6 Sawy. 451.) Statutes discriminating in the remedies under the law against non-residents are void. (Pearson v. Portland, 69 Me. 278.) Whenever the law operates alike upon all persons and property similarly situated, equal protection cannot be said to be denied. (Walston v. Nevins, 128 U. S. 578.) State legislation simply forbidding a defendant to challenge the validity of service upon him, and which does not restrain him from protecting his property and rights, is not forbidden. by this amendment. (Kauffman v. Wooten, 138 U. S. 285.) A statute providing for a more severe punishment of ex-convicts for the same offenses than of those not heretofore convicted does not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. (Re Boggs, 45 Fed. Rep. 475.) This constitutional provision applies to_corporations. (Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. R, Co., 118 U. S. 394.)

Due process of law; what is.-Due process of law simply requires that a person should be brought into court and have an opportunity to prove any fact for his protection. (People v. Essex County, 70 N. Y. 229; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 57, 609.) It is such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for protection of individual rights as th.se maxims prescribe, and is identical with "due course of law." (Beyman v. Black, 47 Tex. 558; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509.) It means the regular course of administration of the law through courts of justice by timely and regular proceedings to judgment and execution, according to the existing forms of the law. (Dwight v. Williams, 4 McLean, 586; Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 18 How. 272; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 122; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters 658; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 662; Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 48); State v. Becht, 23 Minn. 413; Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113, Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202; Re Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 331; Wynelamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 333; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. L. 15; Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & S. 171; James v. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 21; Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Wis. 71; Rowan v.

State; 30 Wis. 129; Fetter v. Wilt, 46 Pa. 460; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 413.) It does not necessarily import a trial by jury, but includes summary remedies. Martin v. Mott; 12 Wheat. 19; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Re Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 317; Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., supra; see notes to Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Jud. 1; Chauvin v. Valiton, 8 Mont. 451; Jensen v. Union Pac. R. Co. (Utah), 4 L. R. A. 724; Re Gannon (R. I.), 5 L. R. A. 359.) A State statute forbidding the granting of more than two new trials in the same cause on the facts, but allowing more for errors of law, is not in violation of the provision. (Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U. S. 614.) So a statute providing for the arrest of a defendant upon failure to comply with a decree a rainst him does not violate this provision. (x parte Murray, 35 Fed. Rep. 496.)

Notice essential.-A proceeding where one's property is summarily disposed of is, as to parties not having notice, not due process of law. (Re Ludwigson, 3 Woods, 13; Lavin v. Emigrant Ind. Sav. Bank, 18 Batchf. 1.) Notices provided by statute may be sufficient to constitute due process of law, although not addressed to the persons whose property is affected by name, and although the property was not specifically described. (Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404. See Re Application of New York, 99 N. Y. 580; Ottawa v. Macy, 20 Ill. 413.) Notice is insufficient if it fails definitely to express the kind of improvement to be made. (Hawthorne v. East Portland, 13 Ör. 271.)

Opportunity to be heard must be given.—Opportunity to be heard, when accorded by statute, is sufficient to constitute due process of law. (Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404.) Due process of law means in due course of procedings, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Peerce v. Kitzmiller, 19 W. Va. 564; Burns v. Muitnomah R. Co., 8 Sawy. 543; St. Louis v. Richeson, 76 Mo. 470.) Where individual rights are concerned a party is entitled to be heard, and it is not enough that some notice or information may be given; the law must itself provide for notice. (Kuntz v. Sumpton, 117 Ind. 1.)

§ 11. Judges, terms of office, compensation.-The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated time, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (U. S. Const. art. 3, sec. 1, cl. 2.)

