erty is guaranteed by the fundamental law. (Commonwealth v. Bacon, 13 Bush, 214.) All property is held under the implied liability that its use shall not be injurious to others. (Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 18 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 120; Comm. v. Bacon, 13 Bush. 214.) A party is protected in the enjoyment of all property, whether real or personal (Ervine's Appeal, 16 P. St. 256), including the right to the use of a patented machine. (Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 533.) The legislature has no power to take property from one individual and give it to another. (Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54. It is intended that courts shall enforce this provision even against persons assuming to act under the authority of the government. (United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196.)

Due process of law means such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law permit and sanction. (Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 18 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 119; Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402.) It simply requires that a person should be brought into court and have an opportunity to prove any fact for his protection. (People v. Essex Co., 70 N. Y. 229. It means law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice (Barker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 480; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129; State v. Becht, 43 Minn. 413), a timely and regular proceeding to judgment and execution. (Dwight v. Williams, 4 McLean, 586.) It generally implies and includes parties, judge, regular alegations, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings (Murray v. Hoboken etc. Co., 18 How. 272; Huber v. Reilly, 53 Pa. St. 112; Reese v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 122; Westervelt v. Greg, 12 N. Y. 202); a legal proceed ng under direction of a court (Newcon.b v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71); intending to secure the right of trial according to the torms of law (Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113); the law of the land (Matt v. Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 331; Murray v. Hoboken etc. Co. 18 How. 272; James v. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 251); a present existing rule and not an ex post facto law (Ho Ke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15; Taylor v. orter, 4 Hill, 117; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 33; Norman v. Ileist, 5 Watts & S. 171; Murray v.

Hoboken etc. Co., 18 How. 272); a law existing at the time of the vesting of rights (Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Feters, 628; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 662; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146). That it means a trial according to some settled course of procedure is not universally true. (Green v. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311; Murray v. Hoboken, etc. Co., 18 How. 272; H ke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Van Zandt v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 2650; State Bank v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59). It does not necessarily import a jury trial (Ex parte Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 317), but includes summary remedies. (Martinv. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Ex parte Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 317; Murray v. Hoboken etc. Co., 18 How. 272.) Civil proceedings for contempt are not included. (State v. Becht, 23 Minn. 411.) A statute making the property owner liable for damages resulting from the illegal use of property by a tenant is valid. (Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 18 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 124; Dobbins v. U. S., 96 U. S. 395.) An assessment for grading and improving streets is not a taking of property without compensation, or without due process of law. (Griffin v. Mayor, N. Y. 419.) Private property may be taken by a commander in war in case of exigency, but the case must be urgent. (Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115; and see Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; Clarke v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564.) Provisions for searches and seizures to aid in the collection of the revenue are not repugnant to this amendment. (Matt. of Platt, 7 Ben. 261; 19 Int. Rev. Rec. 132; Murray v. Hoboken etc. Co., 18 How. 277; Ames v. Port Huron etc. Co., 11 Mich. 139.) So processes for seizure and assessment are within the discretion of the legislature (Pullan v. Kinsinger, 2 Abb. U. S. 94; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97), but Congress has no power to provid for the absolute forfeiture of land as a penalty for the noupayment of taxes without any process. (Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 100). A confiscation act does not authorize seizure and confiscation without due process of law. (Hodgson v. Milward, 3 Grant, 406.) Congress has no power to organize a board of revision to nullify confirmed titles. (Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160.) A trial before a board of election officers is not due process of law. (Huber

v. Rielly, 53 Pa. St. 112.) By "without due process of law" is meant all the guarantees set forth in the sixth amendment. (James v. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 251; Jones v. Montes, 15 Tex. 353.) A statute which provides for a trial and notice thereof, and for giving a hearing, for deliberation and judgment, and for an appeal, is not in violation of the United States Constitution. (Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294.) Proceedings, whether ex parte or adversary, which result in depriving a person of his private property, are not wanting in "due process of law," if such person has consented thereto in advance of the proceedings. Murdock v. Cincinnati (Ohio), 39 Fed. Rep. 891; 25 Ohio L. J. 26.

