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235; Parsons v. Armor, 3 Peters, 415; U. S. v. Pathbone, 2 Paine, 578.) The inhibition contained in this article refers to suits at common law alone, and not suits in admiralty, although the courts of common law have a concurrent jurisdiction (Warring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 89; U. S. v. Bright, Bright. N. P. 19; Bains v. The James & Catherine, Bald. 544), in which suits in admiralty the trial is never by jury (U. S. v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Margaret, 9 Wheat. 421; The Betsey, 4 Cranch. 443; Whelan v. U. S., 7 Cranch, 112; U. S. v. The Queen, 4 Ben. 237; Clark v. U. S 2 Wash. C. C. 519; U. S. v. Irma, 12 Int. Rev. Rec. 42), nor does the provision embrace the established exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity (Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 353; Woodworth v. Rogers, 3 Wood. & M. 135; Ely v. M. & B. Manuf. Co., 4 Fish. 64; Scott v. Bilgerry, 40 Miss. 199; Motts v. Bennett, 2 Fish, 642), nor to a proceeding under statutory provisions and forms specially provided (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 3 Wis. 157; Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean, 469; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348); or a proceeding to assess damages. (Bonaparte v. Camden R. R., Ball. 205.)

The first clause of this amendment relates only to United States courts. The States are left free to regulate trials in their own courts. (Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294; McLane v. Leicht, 39 Iowa, 401; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90.) The Constitution does not confer, but simply preserves inviolate where it existed already, the right of trial by jury. (McBride v. Stradley, 103 Ind. 465; Seeley v. Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 1.) The wager of law, if it ever had a legal existence in the United States, is completely abolished by the constitutional provisions for trial by jury. (Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheat. 642.) The right to trial by jury thus secured by the Constitution cannot be impaired by blending with a claim cognizable at law a demand for equitable relief. (Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106.) The remission of a part of the verdict, followed by a judg ment for the remainder, as a condition of the denial of a new trial, does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to have the question tried by a jury in violation of this amendment. (Arkansas Valley Land &

Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69.) On the trial of an equity case, a jury may be called into court in its discretion and issues be submitted to it. (Wilson v. Riddle, 123 U. S. 608. See also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408; Ex parte Wood, 9 Wheat. 603; Killian v. Ebbinhaus, 110 U. S. 568.)

Waiver of jury.-Parties may by stipulation waive a jury and submit the case to the court. (United States v. One Hundred Barrels Distilled Spirits, "Henderson's Distilled Spirits," 14 Wall. 44; Ryan v. Riverside & O. Mills, 15 R. I. 436; Chicago R. R. Co. v. Hock, 118 Ill. 587; Pike v. Martindale, 91 Mo. 268; Dole v. Wooldredge, 142 Mass. 161.) It may be waived by stipulation of the parties. (Bamberger v. Terry, 103 U. S. 40; Wayne v. Kennicott, 103 U. S. 554; Rev. Stats. sec. 649.) The right to a jury trial may be waived by express agreement in open court, and by implied consent. (Dunlop v. Zunts, "Moncure v. Zunts," 11 Wall. 416; Kearney v. Case, 12 Wall. 275; Richmond v. Smith, 16 Wall. 429.) Such a waiver sufficiently appears if the record declares that the cause was called for trial by the court, "the jury having been waived in writing." (Fleitas v. Cockrem, 101 U. S. 301.) A party present by counsel who goes to trial without objection or exception, voluntarily waives a jury trial, but if not present by himself or counsel, it is error for the court to try the case. (Kearney v. Case, 12 Wall. 275; Baylis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 U. S. 316; Morgan v. Gay, 19 Wall. 81.) But such error cannot be taken advantage of collaterally. (Maxwell v. Stewart, 21 Wall. 71; 22 Wall. 77) Trial by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people; consequently, every reasonable presumption should be indulged against its waiver. (Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408.)

Right, when not to attach.-This section does not apply to a motion for summary relief (Banning v. Taylor, 21 Pa. St. 289), as that judgment may be entered against the surety on an appeal bond (Hiriart v. Ballou, 9 Peters, 156), or a judgment by default for failure to produce books and papers (U. S. v. Distillery, 8 Chic. L. N. 57), or for judgment on a forfeited recognizance (People v. Quigg, 56

