Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297.) If the right of property in the subject-matter is given or created by an act of Congress, it is within the judicial power of the United States (Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323); but State courts may entertain jurisdiction of cases arising under the laws of the United States upon principles of comity, which authorize the courts of every civilized State to administer law and justice to suitors. (Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1. 3 Serg. & R. 169; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34.) Congress may give the circuit courts original jurisdiction in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction attaches. (U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 821; Jones v. Seward, 41 Barb. 272.)

As to persons.-The judicial power extends to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, embracing civil suits, but not to suits against the executive to prevent the enforcement of reconstruction laws. (Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 498; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.) It extends to suits where a State is a party (N. Y. v. Conn., 4 Dall. 1; N. J. v. N. Y., 5 Peters, 290; Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402, 415; Oswald v. N. Y., 2 Dall. 415; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Grayson v. Va., 3 Dall. 320; Mass. v. R. I., 12 Peters, 755; Gov. of G1. v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 122; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 55; Mowrey v. Indiana & C. R. R. Co., 4 Biss. 80), but only when it is a party to the record (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; N. Y. v. Conn., 4 Dall. 3; Fowler v. Lindsay, 3 Dall. 411; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115), and process is served on the chief executive and attorneygeneral of the State (Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402; 3 Dall. 1; Oswald v. New York, 2 Dall. 415; Chisholm v. Ga., 2 Dall. 419; N. J. v. N. Y., 5 Peters, 284; Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320; Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. 96); or when the governor is sued in his official capacity. (Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. 97; Gov. of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 110.) It extends to controversies between two or more States (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McLean, 204), including suits to settle disputed boundaries (R. I. v. Mass., 12 Peters,

657; Ala. v. Ga., 23 How. 510; Brainard v. Williams, 4 McLean, 122), and it only applies to States that are members of the Union, and to public bodies owing obedience and conformity to its Constitution and laws (Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 377), Indian nations not being deemed States. (Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 5 Peters, 16.) It extends to controversies between a State and citizens of other States, but this does not include a suit by the citizens against the State. (Cohens v. Va., 6 Wheat. 406; see post, 11th Amend. note.) It extends to controversies between citizens of different States (Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286; but see Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57); the situation of the parties, and not their characters, determines the jurisdiction. (Connolly v. Taylor, 2 Peters, 556.) Citizenship, as to jurisdiction, means only residence (Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Peters, 761; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Lessee of Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. 546; Lessee of Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101), and for this purpose a corporation is deemed a citizen of the State which charters it. (Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57; U. S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 410; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497; Cumberland etc. Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Peters, 60; Marshall v. Bait. etc. R. R. Co. 16 How. 314; Wheeden v. Camden etc. R. R. Co. 4 Am. Law Rep. 296; Bank of U. S. v. Devaux, 5 Cranch, 61.) This clause does not embrace cases where one of the parties is a citizen of a Territory, or of the District of Columbia. (Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91; Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Peters, 761; Hartshorne v. Wright, Peters C. C. 64; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 376; Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 287; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 737; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 86.) Controversies between citizens claiming lands under grants of different States are within the jurisdiction, notwithstanding one of the States, at the time of the first grant, was a part of the other. (Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292.) It is the grant which passes the legal title and authorizes jurisdiction. (Colson v. Lewis, 2 Wheat. 377.) This clau e gives jurisdiction where foreign states or individual foreigners are parties (Chappedelaine v. Deche

naux, 4 Cranch, 308; Brown v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303), but an Indian tribe is not a foreign nation within this provision. (Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 5 Peters, 1; Worcester v. Ga., 6 Peters, 619.) The controversy, in order to give jurisdiction, must be one in which a citizen of a State and an alien are parties (Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 What. 91; Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Peters, 761; Brown v. Keene, S Peters, 112; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason, 443, 5 Mason, 35; Case r. Clarke, 5 Mason, 70; Wilson v. City Bank, 5 Bank. Reg. 270; Catlett v. Pac. Ins. Co., 1 Paiue, 594; Lessee of Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. 546; Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 164; Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch, 306), or a nominal citizen suing for the use of an alien. (Brown v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303.) So, a foreign corporation is an alien. (Society for Prop. of Gosp. v. N. H., S Wheat. 464; Comml. etc. Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Peters, 60.) The opposing party must be a citizen, and it must so appear on the record. (Jackson v. Twentymen, 2 Peters, 136; Baird v. Byrne, 3 Wall. Jr. 1.) At common law an alien cannot maintain a real action (Jones v. McMasters, 20 How. 20; Lanfear v. Hunley, 4 Wall. 209; McDonogh v. Millandon, 3 How. 693; Semple v. Hager, 4 Wall. 433; Barges v. Hogg, 1 Hayw. 485; Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill, 79; White v. Sabariego, 28 Tex. 246); the disability is personal. (Kemp v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Peters C. C. 40.) This section does not include controversies between people of a State as to the formation or change of their constitution. (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 55; Mass. v. R. I., 12 Peters, 755.) A court may have jurisdiction as to parties and subject-matter, yet if it makes a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by the law of its organization, its decree is void. (United States v. Walker, 109 U. S. 258.)

