exercised, to so hold. The first section of the third article of the constitution is as follows: "The legislative power of this State shall be vested in two distinct branches: the one to be styled the senate, the other the house of representatives, and both together the general assembly of the State of Alabama"; and the style of their laws shall be, "Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama, in general assembly convened." It is contended, that the Code is not the law, because it has not the style prescribed. Conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the adoption of the style is necessary to the validity of an act of the legislature, it will not aid the appellants. The bill adopting the Code is preceded by the words designating the style of the laws, and that is sufficient. It would be impracticable to make the style precede every law called into force by act of the legis lature. The style which heads the bill adopting the Code, may well be regarded as the style of the laws embraced in it. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. WILLIS, ADM'R, &c., vs. CADENHEAD. [PETITION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE OF DECEASED WIFE.] 1. Statute of distribution (Code, § 1990), as to separate estates of married women dying intestate, construed. The provisions of the Code (§§ 1990, 1997), regulating the distribution of the separate estate of a married woman dying intestate, Willis, adm'r, &c., v. Cadenhead. do not apply to separate estates created by deed before the 1st March, 1848, although the marriage took place after that day; and the husband, in such case, takes nothing under the statute. APPEAL from the Court of Probate of Butler. The proceedings in this case were had on the petition of Anna E. Cadenhead. by her guardian, for distribution of the estate of her mother, Sarah A. S. Willis, of which George T. Willis, the surviving husband of the said Sarah, was the administrator. On the hearing of the petition, as appears from the bill of exceptions, "the petitioner proved that the said Sarah A. S. Willis, whose maiden name was King, first intermarried with one Isaac N. Cadenhead, and afterwards gave birth to the petitioner, who is her only living child; that the said Isaac N. Cadenhead then died, and the said Sarah afterwards, on the 3d October, 18: intermarried with the defer d aut, George T. Willis; that the said Sarah died on the 1: July, 1853, and the said defendant administered on her estate on the 26th August, 1853; and that more than eighteen months had elapsed, after the grant of said letters of admin istration, before the commencement of this proceeding." The petitioner then introduced a deed of gift from Henry King, dated October 5, 1845, by which, in consideration of natural love and affection, he conveyed certain negroes to the said Sarah, who was his daughter, "to have and to hold to the said Sarah, in her own separate right, free and exempt from all debts or contracts whatever of any husband she may hereafter marry, and her heirs forever, in fee simple;" "which said deed was regularly proved and recorded as the law directs." She further proved, "that the slaves mentioned in said deed were returned by said administrator as a part of said estate; and that said deed was executed and delivered to her mother at the time it bears date. And the petitioner thereupon insisted, that she was the sole distributee of said estate, so far as the negroes named in said deed are concerned, and entitled to a decree of the court ordering the administrator to deliver them to her as such." "The defendant proved, that he lived with the deceased, as her husband, from the time of their marriage until her death, on the 21st July, 1853; and that said slaves were in Willis, adm'r, &c., v. Cadenhead. the possession of the deceased, under said deed, at the time of his intermarriage with her, and remained in his and her possession until her death. And he thereupon insisted, that said slaves were subject to distribution between himself and said petitioner, and that the court ought to decree that he retain one-half of said slaves." ፡፡ Upon this state of facts, there being, as appeared from the proof, sufficient property, aside from said slaves, to more than pay all the debts of the estate, the court ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the petitioner was entitled to the entirety in said slaves, and that the defendant deliver the same to her; whereupon the defendant excepted." This decree is now assigned as error. WM. P. CHILTON, for the appellant. RICE, C. J.-The provisions of sections 1990 and 1997 of the Code do not apply to the separate estate of a married woman, which was created before her marriage, by a deed executed in 1845, containing a provision that such separate estate should be "free and exempt from all debts or contracts whatever of any husband" she might thereafter marry.-Gerald v. McKenzie, 27 Ala. Rep. 166; Friend v. Oliver, 27 Ala. Rep. 532; Cunningham v. Fontaine, 25 Ala. R. 644; Kidd v. Montague, 19 Ala. R. 618; White v. White, 4 Howard's Practice Rep. 102; Perkins v. Cottrell, 15 Barb. Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; Ratcliff v. Dougherty, 34 Miss. Rep. 181; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) Rep. 311; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. Rep. 1. By virtue of that deed, rights vested in her, which could not be divested, nor impaired, by any subsequent legislative enactment.-Bronson v. Kenzie, 1 How. (U. S. Sup. Ct.) Rep. 311, and other authorities cited supra. And we cannot presume that the legislature, in adopting the provisions of the Code in relation to separate estates, intended to violate the constitution by attempting to impair her rights under that deed. If sections 1990 and 1997 of the Code apply to her separate estate, we think it very clear that sections 1983, 1987 and 1988 would also apply to it; because, we believe the words "separate estate", as used in each of those several Jesse v. Cater. sections, have precisely the same meaning and extent. And it is undeniable, that the legislature had no constitutional power to make the provisions of sections 1983, 1987 and 1988 applicable to her separate estate created by said deed. The fair conclusion is, that the legislature did not intend to apply the provisions of any of the sections above cited to her separate estate; or to any separate estate created by deed prior to the 1st of March, 1848. Upon her dying intestate in July, 1853, leaving her only child and husband surviving, her husband is not entitled to any part of such separate estate under section 1990 of the Code, or any other statute provision; but all of such estate, after the payment of the debts and charges against the estate, belongs to her child, under sections 1572 and 1581 of the Code. The counsel for the appellant has not argued any questions except such as are, in effect, decided adversely to appellant by the propositions above laid down. And as we are satisfied there is no error in respect to those questions, we affirm the decree of the probate court. JESSE vs. CATER. [ACTION ON INJUNCTION BOND-PLEA OF ARBITRATION AND AWARD.] 1. Error without injury in overruling demurrer to several pleas of which one is good.— 2. Conclusiveness of judicial decisions.-When a case is brought to the appellate 28 475 132 322 Jesse v. Cater. matters in controversy between them, and the agreement contained a stipulation "that the award of the arbitrators, made in pursuance of this agreement, shall terminate and forever decide all matters of controversy, at law or in equity, in relation to the said livery-stable": Held, that the right of action at law on the injunction bond, though it might not be included in the subject-matter to be directly decided by the arbitrators, was nevertheless to be settled by the award; and that, consequently, after the award was made, an action at law could not be maintained on the injunction bond, unless the award was not binding. 4. Plea averring arbitration and award.-In an action on an injunction bond where the matters in controversy in the injunction suit were submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrators awarded that certain acts should be done by the parties concurrently, a plea setting up the submission and award must aver performance on the part of the pleader, or an offer to perform, or a good and legal excuse for the omission to do either. 5. Award construed. In awarding an exchange of lots, the arbitrators directed that the parties "can and do make" to each other respectively "a feesimple title": Held, that the conveyances were to be executed concurrently; that a 66 fee-simple title" meant a good title; that the award did not ascertain that the defendant then had the title to the lot which he was to convey, but that he could procure it; and that his failure to procure the title was a good and legal excuse for the plaintiff's failure to perform. 6. Estoppel by submission and award.-Where a submission to arbitration is made under an order of court, and the award entered up as the judgment of the court, a party is not thereby estopped from pleading any matter not necessarily within the scope of the award. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Dallas. This action was commenced in February, 1853, and was founded on an injunction bond, the condition of which, as alleged in the complaint, was, "that if the said Jemima M. Cater, or her sureties for her, or her or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, shall pay to the plaintiff, his executors, administrators, or assigns, all costs, loss, or damages, that he may or shall sustain by the illegal, wrongful, or improper suing out of an injunction from the 19th chancery district, State of Alabama, by which said plaintiff was restrained from erecting a livery-stable in the town of Selma." The declaration alleged, that the condition of said bond was broken, in this: 1st, that said injunction was dissolved at the November term, 1852, of said chancery court, and the plaintiff's bill dismissed, and that great damage accrued to the plaintiff in consequence of said injunction and suit, which the |