(Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 35; Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash. C. C. 455.) Whatever may be the extent of the jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a suit, in respect to jurisdiction over persons and property it can only be exercised within the limits of the judicial district. (Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters, 300; Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 35.) The circuit court has jurisdiction only over the inhabitants of the district, or persons found therein, and served with process. (Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch, 424; Anderson v. Shaffer, 10 Fed. Rep. 266.) So where a cit.zen of New Hampshire and a citizen of Georgia sued a citizen of Massachusetts in New York, where he was arrested, the court had no jurisdiction (Moffatt v. Soley, 2 Paine, 103); but where there are two districts in a State, a citizen of such State is liable to suit in either district, if served with process. (McMicken v. Webb, 11 Peters, 25; Vore v. Fowler, 2 Bond, 294; Locomotive Co. v. Erie Ry. Co., 10 Batchf. 232.

Local actions.-Suits which concern realty cannot be maintained, unless the land lies within the district (North Ind. R. R. Co. v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 15 How. 233; Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 2 3; Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 35; Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash. C. C. 456); as a bill to ab te a nuisance (Mississippi and Mo. R. R. C、. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485); or to grant relief for an injury threatened to real estate (Northern Ind. R. R. Co. v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 15 How. 233); nor to decree a sale of Jands in another State by a master acting under its author ty (Boyce v. Grundy, 9 Peters, 275; Watts v. Waddle, 1 McLean, 200; see Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, 11); but it may pass a decres enforcing a lien and require its payment, though the land is in another State. (Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. 1; King v. T. D. & C. R. R. Co., 7 Pa. L. J. 166.) So it has jurisdiction, when the person may be found in the district, in case of fraud, trust, or contract (Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Briggs v. French, 1 Sum. 504); or when parties, citizens of different States, own land on the opposite side of a dividing line stream (Rundle v. Delaware & R. Can. Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 275; Stillman v. White Rock Manuf. Co., 3 Wood. & M. 53S); or if a mill-site is injured by the diversion of water in another State. (Foote v. Edwards, 3 Blatchf. 310.)

Change of residence before suit.-Mere residence is prima facie evidence of a change of domicile (Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101); but an intention to remove permanently to another State is never presumed. (Reed v. Bertrand, 4 Wash. C. C. 514.) It must be proved by acts and not from declarations. (Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163.) The exercise of the right of suffrage after change is proof, but citizenship may be proved by acts, although all rights of a citizen are not shown to have been claimed or exercised. (Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163.) If the removal is real a citizen may remove to be able to sue in the circuit court (Catlett v. Pac. Ins. Co., 1 Paine, 594; Briggs v. French, 2 Sum. 251; Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. 546; C stor v. Mitchel, 4 Wash. C. C. 191); but the removal must be bona fide animo manendi, and not merely ostensible, temporary, or colorable (Jones v. League, 18 How. 76; Case v. Clark, 5 Mason, 70; Rice v. Houston, 13 Wall. 66; Gardner v. Sharp, 4 Wash. C. C. 609; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Read v. Bertrand, 4 Wash. C. C. 514; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163); so of an administrator. (Rice v. Houston, 13 Wall. 66.)

Change after suit.-Jurisdiction depends on the state of things at the bringing of the action. and subsequent events cannot oust it. (Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat, 537; Dann v. Clarke, 8 Peters, 1.) So it cannot be divested by a change of residence of either party (Morgon v. Morgan, 2 Wheat, 290; Connolly v. Taylor, 2 Peters, 556); and so where the action survives on the death of a party, and his administrator continues the suit (Clarke v. Matthewson, 12 Peters, 164; Whyte v. Gibbs, 20 How. 511; Trigg v. Conway, Hemp. 711; Hatfield v. Bushnell, 1 Blatchf. 333); or in proceedings to enforce a judgment (Hatch v. Dorr, 4 McLean, 112); or judgment may be revived by scire facias. (Penn v. Klyne, Peters C. C. 446.)

§ 88. Suits by assignees.-Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any suit, except upon fo.eign bills of exchange, to re

cover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder, if such instrument be payable to bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made. (Act of March 3, 1875, 18 U. S. Stats. 470, as amended by Act of March 3, 1887, 24 U. S. Stats. 552, and re-enacted to correct enrollment Aug. 13, 1888, 25 U. S. Stats. 433.)

Suits by assignee of choses in action.-Since the act of 1875 the assignee of a chose in action may sue in the Federal court. (Van Bokkelin v. Cook, 5 Sawy. 587.) Where a party claims through an assignment, he must affirmatively show that the action might have been sustained by the assignor. (Turner v. Bank, 4 Dall. 8; Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537; Bank of U. S. v. Moss, 6 How. 31; Bradley v. Rhines, 8 Wall. 393.) Choses in action include all debts and all claims for damages for breach of contract (Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387); all contracts, promises, and covenants for the delivery of the chattels or moneys (Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441); open accounts or unliquidated accounts, as well as promissory notes (Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch, 332; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 2 Curt. 582), and all torts, when connected with contracts (Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387); but not torts arising from a breach of some duty to which the law attaches damages (Barney v. Globe Bank, 5 Blatchf. 107); nor does the term apply to an action by an assignee to recover the possession of the chose in action or damages for its wrongful detention (Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. 622); as an action of replevin to recover a bank bill (Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. 622); nor does the term "assignee" in the proviso in this section include executors and administrators (Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch, 306; Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheat. 642; Meyer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. 349); but an assignment by operation of law, as to an assignee in insol

