Cranch C. C. 342.) If not reasonable, the trial may be postponed to give the party an opportunity to procure the evidence. (Geyger v. Geyger, 2 Dall. 332; Bank of U. S. v. Kurtz, 2 Cranch C. C. 342.) The power to grant the motion is discretionary, but should be firmly exercised in a proper case. (Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. 201.) The court may at once either refuse the motion or make the rule absolute (Dunham v. Riley, 4 Wash. C. C. 126), and where an intent to conceal or destroy the books or papers is shown the order should be made without delay, and absolute; but if there is no suggestion of fraudulent intent, and the evidence as to their pertinency is not satisfactory, the order nisi should be made. (Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. 201.) The order need not be absolute, but may leave the party to show cause at the trial. (Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. 201; Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401; Dunham v. Riley, 4 Wash. C. C. 126.) Where the motion is made before trial, the order must require the production of the books at the trial (Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. 201; Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401; but see Central Bank v. Taylor, 2 Cranch C. C. 427), and it may require him to produce them and leave them with the clerk, or furnish copies to the adverse party (Jacques v. Collins, 2 Blatchf. 23); but the word "require" does not include the power to compel compliance (Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. 201); as the penalty for a failure to produce a paper is nonsuit or default (Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401), and a motion for non pros for failing to produce may be made even after the jury is sworn. (Waller v. Stewart, 4 Cranch C. C. 532.) A party cannot be compelled to produce a paper which would subject him to a penalty or a forfeiture. (Finch v. Rikeman, 2 Blatchf, 301; U. S. v. Packages, Gilp. 306.) The order must be served a reasonable time before the production of the paper is required. (Macomber v. Clarke, 3 Cranch C. C. 347.) It is premature before the jury are sworn and the trial commenced for either party to call upon the other to produce a paper which he has received notice to produce on the trial. (Hylton v. Brown, 1 Wash. C. C. 298.) He has no right to examine them before trial

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to discover if there is in them anything pertinent to the issue (Triplett v. Bank of Washington, 3 Cranch C. C. 646); but the books must be produced at the trial, or an excuse given under oath for not producing them (U. S. v. Barrels, 10 Int. Rev. Rec. 205); so he may make oath that they are not in his possession (U. S. v. Packages, Gilp. 306; Macomber v. Clarke, 3 Cranch C. C. 347); and such oath may be met by contrary proof. (Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 381.) If the omission to produce the books arose from oversight, the case may be postponed to allow time to procure the affidavit of the party. (U. S. v. Barrels, 10 Int. Rev. Rec. 205.) If by affidavit he explains how the paper came into his possession, the court may order the affidavit put in evidence with the paper. (Bank of U. S. v. Wilson, 3 Cranch C. C. 213.) If a party inspects a book after its production, it may be used as evidence by the adverse party. (Waller v. Stewart, 4 Cranch C. C. 532.) After removal of a cause from a State court, the circuit court should enforce an order made in the State

court for the production of books or papers. (Williams Mower Co. v. Raynor, 7 Biss. 245.) This section applies as well to cases arising under the revenue laws (U. S. v. Hughes, 12 Blatchf. 553; U. S. v. Distillery, 6 Biss. 483) as in a proceeding to enforce a forfeiture under these laws. (U. S. v. Mason, 6 Biss. 350.) There is nothing in this section to prevent government from seizing and examining the books of a distiller to ascertain some fact that will sustain a charge. (U. S. v. Mason, 6 Biss. 350.) A description is sufficient which calls for the production of books and papers of a certain business between specified dates. (U. S. v. Distillery, 6 Biss. 483; U. S. v. Three Tons, 6 Biss. 379.)

§ 245 (725). Power to impose oaths and punish contempts.-The said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority; provided, that such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any

cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts. (Rev. Stats. sec. 725.)