N. Y. 83); nor does it apply to preliminary inquiries which do not involve a trial of the merits (Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348), nor to cases where the facts are conceded (U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. 210), nor to a proceeding to annul the license of a pilot (Low v. Commissioners, Charlt. R. M. 302), nor to the imposition of a fine for failure to comply with the inspection laws (Green v. Savannah, Charlt. R. M. 368), nor where there is default in proceedings under confiscation laws, in a seizure on land (Miller v. U. S. 11 Wall. 268); but in an information in rem, the claimant is entitled to a trial by jury. (U. S. v. Barrels, 1 Bond, 587; U. S. v. Distillery, 8 Chic. L. N. 57; U. S. v. Packages, Gilp. 235.) A trial by referees without the consent of the parties is not sanctioned (U. S. v. Rathbone, 2 Paine, 578); so a nonsuit cannot be ordered in any case without the consent of the plaintiff. (Etmore v. Grymes, 1 Peters, 469; D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Peters, 476.) A statute appointing commissioners to determine titles, and making their award final, does not takeaway the right of trial by jury (Barker v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 559); but the State legislature cannot direct the Federal courts, in a trial at common law, to appoint commissioners on questions which should be submitted to a jury. (Green v. Bidd'e, 8 Wheat. 1; Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Peters, 492; Rev. Stats. sec. 649.)

Re-examination of causes.-The second clause of this article is substantial and independent, and applies to cases coming into Federal courts from State courts, and protects the verdicts rendered therein. (Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274.) The only mode of review is on motion for a new trial. (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433; U. S. v. Wonson, 1 Gall. 20; Patrie v. Murray, 43 Barb. 323, 29 How. Pr. 312; Wetherbee v. Johnson, 14 Mass. 412.) Since this amendment Congress cannot confer authority to grant a new trial by a re-examination of the facts tried by a jury, except to redress errors of law. (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433; Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Peters, 492.) An act of Congress, so far as it authorizes the removal of causes after verdict, is in violation of this amendment. (Benjamin v. Murray, 28 How. Fr. 193; Patrie v. Murray, 43 Barb. 323; 14 Mass. 412;

and see Spencer v. Lapsley, 20 How. 264; People v. Murray, 5 Park. C. C. 577.) No review of the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial can be had, under Rev. Stat. sec. 649, unless the record shows that a written stipulation waiving a jury was filed with the clerk. (Kearney v. Case, 12 Wall. 275.)

§ 9. Bail-Fines-Punishments.-Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. (U. S. Const. Amend. art. 8.)

Bail. This provision applies to national and not to State legislation. (Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters. 243; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 480; James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. 220; Barker v. People, 3 Cowen, 686.) The Supreme Court cannot on habeas corpus revise the sentence of an inferior court on the ground that the fine was excessive. (Ex parte Watkins, 7 Peters, 568.) The constitutional right to bail is not operative after trial and conviction. (Ex parte Schwartz, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 74.)

§ 10. Equal protection of the laws.— All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Const. U. S. Amend. 14, sec. 1.)

Constitutional law; protection of property rights.-Depriving a person of his property without notice and without examination of witnesses is in contravention of the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing pro

tection to property rights. (Sullivan v. Oneida City, 61 Ill, 242.) That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, is a principle of natural justice. (Brown v. Morrison, 5 Ark. 217.) Permitting a plaintiff to file a bill in chancery as an amendment to his declaration at law, according to the settled course of judicial proceedings in the State, is not a violation of the provision of the United States Constitution, that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. (Holman v. Manning (N. H.) March 14, 1890.) See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 92, where by the practice in that State amendments may be made at any stage of the proceedings, if justice requires. (Morse v. Whitcher, 64 N. H. 591; Metcalf v. Gilmore, 59 N. H. 417; Walker v. Walker, 63 N. H. 321, 326; Brooks v. Howison, 64 N. H. 382; Owen v. Weston, 63 N. H. 599; Tasker v. Lord, 64 N. H. 279.)

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Equal protection of the laws.-This clause applies to all cases where the equal protection of the laws is denied to defendant. (Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313.) Equal protection of the laws," as here used, means equal right to resort to courts for the redress of wrongs and enforcement of rights, and exemption from unequal burdens or exactions of any kind. (Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 722; 8 Sawyer, 238; 18 Fed. Rep. 385.) Congress cannot provide for punishment of individuals conspiring to deprive others of equal protection of the laws; this clause is aimed at State legislation only (U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629); nor does it relate to territorial or municipal arrangements for portions of a State. (Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22.) A State statute discriminating between Chinese and other aliens is void, as denying them the equal protection of the laws. (Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566; Parrott's Case, 6 Sawy. 349.) So, a statute forbidding employment of Chinese is void. (Parrott's Case, 6 Sawy. 349.) A city ordinance requiring prisoners' hair to be cut, being a more degrading punishment as to Chinese than to other aliens, discriminates as to the former, and is void. (Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552.) A law prohibiting aliens incapable of becoming citizens from fishing in State waters is discriminating and void. (23Ah Chong,

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