Suits against States. This provision was held to extend to all pending suits, as well as to future cases (Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 294; Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Da 1. 402; 3 Dall. 1), but applies only to original suits, and not to appeals or writs of error (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264); nor does it extend to suits of admiralty or maritime

jurisdiction. (Olmstead's Case, Fright. N. P. 9; Ex parte Madrazo, Peters, 127.) The amendment is of necessity limited to those suits in which a State is a party to the record (Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Olmstead's Case, Bright. N. P. 9; U. S. v. Bright, Bright N. P. 19; Swasey v. N. C. R. R. Co., 1 Hughes, 1; 71 N. C. 571), or where the chief magistrate is sued in a claim upon him in his official character. (Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 123.) The amendment provides that no suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against a State (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 139; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738), and for those cases only. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.) If the state be not necessarily a defendant, although its interest may be affected, this amendment does not apply. (Fowler v. Liads y, 3 Dall. 411; New York v. Connecticut, 3 Dall. 1; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 139; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 5.50.) A State by becoming interested in a corporation lays down its sovereignty so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. (Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 324; Dayton v. Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 309.) So a suit may be maintained against a corporation, although a State be a member thereof (Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank. 9 Wheat. 904; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 297), or even the sole corporator (Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Peters, 318; 3 Peters, 431.) A mere suggestion of title in the State to property in the possession of an individual will not prevent a Federal court from looking into the validity of the title; and if the court decides that the State has no title, the State cannot resist legal process in the case. (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 735.) Although an independent sovereign cannot be sued (Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738), yet there is nothing in the Constitution to deprive a State court of jurisdiction over suits which it possessed before the Constitution was adopted. (Garr v. Bright, 1 Barb. Ch. 157.)

Admiralty and maritime.-The Constitution confers not only admiralty but all "maritime" jurisdiction, (De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; and see The Seneca, Gilp. 28; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 82; The S. C. Ives, Newb. 205.) "Maritime" was added to guard against a narrow interpretation of the word "admiralty." (Fretz v. Bull, 12 How. 466; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 561; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.) These words refer to the general system of maritime law fami iar to this country when the Constitution was adopted (N. J. S. N. Co. v. Merch. Bank, 6 How. 344; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 83), and regard must be had to our legal history, Constitution legislation, usages, and adjudications. (The St. Lawrence, I Black. 522; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 576.) The grant was not intended to be limited to cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England when the Constitution was adopted. (New Jersey Co. v. Merch. Fank, 6 How. 314; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 411; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; The Seneca, Gilp. 10, 34; The Gold Hanter, Batchf. & H. 300; Steel v. Thatcher, 1 Ware, 91; The Hunt ess, 2 Ware (Dav.) 82; The C. S. Ives, Newb. 205, The Volunteer, I Sum. 551.) The maritime law is a part of the common law. (Thompson v. Tie Catharina, 1 Pet. Adn. 104.) The term belongs to the law of nations as well as to domestic and municipal law. (The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 82.) The jurisdiction is entirely distinct from the power of Congress to regulate commerce. (The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Sarah Jane, 1 Low. 203.) It makes the judicial co-extensive with the legislative power (The Huntress, 2 Ware. (Dav.) 82), an I covers not merely the cognizance of the cae, but the jurisprudence and principles by which it is administered. (The Chusan, 2 Story, 455.) The whole subject belongs exclusively to the general government (The Chusan, 2 Story, 455), and the jurisdiction in the Federal courts is exclusive. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters, 511; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall 555; The Wave, Blatchf. & H 252.) Jurisdiction in admiralty is expressly granted