Tenure of office.-Congress cannot limit the tenure of judicial offices, or diminish the compensation, or alter the stated time for payment. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.) Judges of courts established by Congress must be appointed to hold office during good behavior. (Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 410, note; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How 49; U. S. v. Todd, 13 How. 52.) The fees allowed to justices of the peace in the District of Columbia cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. (U. S. v. More, 3 Cranch, 160, note.) Territorial courts being erected in the exercise of the general sovereignty of the United States over territory it may own, their judges may be appointed for brief terms. (Amer. Ins. Co. v. Can er, 1 Peters, 516.) This case prohibits the imposition of a tx on the salary of a judge. (Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 Watts & S. 415.) Judges cannot be required to perfor n any but judicial functions. (Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 410, note; U. S. v. Todd, 13 How. 52, note; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 49.)

§ 12. Supreme law of the land.--This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. (U. S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.)

FED. PROC.-5.

Constitution and acts of Congress.-The object of this Constitution was to establish a government which to the extent of its powers should be supreme within its sphere of action (Dobbins v. Commrs. of Erie Co., 16 Peters, 435; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 520; 3 Wis. 1; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; U. S. v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U. S. 44; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.) The Constitution of the United States is the paramount law of the land, and the ordinance of 1787 is a part thereof. (Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Peters, 628; New Jersey v. Wilton, 7 Cranch, 164; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366; Matter of Romaine, 23 Cal. 585; Pollard v. Kibbe, 14 Peters, 417.) The Constitution, treaties, and laws made by the General Government on the rights, duties and subjects specially enumerated and confided to their jurisdiction are exclusive and supreme as well by express provisions as by necessary implication. (Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Farmers & M. Bank v. Deering, 91 U. S. 29; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 685; Pensacola T. Co. v. West U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1; Sims' Case, 7 Cush. 729; U. S. v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U. S. 44.) The Constitution is by this clause made a part of the organic law of each State. (Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 356; Matt. of Romaine, 23 Cal. 585.) The Government of the United States and that of the States are to be considered as parts of the same system. (Stearns v. U. S., 2 Paine, 350; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229.) The laws of the United States are supreme only when made in pursu ance of the Constitution. (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; McCulloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316.) And an act of Congress repagnant to the Constitution is void. (Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 137; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 520, 3 Wis. 1.) From the supremacy of the constitution and laws of the United States it neces arily results that the interp etation of the laws by the highest tribunal created by the law itself, must be equally supreme over the constitutions and laws of the several States. (Warner v. The Uncle Sam, 9 Cal. 697.) The law of a State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, if they interfere with the laws of Congress must yield to them. (Gibbens v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150;

Brown v. State, 12 Wheat. 419; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black, 620; 23 N. Y. 192; 32 Barb. 509.

Treaty as supreme law.-A treaty is a solemn agreement between nations. (Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 314; Worcester v. State, 6 Peters, 515; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. 454.) It has the binding force of law (The British Prisoners, 1 Wood. & M. 72; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 449); and binds the courts as much as an act of Congress. (United States v. The Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103.) It binds the nation in the aggregate and all its subordinate authorities and judges of every State. (Ware v. Hylton, 2 Dall. 199; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 176; Worce ter v. Georgia, 6 Peters, 575; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Owings v. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 348; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 413; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 399; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 329; People v. Gerke, 4 Amer. L. R. 604; 6 Op. Att.-Gen. 291; Fellows v. Denniston, 23 N. Y. 420.) When duly ratifiel it is the law of the land. (Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366; Pollard v. Kibbe, 14 Peters, 414; Doe v. Branden, 16 How. 635; Wilson v. Wall, 34 Ala. 288; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.) It is supreme only when made in pursuance of that authority which has been conferred upon the treaty-making department, and in relation to subjects over which it has jurisdiction. (People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 23; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. 454; Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine, 688; Wilson v. Wall, 34 Ala. 288.) It is to be regarded as equivalent to an act of Congress whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision; an l where a treaty and an act of Congress are in conflict, the latest in date must control. (Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 314; U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 601; U. S. v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 51; Gordon v. Kerr, 1 Wash. C. C. 322.) Whether an act of Congress shall prevail over a treaty is a question solely of municipal law, as distinguished from public law. (Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. 454.) Federal and State judges are bound to determine any constitution or laws of any State contrary to any treaty null and void. (Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199; Society v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464.) If the Supreme