Disobedience or resistance to orders, etc.—The exercise of the power to punish for the disobedience of an order has a two-fold aspect: first, to punish for disrespect of the court, and second, to compel performance of the duty required; in the first case the court must judge for itself as to the punishment; in the latter the party should be imprisoned till he performs the act required (In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157), and the Federal court may commit for contempt, although it has not jurisdiction over the cause. (Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. St. 9.) Where the order is in effect a final judgment for payment of money, the power of the court cannot be enforced (In re Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Bank. Reg. 368; The Blanche Page, 16 Blatchf. 1); and a person who merely interferes with property constructively attached cannot be proceeded against. (Steam Stone Cut. Co. v. Windsor Manuf. Co. 3 Fed. Rep. 298.) An interpreter or expert refusing to obey a summons will not be committed except in case of necessity. (In re Roelker, 1 Sprague, 276.) The power to summon a witness carries with it the power to enforce obedience; and if he lives within a hundred miles of the court, he may be attached for contempt for refusing to obey the subpoena. (Voss v. Luke, 1 Cranch C. C. 331; Hodgson v. Butts, 1 Cranch C. C. 447; Somerville v. French, 1 Cranch C. C. 474; U. S. v. Williams, 4 Cranch C. C. 372; see Woods v. Young, 1 Cranch C. C. 346; Park v. Willis, 1 Cranch C. C. 367; Lewis v. Mandeville, 1 Cranch C. C. 360; Ex parte Pleasants, 4 Cranch C. C. 314; U. S. v. Jacobi, 4 Am. L. T. 148.) He may be attached for contempt, although he lives out of the district (U. S. v. Williams, 4

Cranch C. C. 372); but sickness of himself or family will be an excuse (Ex parte Beebees, 2 Wall. Jr. 127); or in case of great inconvenience. (Ex parte Beebees, 2 Wall. Jr. 127.)

Contempt. The power to punish for contempt is incidental and necessary to the exercise of all other powers. (U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 401.) A contempt of court is a crime against the United States (U. S. v. Jacobi, 4 A. M. L. T. 148); and if willful may be dealt with by indictment. (U. S. v. Jacobi, 4 Am. L. T. 148.) This section applies to the circuit and district courts. (Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 506.) The power to commit for contempt is limited to cases where there has been misbehavior in presence of the court, or of any officer of the court in his official transactions, or where there is a resistance to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the court. (Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall, 506; Bridges v. Sheldon, 18 Blatchf. 518.) A proceeding for contempt cannot be reexamined on appeal or writ of error. (Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121.) This section is a limitation upon the manner in which the power to punish for contempt shall be exercised. (Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 506.) The circuit courts have power to punish for contempt for any disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of the said courts. (R. S. sec. 725; 1 Stat. 83; 4 Stat. 487; Re Terry, 128 U. S. 287.) The right of a citizen of one State to institute proceedings in a United States circuit court situated in another State, to punish for contempt citizens of the latter State who have disobeyed a decree of such court in the enforcement of which the petitioner has an interest, is a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stats. secs. 5508, 5509, which provides a punishment for conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate a pesron in the exercise of such rights. (United States v. Lancaster, 10 L. R. A. 317; see Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; 44 Fed. Rep. 885, 896.)

In presence of the court. It is a contempt of court

for a person acquitted of a crime to threaten vengeance on a witness within the possible hearing of the court (U. S. v. Carter, 3 Cranch C. C. 423); or to use abusive language in the court-room (U. S. v. Emerson, Cranch C. C. 188); or to commit an assault and battery at the entrance to the court-room (U. S. v. Emerson, 4 Cranch C. C. 188); or for a witness to refuse to be sworn according to law (U. S. v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. 364); or to refuse to answer a question and misbehave before the jury (U. S. v. Caton, I Cranch C. C. 150); but it is not a contempt to serve a summons on a suitor while he is in actual or constructive presence of the court. (Blight v. Fisher, Peters C. C. 41.)

Out of presence of court. --If an officer does not obey an order directing him to pay over money received in his official capacity, it is a contempt of court. (In re Pittman, 1 Curt. 186; Bagley v. Yates, 3 McLean, 465.) So where money is collected by a deputy marshal ex officio (The Lawrens, 1 Abb. Adm. 508; U. S. v. Manu, 2 Brock. 1; Bagley v. Yates, 3 McLean, 465); but the marshal is not responsible (Bagley v. Yates, 3 McLean, 465); and if proceedings are instituted for fees collected by an officer, his claim for fees for services rendered may be set off. (U.S. v. Mann, 2 Brock. 1.) If an attorney collects money for his client, and refuses to pay it over, he is liable for contempt (In re Paschal, 10 Wall. 483); but if he has crossdemands, and has not acted dishonestly, he is not liable (In re Paschal, 10 Wall. 483), and courts cannot disbar him for the contempt, but may do so for misconduct. (Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 506.) A person summoned as a juror, expressing an opinion for the purpose of disqualifying himself is guilty of a contempt (U. S. v. Devaughan, 3 Cranch C. C. 84); or for disobeying orders of court as to conversing with others about the case (In re May, 1 Fed. Rep. 737); or for escaping out of a window of the juryroom. (Offutt v. Parrott, 1 Cranch C. C. 154.)

$246. Occupants of lands, remedies for improvements. -- When an occupant of land, having color of title, in good faith has made valuable improvements thereon, and is, in the