FED. PROC.-25.

vency proceedings, is within the proviso (Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch, 332); or of a receiver in such proceedings. (Bradford v. Jenks, 2 McLean, 130.) The phrase "promissory notes negotiable by the law-merchant" contemplates notes in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, subject to no equities in favor of the maker. (Gregg v. Weston, 7 Biss. 360.) All cases not specially within the exception in this section are within the general operation of the act (Briggs v. French, 2 Sum. 251); for if the assignor could maintain the action at the time the suit was commenced, the assignee may sue. (Chamberlain v. Eckert, 2 Biss. 126; but see Thaxter v. Hatch, 6 McLean, 68.) The assignee of an appearance bail may sue; although the marshal and defendants are citizens of the same State. (Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer, 4 Wash. C. C. 482.) The holder of a foreign bill of exchange may sue in the circuit court (Buckner v. Finley, 2 Peters, 586); or of a bank bill (Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308); or he may sue a stockholder, although the note is payable to bearer. (Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 243.) The holder of a note may sue thereon in the Federal courts, although the nominal payee could not (Bank v. Wistar, 2 Peters, 318; Smith v. Clapp, 15 Peters, 125; Bonnaffee v. Williams, 3 How. 574; Halstead v. Lyon, 2 McLean, 226; Sackett v. Davis, 3 McLean, 101; Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 243; Towne v. Smith, 1 Wood. & M. 115.) As to holder of an accommodation note, see Noell v. Mitchell, 4 Biss. 346; of a non-negotiable note, see Shuford v. Cain, 1 Abb. U. S. 302; or although the payee indorsed it (Varner v. West, 1 Woods, 493); and so where maker and payee were citizens of different States (White v. Leary, 3 Dill. 378; Kirkham v. Hamilton, 6 Peters, 20); but if both maker and payee are citizens of the same State, an indorsee cannot sue in the Federal courts (Keary v. Bank, 16 Peters, 99; Gibson v. Chew, 16 Peters, 315; Dromgoole v. Bank, 2 How. 241; Coffee v. Planters' Bank, 13 How. 183; Willes v. Newberry, 4 McLean, 226; Shuford v. Cain, 1 Abb. U. S. 302; Small v. King, 5 McLean, 147); nor can he sue a remote indorser if the intermediate indorser could not (Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537); but if the indorsee and the immediate indorser are citizens of different States, he may sue in the

circuit court (Young v. Bryan, 6 Wheat. 146; Evans v. Gee, 11 Peters, 80; Coffee v. Planters' Bank, 13 How. 183; Campbell v. Jordan, Hemp. 534; Dennison v. Larned, 6 McLean, 496; Codwise v. Gleason, 3 Day, 3), although the intermediate indorser could not. (Wilson v. Fisher, Bald. 133; Milledollar v. Bell, 2 Wall. Jr. 334.) If the first and second indorsers agree to share the loss, the former may sue on the agreement, although the latter and the payee are citizens of the same State. (Phillips v. Preston, 5 How. 278.) If a note does not, under the laws of the State, possess the qualities of a negotiable instrument, the assignee cannot sue. (Gregg v. Weston, 7 Biss. 360.) The assignee of a note and mortgage, if of the requisite citizenship, may file a bill to foreclose in the circuit court (Seckel v. Backhaus, 7 Biss. 354); but if they are assigned by delivery, he cannot maintain the action if the assignor and mortgagor are citizens of the same State (Mersman v. Werges, 3 Fed. Rep. 378; 1 McCrary, 528; reversed 112 U. S. 139); so of the assignee of a bond and mortgage. (Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441; Hill v. Winne, 1 Biss. 275; contra, Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McLean, 204.) The assignee of a municipal bond, if negotiable, may sue in the circuit court (Porter v. Janesville, 3 Fed. Rep. 617; Halsey v. Township, 3 Fed. Rep. 364); or of a negotiable bond, although the obligor and the person to whom it was issued were citizens of the same State. (White v. Vermont & M. R. R. Co., 21 How. 575; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Bradley v. Williams, 3 Hughes, 26.) A coupon payable to bearer is negotiable by the law merchant (Pettit v. Hope, 18 Blatchf. 180), and the holder may sue in the Federal courts (Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327; McCoy v. Washington, 3 Phila. 290; Pettit v. Hope, 2 Fed. Rep. 623); although the party from whom he received it could not maintain the action. (Cooper v. Thompson, 13 Blatchf. 434; see Clark v. Janesville, 1 Biss. 98.) An equitable assignee of a claim to an account cannot sue if his assignor could not. (Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 2 Curt. 582.) A suit to compel a specific performance or to enforce its stipulations was not, under this section, maintainable by an assignee. (Corbin v. Black Hawk Co., 105 U. S. 659; Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. 622; Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Sere v. Pitot, 6