Eminent domain.-The power of the government respecting public improvements is a sovereign power, resting in the discretion of Congress. (Avery v. Fox, 1 Abb. U. S. 246; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427.) Under the police power, persons and property are subject to all kinds of restrictions and burdens to secure general comfort, health and prosperity. (Thorne v. Rutland & R. R. B. (o., 27 Vt. 140; Saughter House Cases, 13 Wall. 35; Munn v. Illinois, 91 U. S. 123; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 13 Am. Law. Reg. 121.) This power of eminent domain is not impaired by the Constitution. (Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Br. Co., 2 Port. 296: West Riv. Br. Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 533.) The terms in the Constitution are declaratory and not restrictive. (Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31.) Where there is an apparent public interest to be subserved, the legislature, or person or body it may designate, is the proper judge of the necessity. (Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71.) Governments more frequently effect these objects through the aid of corporations than by their immediate agents. (Ches. & O. Com. Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. (.599; Balt. & O. R. R. Co. v. Van Ness, 4 Cranch C. C. 593; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427.) Private property embraces all private property (Murray v. Hoboken etc. Co., 18 How. 272; U. S. v. Harding, 1 Wall. Jr. 127), including franchises. (West. Riv. Br. Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 658; Charles Riv. Br. v. Warren Br., 11 Peters, 645; Bonaparte v. Camden etc. R. R. Co., Bald. 205; Enfield Br. Co. v. Hartford etc. R.

R. Co., 17 Conn. 40; Lexington & O. R. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 239; Tuckahoe Co. v. Railroad Co., 11 Leigh, 42; Piscataqua etc. Br. v. N. H. Br., 7 N. H. 35; Barber v. Andover, 8 N. H. 338; Pierce v. Somersworth, 10 N. H. 370; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 20; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 146; Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Br. Co., 2 Port. 295; Boston W. P. Co. v. Boston etc. R. R. Corp., 41 Mass. 360; L. etc. R. R. Co. v. Chappell, 1 Rice, 383; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; West. Riv. Br. Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446; Bloodgood v. M. etc. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 14.) Any injury to the property is a taking within the meaning of this provision (Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 180; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 613; Walker v. Shepardson, 4 Wis. 511; Goodall v. Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 33; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Fisher v. Horicon Iron Co., 10 Wis. 353; Newell v. Smith, 15 Wis. 104; but see Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 248), as an interruption to the use of property. (Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 144.) Where the law strips property of its attribute the owner is within this provision. (Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378.) This provision refers only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. (Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.) The power to take private property is limited to purposes for public uses. (U. S. v. Chicago, 7 How. 195; U. S. v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76.) It is not a limitation on the taxing power, but on the power of eminent domain. (Gilmer v. Shellenberger, 2 Black, 510) Public use means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. (Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Heyneman v. Blake, 19 Cal. 579; see People v. Kerr, 3 Barb. 357.) The legislature cannot take private property for purely private uses (Consol. Chan. Co. v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 269; Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71; but see Ex parte Barnard, 4 Crauch C. C. 294); so a tax law in aid of a private enterprise and business is void. (Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 177; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 18 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 116; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; Weismer v. Vill. of Douglass, 64 N. Y. 92.) A railroad company cannot condemn a site for the erection of manufactories of railroad

cars (Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484); but a statute authorizing the taking of private property for mill-sites and dams is valid. (Newcomb v. Smith, I Chand. 71.) Extriordinary and unforeseen occasions arise in cases of impending danger when private property may be appropriated to the public use, but the emergency must be extreme and imperative. (U. S. v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623; Taylor v. Railroad Co., 6 Cold. 646); as in case of military necessity (Clark v. Mitche 1, 61 Mo. 564); or in case of a conflagration (Bishop v. City of Macon, 7 Ga. 200). If movab.e proper y is taken in good faith by a military commander, the title ve ts in government, although it was subsequently discovered not to have been actually necessary (Taylor v. R. R. Co., 6 Cold. 646; Williams v. Wickerman, 44 Mo. 484); the courts cannot interfere with such acts. (Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71.) Every attempt of a public officer to take private property for public use, unless justified by some pressing necessity, is a simple trespass, for which the government is not responsible. (Pitcher v. U. S., 1 Nott. & H. 7.) The power to appropria e land or other property within the State for its own use belongs exclusively to the Federal government, and can in no wise be affectel by the State legislature. (Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367; Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471; Darlington v. U. S., 33 Leg. Int. 4 9; but see Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356.) Courts may determine a use is a public use, but not the extent to which property may be taken. (St. Louis Co. Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175.)

Compensation on condemnation.-The Constitution does not recognize any necessity as authority for taking property for public use without compensation (Norr s v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385; Corbin v. Marsh, 2 Duval, 193), even on the rightful taking of property for public use or destruction by a military officer (Grant v. U. S., 1 Ct. of Cl. 41; 2 Ct. of Cl. 551; Wiggins v. U. S., 3 Ct. of Cl. 412), but the power to confiscate the property of public enemies is not affected by the restriction of this amend ment. (Miller v. U. S., 11 Wall. 268.) Private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensat on. (Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet r3, 253; Back r v. State, 7